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Abstract 
 
In our increasingly connected world, maintaining the security of information systems 
is challenging. Today’s interconnected business environment calls for a change in 
how IS security is achieved to include thinking about the entire networks of 
relationships involved in preventing threats rather than just focusing on individual 
organizational security processes. Despite acknowledging the role of distributed and 
heterogeneous actors in achieving a secure environment, there is a lack of knowledge 
of how these actors actually prevent security threats. Moreover, the heterogeneity of 
actors involved gives rise to the issue of incentives needed to align their interests to 
ensure successful collective security efforts. 
 
This PhD thesis addresses these issues by zooming in on security networks, defined 
as collective efforts pursued by distributed actors to develop and adopt prevention 
measures to achieve security, to explain how these networks prevent security threats 
and identify the incentive mechanisms for converging the network’s heterogeneous 
actors. I challenge equilibrium and linearity assumptions identified in the current 
literature and argue for the need to adopt different theoretical and methodological 
approaches to uncover the dynamics in these networks. Through a historical case 
study of credit card fraud and how its prevention measures evolved over the last 55 
years, I develop a process model of prevention encounters in security networks. The 
model depicts the dynamic and interactive nature of the prevention process and 
shows how the three proposed prevention mechanisms, namely, proposing solutions, 
resolving dissonance, and paving the way, interact to achieve prevention. The thesis 
further proposes three new forms of incentive mechanisms (transformative, 
preparatory, and captive) that are crucial for the survival of collective security efforts 
and show how they interact with the three prevention mechanisms. 
 
By this, this research complements the current security networks literature by 
offering a process model that explains how security networks achieve prevention. In 
addition, the interplay between the three incentive mechanisms reveals that 
incentives are not only ready-made structures or one-time event as depicted in the 
current literature but that they should also be seen as a socially dynamic process. 
 x 
Keywords: security networks, IS security, prevention encounters, prevention 
mechanisms, incentive mechanisms, credit card, process model
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“If you are not a data breach victim, you are not paying attention”1 
 
Maintaining the security of information systems (IS) is a critical activity. Security 
threats disrupt the continuity of business operations and negatively affect 
organizations’ reputation and market value (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). Attaining 
security has become more complex given today’s interconnected business 
environment. In such an environment organizations are more susceptible to security 
attacks (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Straub & Welke, 1998) because the origins of 
security threats are manifold (Mookerjee et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2007). As 
organizations seek to fix one loophole another emerges. This makes security attacks 
exceed a single organization’s capability of fighting them (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012; 
Kunreuther & Heal, 2003; Smith et al., 2007).  
 
IS security is thus no longer confined by organizational boundaries but transcends 
them to be dependent on all those operating on the same network (Anderson & 
Moore, 2006; Zhao et al., 2013), where security is expanded to include extra-
organizational settings (Straub et al., 2008; Whittington, 2006) and not only 
organizational ones (See (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013; Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010; Siponen, 2000; Straub, 1990)). Extra-organizational settings refer to 
the wider context that exists outside organizational boundaries where organizations 
get involved in information and resource sharing to better secure their systems. 
 
Therefore, security efforts are envisaged to be rising from heterogeneous and 
distributed actors who come together (converge) and form networks which this 
research will refer to by security networks. Security networks are defined as 
collective efforts pursued by distributed actors to develop and adopt prevention 
measures to achieve security. 
 
 
1 
Larry Ponemon in Pagleiry (2014). Half of the American adults hacked this year. Available from 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/. Accessed 25/3/2015 
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1.1 Motivation for the Study 
 
Security attacks have become pervasive. News stories seldom devoid of any security 
breach incidents. Even organizations with vast resources (e.g.  Sony, Target, Neiman 
Marcus, Adobe) are vulnerable. This indicates that they by themselves cannot face 
the continuous rise in security threats and collective security efforts are needed.  
 
Nonetheless, on the one hand, the security perspective that receives wide attention in 
IS security literature is one that examines security within organizational settings. In 
this perspective, issues like IS security policies, security strategies, risk management, 
employees compliance with security policies become the focus for research. On the 
other hand, security research that acknowledges the distributed and collective nature 
of security focuses on cause-effect relationships. Therefore, little is known about 
how actors in collective security efforts actually collaborate to prevent threats. That 
is, we lack knowledge of the processes by which security networks develop and 
adopt prevention measures to achieve security.  
 
Another critical issue stems from the heterogeneity of actors involved and their 
interests. Since collective effort is needed, it becomes important to understand the 
incentives required to align actors’ interests and motivate them to contribute to 
security networks. While IS security literature that accounts for its distributed nature 
identifies different and valuable incentive schemes used to encourage actors to 
become part in these collective efforts, which range from rewards and subsidies to 
increasing profits and cost savings (Cavusoglu et al., 2008; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; 
Hui et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014), incentives are mainly studied through static 
models (August & Tunca, 2011; Cezar et al., 2014). However, security threats 
(Hunton, 2009) and actors’ interests evolve over time (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005), 
and incentives are expected to change to adjust to such transformations (August & 
Tunca, 2011). A need for a dynamic model that accounts for the changes in security 
efforts and the underlying incentive mechanisms therefore emerges (Cavusoglu et 
al., 2008; Cezar et al., 2014). In addition, the current knowledge in incentives is 
mainly drawn from analytical models based on rational choice. Financial incentives 
are therefore seen to be the primary driver for collective security efforts. Unifying 
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the incentives required under one type nonetheless does not acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of actors and their interests that would make one kind of incentives not 
enough to converge actors in security networks. Moreover, the paucity of empirical 
data drove researchers to call for more empirical studies that can better identify 
incentives in real-life contexts (Arora et al., 2008; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon et 
al., 2003; Kannan & Telang, 2005; Ransbotham et al., 2012) 
 
This research addresses these needs by offering a process model on security 
networks. The model facilitates a deeper understanding of the process by which 
actors converge to prevent security threats and attain security, and show the 
incentive mechanisms in play. This is of great importance because although 
maintaining a secure environment is a shared goal across actors, they do not 
necessarily work towards achieving it. Identifying when and how actors successfully 
converge in security networks promise to offer valuable implications for 
organizations and policymakers when formulating security strategies. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
In the digital age, security threats are on the rise. Innovations in committing criminal 
activities are likely to be one step ahead of those seeking to prevent it. As achieving 
security hinges on heterogeneous actors, this research aims to offer a process model 
on security networks and identify incentive mechanisms needed to maintain the 
collective efforts. It also seeks to shed light on the neglected but important role of 
technology in security networks and uncover the socio-technical interactions in these 
networks.  
Accordingly, the research has the following objectives: 
 Understand the process by which prevention measures are developed and 
adopted over time. 
 Identify actors, their interests, and how the latter are aligned to ensure 
convergence. 
 Identify the role of technology in security networks. 
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In meeting these objectives the research seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
1. What is the process by which security networks achieve prevention? 
 
2. What are the incentive mechanisms for converging heterogeneous actors to 
develop and adopt prevention measures to better secure their systems? 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two provides a review of the literature in 
IS security that embraces the notion of extra-organizational settings and the 
heterogeneity of actors needed to achieve security. Fundamental issues and key 
assumptions are discussed along with how they limit our knowledge about security 
networks and incentive mechanisms. The chapter thus advocates the need for a new 
theoretical perspective to address current limitations. Chapter three presents a 
process perspective on security networks that should address identified limitations. It 
introduces and discusses the concept of prevention encounters that is used to develop 
a process understanding of security networks. The chapter further synthesizes three 
forms of incentives for converging actors in collective security efforts that go beyond 
ones currently identified in the literature. Chapter four details the research methods 
and design, it discusses the historical case study approach adopted as well as data 
collection and analysis processes. Research findings start with a narrative of the case 
study in chapter five. Chapter six is dedicated to case analysis. It presents a process 
model on security networks along with the incentive mechanisms for converging 
actors in collective security efforts. It by this answers the research questions. Chapter 
seven is a discussion of the research findings relating them to the relevant literature. 
Implications for theory and practice, limitations, and opportunities for future 
research are discussed in chapter eight.  
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2 PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY NETWORKS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the current approaches in security networks. It 
first starts by acknowledging the mainstream literature in IS security that focuses on 
security within organizational processes. I show that within the objectives of my 
research this literature offers limited value. Accordingly, I move to discuss in details 
the stream of literature that acknowledges the distributed nature of IS security, its 
underlying assumptions, and explain how these affect our knowledge about security 
networks and incentives in these networks. Given the current focus on variance 
theory the chapter argues for a need for a different theoretical lens to acknowledge 
the dynamic and complex nature of IS security. 
 
2.2 Security within Organizational Settings 
 
Organizations’ defence lines against security threats have evolved over time to keep 
pace with the rapid changing environment. The movement from closed silo systems 
to open interconnected ones was associated with a parallel movement in prevention 
measures from a mere focus on technical controls to admitting the importance of the 
social aspect in protecting organizations against security threats. 
 
Security within organizational settings focuses on creating a secure environment 
through developing security policies (Goel & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Png & Wang, 
2009), and ensuring employees compliance with them through security awareness, 
training and education programs (Boss et al., 2015; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et 
al., 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Of importance in this stream as well is 
investing in IS security. Spending on information security needs to be justified and 
therefore research on risk assessment (Salmela, 2008; Sun et al., 2006) and the value 
of prevention measures (Cavusoglu et al., 2005; Cavusoglu et al., 2009; Kumar et 
al., 2008) becomes crucial.  
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This perspective provides valuable knowledge on how organizations can build 
stronger security. Nonetheless, the interconnected business environment makes 
security not only a matter of organizational processes. Organizations might have a 
strong security system but become vulnerable to security attacks because of a 
deficiency in one of their partners’ system. An example is the infamous Target 
security breach that compromised nearly 40 million credit and debit cards. The 
breach was not caused by low security measures from Target’s side but rather 
insufficient security procedures in one of its contractors. Accordingly, achieving 
security requires collaboration between different actors that reside outside 
organizational boundaries. As the central concern in this stream of security literature 
is organizational processes, it is not surprising to find that it offers limited insights 
on such collective security efforts, which is the main focus of this research. 
Therefore, I will move next to discuss in more details the literature on IS security 
that acknowledges its distributed nature.  
 
2.3 Current Approaches on Security Networks  
 
The outstanding innovations in digital technologies are fiercely challenging any left 
organizational boundaries. Information can now be accessed via multiple paths, 
adding to an already complex task of protecting information asset. Organizations are 
realizing that security is distributed across actors outside their boundaries, and so 
there is a need to collaborate with others to be better protected against security 
threats (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012). 
 
Preventing security threats and maintaining a secure environment therefore are 
perceived as a result of distributed agency that cuts across organizations and 
industries. Collective security efforts are evident in the emergence of various 
security networks that aim to harness the efforts of heterogeneous actors to build a 
secure environment. Such networks include; information sharing and analysis 
alliances, such as Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 
vulnerability disclosure networks, as Computer Emergency Response Team and 
iDefense, and IS security outsourcing. 
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In what follows, I provide an overview of how collective security efforts are 
currently theorized, mainly around streams of IS security outsourcing, information 
sharing alliances, and vulnerability disclosure networks, and how their underlying 
assumptions influence our understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
2.3.1 IS Security Outsourcing 
 
This form of collective security efforts is manifested in outsourcing relationships 
between organizations and their managed security service providers (MSSPs). The 
constant growth in MSSP market which ranges between 18%-21% annually (Ferrara 
et al., 2013) indicates consensus on the value of delegating security functions to 
other actors.  
 
Security is a challenging and costly task. The increasing complexity in security 
requirements in terms of compliance to security standards and government 
regulations, and the dynamic IT environment with the multiplicity of software 
applications and operating systems put more pressure on resources needed to achieve 
security organizations may not necessarily afford (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012). 
Outsourcing security functions hence become an attractive move (Lee et al., 2013). 
MSSPs offer valuable expertise and resources needed to confront new waves of 
security threats as well as the bewildering number of technological solutions. Their 
security solutions are various and include network monitoring, intrusion protection, 
managed firewall services, and vulnerability scanning. Coordinating security 
responsibilities between the organization and its MSSP is crucial for the success of 
the collective efforts (Lee et al., 2013). Unfortunately, outsourcing relationships 
suffer from principle-agent problem because it is hard to verify the efforts of each 
actor. Ensuring collective efforts gets even more challenging when going beyond this 
bilateral relationship to consider the impact MSSP’s multiple clients have on overall 
security. MSSP clients share the same security infrastructure, this indicates the larger 
the MSSP client base, the higher the security risk since a security breach in one 
client’s system can spill over to the others as well, affecting outsourcing decisions 
(Hui et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2013). Nevertheless, having multiple clients build to 
MSSP’s expertise and help in preventing security attacks through knowledge 
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accumulation and distribution (Lee et al., 2013). MSSP learns from security threats 
occurring in one client and utilizes this knowledge to better protect all other clients. 
 
Since security is distributed across organizations and MSSPs, designing effective 
service level agreements is critical to prevent security attacks and maintain collective 
efforts. Cezar et al. (2014) show outsourcing contracts that adopt a dual strategy of 
rewarding MSSP when revealing a breach and imposing penalties if it was 
responsible for it ensures maximum benefits from security outsourcing. While these 
researchers focused on bilateral contracts, Lee et al. (2013) recognize organizations’ 
security responsibility as well as MSSPs’ and propose a new multilateral contract 
that organizes the payment structure to include all MSSP’s clients not only the one 
that suffers from a security breach. Their new contract design acknowledges the 
negative or positive effect one organization’s security efforts can have on other 
organizations in the networks and seek to restructure refunds or penalties 
accordingly. 
 
2.3.2 Information Sharing Alliances 
 
Another manifestation of security networks is information sharing alliances. 
Information sharing alliances were established upon the U.S. federal government’s 
initiatives to help secure the private sector’s critical infrastructure against the 
constant and severe threats of cybercrime (Gordon et al., 2003). Sharing security 
information such as, breaches, detection and prevention methods is presumed to 
encourage a proactive approach towards security since it can prevent other 
organizations from falling into the same attack (Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007) 
as well as deter future attacks as sharing will increase attacker’s risk of being caught 
(Schechter & Smith, 2003). Collaborative behaviour in sharing alliances is also 
enhanced because of interdependent security (Kunreuther & Heal, 2003) among 
organizations. In this context, organizations realize that security threats in any of 
them can easily transcend to the rest. Therefore, collaboration and contributing to 
information sharing will leave each organization in a better position (Hausken, 
2007). 
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Members in sharing alliances shape one another especially with regards to decisions 
about security investments and level of sharing. The relationship between those two 
can either have a complementary or a substitute effect. Complementary effect of 
sharing rises in highly competitive environment. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) show that 
an organization decision to increase its information sharing or security investment 
will cause its competitors to adopt similar decisions in an attempt to protect their 
market share. Substitute effect of sharing benefits organizations, especially those 
with limited resources, as sharing compensates for part of investments needed in 
security solutions (Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007). However, due to free-riding 
behaviour, decentralization of information security decisions engenders insufficient 
investments in prevention measures with each organization relying on investments 
made by others (Gordon et al., 2003). If organizations can gain knowledge of 
security threats, how to detect them and what prevention measure is best to adopt 
with relatively no costs, they will lack incentives to invest in new and innovative 
methods. 
 
Free-riding behaviour is a common problem in information sharing alliances, and if 
it proliferates the collective efforts will dissolve. Several organizations involved in 
security breaches incidents that hit the news (ex. Heartland Payment Systems, TJX, 
JP Morgan Chase, HSBC) were actually members in Financial Services Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center. The lack of incentives for members to cooperate and 
share their security information and act opportunistically instead is seen the cause for 
information sharing alliances ineffectiveness (Liu et al., 2014). Given its importance 
in maintaining the collective efforts, scholars call for researches that examine 
strategies for diminishing free-riding behaviour and increasing information sharing 
(Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014). 
 
2.3.3 Vulnerability Disclosure Networks 
 
Many security breaches are caused by software vulnerabilities (Cavusoglu et al., 
2007). In vulnerability disclosure networks ensuring information security is 
distributed across actors involved in the vulnerability disclosure process. Those 
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range from originators who discover the vulnerability to technology vendors who 
have to patch the software flaws. 
 
Multiple mechanisms exist for disclosing vulnerabilities with each having a different 
impact on affected actors. In full vendor disclosure, the vulnerability is only reported 
to vendors who then develop a patch to correct the flaw. Since the vulnerability is 
exclusively disseminated to vendors, the latter retained the full control over fixing it 
and lacked incentives for a prompt response. Therefore, vulnerabilities were not 
patched or patched after long delays (Cavusoglu et al., 2007). Vendors’ passive 
engagement increased risks of security breaches and another mechanism for 
disclosing vulnerabilities that ensure their commitment was developed. In immediate 
public disclosure, the public becomes aware of the vulnerability as soon as it is 
discovered. This disclosure mechanism aims to exert more pressure on vendors to 
release a patch while at the same time giving software users the opportunity to take 
provisional corrective actions till the patch is released. This mechanism nevertheless 
has its own caveat. Instantly disclosing the vulnerability to the public enlightens 
hackers who can promptly exploit the vulnerability causing more damage. It can also 
hurt vendors who are genuinely committed to security by not giving them sufficient 
time to correct the flaw. Hybrid disclosure emerged to align actors’ interests by 
giving vendors a grace period for releasing a patch after which the vulnerability is 
disclosed to the public. A recent disclosure mechanism is pre-notifications 
disclosure where a third party (infomediary) provides financial rewards to 
discoverers for vulnerabilities reported to it. The infomediary then disseminates this 
information to its clients who use it to adopt precautionary measures until a patch is 
released. This mechanism is presumed to deter hackers from finding and exploiting 
vulnerabilities (Kannan & Telang, 2005; Ransbotham et al., 2012). 
 
The multiplicity of actors involved, the diversity of their interests, and the presence 
of multiple disclosure mechanisms make vulnerability disclosure a complex process. 
It is in organizations’ interest, for instance, to receive vulnerability information as 
soon as it is discovered in order to take prompt intermediate corrective actions till a 
patch is released. This nonetheless can have negative consequences on organizations 
that have not yet developed an intermediary solution, and on vendors who become 
less incentivized because vulnerability information already went public and 
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organizations are temporarily protected, therefore they stall patch development 
process (Arora et al., 2008; Cavusoglu et al., 2007). Such complexities and 
entanglements in relationships make the locus of action shifts during vulnerability 
disclosure process from one actor to another, and so actors collectively contribute to 
securing their network. These actions shape subsequent actions; the grace period 
determined by coordinators for example or the presence of infomediaries influence 
vendor’s patch release time, which can further influence other vendors’ patch release 
decisions (Kannan & Telang, 2005; Li & Rao, 2007). Determining the conditions 
under which each mechanism is the best course of action plays a significant role in 
achieving security and motivating actors’ engagement in security efforts.  
 
2.4 Assumptions in Current Approaches 
 
In their investigation of the relationships among actors to understand how their 
decisions affect security and obtain knowledge on best strategies to follow, 
researchers depend mostly on game theory and rational choice models, where actors’ 
relationships are examined through predefined set of variables (Mohr, 1982), such as 
the relationship between information sharing and security investments (Gal-Or & 
Ghose, 2005; Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007; Zhao et al., 2013), and 
vulnerability disclosure and speed of releasing patches (Arora et al., 2010; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Ransbotham et al., 2012). Explanation is thus based on 
variance theories and discovering associations between variables. In here, actors are 
perceived to react to specific exogenous factors (e.g. vulnerability disclosure time, 
outsourcing contract design), which are then used to determine the best approach that 
results in the desired action and derive incentives consequently. For example, 
software vendors’ reaction to different vulnerability disclosure mechanisms, whether 
it is immediately after discovery, after a determined period of time, or no public 
disclosure at all, is explored to determine which mechanism yield better security 
outcome. The current security networks literature therefore focuses on investigating 
causal effects rather than identifying causal processes behind explored associations. 
Since the aim of such variable-oriented research is to discover general laws that 
would allow generalization, certain assumptions follow (Abbott, 2001; Mohr, 1982). 
Little or no attention is given to the process aspect of security networks. That is, we 
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lack a thorough understanding of events unfolding and interactions between actors in 
security networks. This is of paramount importance because security in a networked 
environment is interdependent and reliant on every actor’s actions (Kunreuther & 
Heal, 2003). This interdependence makes security networks a complex phenomenon 
where explanation requires observing processes occurring over time rather than 
focusing on variables and their effects (Brady et al., 2010).  
 
In addition, the emphasis on causal effects tends to shy away from acknowledging 
the role of context in explaining collective security efforts. That is, it is not clear 
when actors actually converge to prevent security threats. In the current literature, it 
is recognized that actors converge to reach equilibrium, however the broader context 
of why actors are not in equilibrium from the start, and therefore why they need to 
combine their efforts is unknown. Exogenous shocks are the main cause for 
disequilibrium but what are these shocks, what causes them and how they disrupt the 
equilibrium remains unclear. Therefore, the contextual conditions behind the 
formation of and interactions in security networks receive scant attention. This can 
be due to the way security networks are theorized. The presence of these networks 
along with their constituent actors is already assumed. In vulnerability disclosure 
networks, for example, the discoverer, the coordinator, the organization, and the 
software vendor comprise the network before the research begins, so what becomes 
of interest is not to explain how and why these actors come together but rather to 
identify the best mechanism for disclosing the vulnerability in a way that maximizes 
security. Context is crucial for explanatory research not only because it can give new 
insights into the formation and the prevention processes of security networks but 
also because it helps in drawing boundaries for the proposed theoretical explanation 
and facilitates transposing the theory to other situations.  
 
Assuming a univocal meaning of variables and that time, context and other variables 
have no impact on meaning is a common assumption in research focusing on causal 
effects (Abbott, 2001; Maxwell, 2004). The current security networks literature thus 
does not give a role to actors’ beliefs and perceptions in collective security efforts or 
how meanings shape such collective efforts. For example, we do not know how 
outsourcing contracts or software patches are interpreted by the interacting parties 
and the role these interpretations have on outsourcing decisions and patch release 
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and installation time. The social aspect of IS security is well-recognized (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001) and prevention technologies can have multiple interpretations 
(Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Translating these interpretations into variables is 
difficult (Maxwell, 2004) and understanding their implications on security networks’ 
prevention processes requires moving beyond examining associations between 
variables to delving more in depth to uncover the causal chain of events occurring 
while achieving security. This would require a change in the theoretical and 
methodological approaches used to investigate the phenomenon (Meyer et al., 2005). 
 
2.5 Incentives in Current Security Networks Literature 
 
The current literature on security networks stresses that if collective security efforts 
are to survive, it is the incentives that bring actors together that have to be ensured. 
Incentives intervene with actors’ behaviour and drive it towards the required output 
(Gneezy et al., 2011), their main goal is thus to influence behaviour. They are 
extrinsic in nature and act as an exogenous stimulus to alter actors’ future actions 
and mobilize movements around the desired act. 
 
The current literature on security networks identifies different incentives that 
motivate actors to contribute to collective efforts towards security. Cost savings is a 
dominant incentive in security networks. Security is expensive; the complexity of 
technological solutions, the need for professional security staff, along with external 
pressure to meet certain security requirements (such as Payment Card Industry 
Standards), make security exceed allocated budget (Hui et al., 2012). To alleviate 
part of these high costs, organizations participate in security networks. Cost savings 
can be attained directly through passing security functions to specialized service 
providers who offer security services to large customer base, allowing organizations 
to achieve security at less cost due to provider’s economies of scale (Cezar et al., 
2010; Schechter & Smith, 2003). Or indirectly by receiving information that makes 
an organization’s security investment more targeted (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). For 
instance, information regarding a particular vulnerability in software X (e.g. firewall, 
intrusion detection system) may cause an organization to reconsider its security 
investment and shift to another more secure product, eliminating by this unnecessary 
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costs. Having access to security breach incidents enables the application of quick 
prevention measures that protect organizations from falling into the same security 
trap and costs associated with that. Organizations are increasingly looking at security 
networks as a way to substitute high investments in security and reduce overall costs 
(Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007). 
 
Increasing market demand is another incentive for participating in security networks. 
Operating in today’s competitive business environment, organizations seek to be 
more alert to actions taken by their competitors and different ways they can maintain 
or increase their market share. Security networks offer such an opportunity. Sharing 
information about security status opens a window for organizations to increase their 
sales due to demand spillover (Cezar et al., 2010; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). A 
technical flaw in one company’s product may shift demand to a competitor’s product 
increasing by this its profits. Organizations that believe security networks can 
increase demands on their products are more inclined to get involved in these 
networks. 
 
Organizations security actions have a significant impact on their reputation and 
market value (Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Yayla & Hu, 2011). By participating in 
security networks where organizations collaborate and share best security practices, 
organizations signal their commitment to security, and emphasize their responsibility 
towards their stakeholders (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005), relieving by this customers 
anxiety regarding the security of their personal information and maintaining their 
trust. Also, joining such collective efforts indicates that security threats once 
identified, rapid corrective actions will follow, decreasing the value of the threat and 
making organizations less attractive to attackers (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012; Kannan 
& Telang, 2005; Ransbotham et al., 2012; Schechter & Smith, 2003). Organizations 
thus benefit from the different signals they send when becoming part of security 
networks, which give them incentives not only to join these networks but also to be 
active members as well. For instance, software vendors’ fear of what impact 
discovered vulnerabilities in their products might have on the perceived quality of 
their overall services, gives them more motivation to supply their clients with 
corrective patches in a timely manner (Arora et al., 2010). 
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Liability for security breaches is a recognized approach to drive genuine security 
efforts in security networks (August & Tunca, 2011; Liu et al., 2014), and a reason 
why some organizations decide to join these networks (Zhao et al., 2013). Liability 
policies, which are often incorporated in service level agreements and membership 
rules, put more pressure on members by making the organization that caused a 
certain security breach take full responsibility and swallow associated costs, 
stimulating better security behaviour. At the same time, liability can be seen by some 
as an opportunity to transfer security risks to other actors giving them further 
motivations to participate in security networks. As an example, besides benefits from 
accumulated knowledge and expertise, organizations outsource their security 
functions to move liability burden from themselves to the outsourcer (Rowe, 2007). 
 
The rational self-interested actor is a common assumption in models used in security 
networks literature, where each actor seeks to maximize his or her own utility. This 
can be seen from the type of incentives identified that are inclined towards financial 
gains. Dependence on rational choice models makes it difficult to detect other forms 
of incentives and possible changes in them over time as the theory presumes actors’ 
motives remain stable, and that every actor will behave rationally. It is not surprising 
therefore to find discrepancies between the theory and the observed phenomenon 
(Green & Shapiro, 1994). Moreover, the literature does not recognize that IS security 
has a social aspect as well, and therefore it does not pay attention to the role of 
language and discourse in motivating desired security behaviour. 
Incentives for collective action are not solely driven by utility maximization and 
rational economic actors who seek to pursue their own objectives through means of 
alternatives evaluation and selection. Competing views such as ones that perceive 
actors as part of a political system with conflicting goals can offer different insights 
on incentives for influencing actors’ behaviour (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992) and 
allow better explanation of incentives mechanisms behind collective efforts in 
preventing security threats and achieving security since it will cater for the 
heterogeneity of actors that seems to be neglected in the current research on security 
networks. 
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2.6 Summary  
 
This chapter provided an overview of collective security efforts in IS literature. It 
revealed how our understanding of the three main manifestations of security 
networks; IS security outsourcing, information sharing alliances, and vulnerability 
disclosure networks, is seen through the lens of variance and static models. The 
chapter further illustrated incentives defined in this literature and showed how the 
literature offers a limited view on incentives because they are derived from analytical 
model based on rational choice where incentives also tend to remain static over time. 
In the context of security however, the environment is always in flux. Interests 
change, and innovative security threats continually emerge where new prevention 
measures to thwart those arise subsequently. Within these conditions, there is a need 
to adopt a different approach in investigating the phenomenon that focuses on 
processes and disequilibria rather than variables and equilibria. I move to explain 
this in the next chapter. 
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3 TOWARDS A PROCESS VIEW ON SECURITY NETWORKS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that to acknowledge the dynamic and complex 
nature of IS security and the required incentives we need to adopt a different 
theoretical perspective. A process lens promises more useful insights on security 
networks. In this chapter, I present and discuss concepts that are used to help me 
meet the research objectives and develop the process model. First, I introduce and 
discuss the concept of prevention encounters, which I use to examine security 
networks. I then introduce three new forms of incentives that I have synthesized 
from the literature on collective action. These incentives complement ones currently 
identified in security networks literature. In later chapters, I explain their role in the 
data analysis and how these incentives come into play in the process of developing 
and adopting prevention measures (i.e. how they are incorporated in the process 
model). 
 
3.2 Prevention Encounters in Security Networks 
 
The complexity of security networks requires moving beyond the current focus on 
examining causal effects to identifying causal mechanisms that are better equipped 
to offer a robust explanation of the phenomenon. The interdependent nature of 
security networks brings forth the importance of the reciprocal relationships amongst 
actors and the impact their interactions have on subsequent decisions and the overall 
security of the network. In such a complex situation, it is not enough to provide a 
description of the succession of events to explain how security networks prevent 
threats and achieve security. Rather, complexity calls for an explanation that is based 
on complex causality (Hesketh & Fleetwood, 2006) that surpasses narrating 
preceding events to considering the entire interacting elements of context, 
mechanisms, actors, and structure. To appreciate the complexity of security networks 
and to capture causal mechanisms in collective security efforts, I have departed from 
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the current focus on variance theories and adopted process theory to study security 
networks. Process theory is an appropriate lens for capturing contextual details and 
mechanisms necessary for gaining the ‘how’ of events (Markus & Robey, 1988). 
 
Since security networks are dynamic the question that arises is where one can start 
studying this phenomenon. This is challenging especially as the uncertainty 
surrounding security efforts results in changes in these networks to adapt to new 
forms of threats (Mookerjee et al., 2011). The starting point in the analysis, this 
study argues, is these change opportunities. This is because it is during these periods 
actors’ convergence to achieve better security is best manifested, and incentives for 
collective efforts can be identified. These convergence points are referred to by 
prevention encounters (Newman & Robey, 1992), which denote actions taken by 
heterogeneous actors to develop and adopt prevention measures that shake an 
established pattern. Prevention encounters represent critical events that have a 
significant impact on how security is attained. They are seen as ‘windows of 
opportunity’ (Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994) for rethinking current security practices. By 
this, they challenge an established process (Isabella, 1990), and force actors to re-
evaluate the effectiveness of existing prevention measures and negotiate possible 
future directions (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Reaching agreement or 
equilibrium becomes a continuous process between actors to restore relative stability 
rather than an end state (Tieben, 2012), and one traced by observing how actors 
interact to respond to events that disrupt their status quo. Security networks are 
hence not preconceived but rather emerge throughout these processes. By zooming 
in on the chain of events occurring while preventing a certain threat, prevention 
encounters shift the focus from a static snapshot view to a dynamic moving pictures 
one. 
 
Interruptions in security practices do not come out of thin air; they rather arise from 
certain events that trigger changes in prevention measures. Organizational change 
literature shows that organizations undergo periods of upheavals that restructure their 
environment (Meyer et al., 1990). The causes of such discontinuities vary from 
social pressure to government regulations and technological advancements which 
constitute prevention encounters triggers. Social pressure reflects organizations’ 
moral and social responsibility towards their stakeholders (Culnan & Williams, 
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2009). It relates to discrepancies between an organization’s goals and its actual 
practices that drive attention and contempt for not only the organization but its 
industry as well (Chandler, 2014; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). Social pressure can be 
externally as well as internally driven. It can rise from the public’s outcry about a 
certain issue that consequently encourage the involvement of other actors such as 
regulators. Or it can arise internally from the industry’s members themselves who 
recognizing the negative impact their practices have on their image decide to react 
and take self-examination and corrective actions to restore public’s trust and 
preserve their image (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). As all issues can be seen important 
and calls for a change (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988), the capability of social pressure to 
act as a prevention encounter trigger lies in its ability to threaten the industry’s image 
and status in the business world (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). 
 
Laws and regulations are another cause of discontinuous change. Through enacting 
laws, legislative and regulatory agencies can disrupt organizations’ environment, 
requiring them to restructure their processes and activities in order to cope with the 
new conditions. The infamous Enron scandal questioned organizations’ accounting 
practices and resulted in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The act which 
introduced stricter financial governance procedures held organization’s board of 
directors responsible for the accuracy of financial statements, created criminal 
penalties for misconduct, mandated the independence of auditors along with other 
requirements was considered one of U.S. greatest reforms in business practices. 
Regulations can further trigger profound shifts in organizational relationships and 
business strategies (Meyer et al., 1990). Dobbin and Dowd (2000) illustrate how 
railroad companies changed their business model from one that relied on cooperative 
relationships to one that is based on mergers and acquisitions upon the enactment of 
antitrust laws that rendered the cooperative model illegal. In a similar vein, Security 
Breach Notification Law mandates organizations to publicly announce security 
breach incidents. Enacting this law attempted to change organizations’ security 
behaviour and put more pressure on them to implement better security controls 
(Winn, 2009). Government regulations therefore change organizations’ institutional 
environment and market mechanisms (Haveman et al., 2001) which in turn impact 
organizations’ current and future security plans. 
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Finally, technology plays a key role in triggering change and restructuring 
organizations’ industry. Meyer et al.’s (1990) research of change in the health care 
industry shows how advances in outpatient surgery and diagnostic and treatment 
technologies were perceived as competence-destroying innovations since they 
allowed non-medical organizations to enter medical services market. Technology in 
this sense eroded barriers to market entry and facilitated mobility within and across 
industries. In triggering change in a given industry, technology needs not be 
developed to serve the needs of that industry. Rather, technologies can be developed 
in one industry but find themselves new applications in another where they can 
challenge existing practices (Levinthal, 1998). An example is the Internet which was 
originally developed by the U.S. government to provide communications between 
academic and military networks but then became the backbone for commercial 
services introducing new forms of business models. Technology, as a prevention 
encounter trigger, then promises a fundamental change in how security is achieved 
through either advancement in technologies specifically developed to meet this 
purpose (security) such as cryptography, biometrics, intrusion detection systems, and 
firewalls; or technologies developed for other purposes but can be used for security 
solutions. 
 
Besides its role in offering a different view on security networks, the concept of 
prevention encounters will facilitate realizing the overlooked role of technology in 
these networks. The seminal paper by Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) called for 
moving beyond the technical focus in IS security research to investigate the socio-
organizational aspect of the phenomenon. At the same time, technology also matters 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Markus & Silver, 2008). Focusing on the interaction 
between the social and the technical is crucial as technology shapes social 
interactions between actors while those interactions themselves can change its 
structure. Technology is at the heart of prevention encounters since the latter is 
concerned with prevention measures, which often come in the form of different 
technologies, and interactions surrounding them. Prevention encounters therefore 
acknowledge the socio-political aspect of technology and the consequences this have 
on the network’s prevention efforts. 
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3.3 Forms of Incentives in Collective Action Research 
 
A major challenge in any collaborative or collective efforts is motivating actors to 
contribute to the end goal. Research in collective action literature offers a great 
opportunity to synthesize different forms of incentives that go beyond the emphasis 
on economic actors and monetary incentives prominent in the current security 
networks literature. Through reading this literature, I have synthesized three forms of 
incentives; transformative, preparatory, and captive, with each aiming at a different 
target to stimulate actions.  
 
3.3.1 Transformative Incentives 
 
The first form of incentives targets actors’ beliefs. Through interacting with their 
surrounding environment, actors utilize their cognitive capabilities to interpret 
events, construct meaning and take the appropriate course of action (Kanfer, 1990; 
Kaplan, 2008). Actors therefore hold certain beliefs about a certain phenomenon 
(Kim & Bearman, 1997). Those beliefs are of paramount interest as they are the 
driving force and consulting agency for actor’s actions. Incentives therefore cannot 
be separated from beliefs (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). From here, attempts to make 
others do what one wants have to seek beliefs alignment. To attain this, significant 
efforts have to be exerted to change actors’ current framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Kim & Bearman, 1997) of a particular situation from one against the desired 
behaviour to one supporting it. Transformative incentives therefore seek to induce 
actors by transforming their beliefs to be aligned with the end goal. Hence, it is the 
differences in opinions and beliefs that stir this form of incentives (Che & Kartik, 
2009). 
 
The literature on social movements represents one of the best manifestations of 
transformative incentives. This literature shows how movement’s goals are 
conceptualized play a vital role in reshaping perceptions about the phenomenon of 
interest and forming the new belief. Framing the movement cause in a way that 
expands its impact by applying “vocabularies of motive” (Benford, 1993) increases 
the chances of disrupting actors current beliefs and replacing them with new 
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supportive ones. Transformative incentives are ideological in nature and aims for 
change (Clark & Wilson, 1961). 
 
The primary tactic used to transform beliefs is rhetoric (Kamenica, 2012). As an art 
of persuasion, rhetoric is an indispensable element in any cognitive manipulation 
attempt (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). It comprises continuous negotiations where 
through careful selection of words diplomatic actors (Mills, 1940) seek to displace 
targeted audience goals with those of theirs (Clark & Wilson, 1961; Latour, 1987). A 
challenging process as it is, belief transformation might face resistance that can 
hinder the recruitment of others to support the end goal. The targeted audience is not 
passive and will fight attempts to change its longstanding beliefs. Different rhetorical 
devices (or types) are thus needed to react to this opposition and make a persuasive 
argument to justify the desired reshape. Hirschman (1991) distinguishes three types 
of rhetorical arguments: perversity, futility, and jeopardy. Perversity argument 
stresses the contradictory effect the action in consideration will have in case it was 
pursued. That is, if the desired action is supposed to improve the current situation, it 
will in fact backfire and produce unintended negative consequences. Futility 
argument claims the current situation is deeply institutionalized that any attempt to 
change it will be in vain or would only result in scratching the surface, leaving main 
structures unchanged. Promises given for a brighter future will hence be shattered 
when facing reality. The jeopardy argument argues the desired action is associated 
with high costs and threatens previous valuable accomplishments. So it is not that 
the action by itself is not desirable but rather its consequences that make it 
unwelcomed when taking contextual conditions into consideration. 
 
Actors draw on these rhetorical arguments to change how others perceive their 
cause, displace their original beliefs, and mobilize them towards the end goal. In a 
way, they exert much effort to reframe the issue at hand to make others see it 
through their lens (Barrett et al., 2013). Social phenomenon is nonetheless open to 
multiple interpretations, and these same rhetorical arguments can be used by the 
opposite party to undermine the need for the action in question. To persuade the 
audience, recruiters have to rely on a repertoire of vocabularies (Benford, 1993; 
Hartelius & Browning, 2008) that can cut across the three rhetorical arguments. In 
his study of the activities of social movement organizations involved in nuclear 
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disarmament, Benford (1993) found that activists increased participation in the 
collective action by framing their goal around vocabularies of severity and personal 
efficacy. Contrary to the belief that nuclear weapons are developed to protect the 
nation from external threat and ensure peace, nuclear weapons constitute the major 
threat to life on earth, and unless action is taken to stop further development, 
doomsday is very near (perversity). To respond to futility claims rose by actors who 
believed their efforts are useless and doubted the collective action ability to do 
anything to change the status quo, movement leaders had to develop a new 
vocabulary of motive, personal efficacy, which they promoted through fliers and 
newsletters that helped in mitigating pessimism and gaining support.  
 
Rhetoric is heavily used by leaders in their transformative efforts (Hartelius & 
Browning, 2008) where the act of leadership by itself is crucial to alter beliefs (Clark 
& Wilson, 1961; Panke, 2013). Those in leadership positions will take it upon 
themselves to shape the identity of their purpose and mobilize actors by invoking 
common interests (Dosh, 2009). Political entrepreneurs (Broz, 1999) constitute a 
powerful resource for mobilizing actors. They possess valuable knowledge regarding 
the various interests of targeted actors (Hartelius & Browning, 2008) which enable 
them to better tune their recruitment strategies to influence others and transform their 
beliefs (Kim & Bearman, 1997; Panke, 2013). 
 
Transformative incentives therefore rely on using rhetoric to influence actors’ 
behaviour and alter their beliefs about the phenomenon of interest. Although 
changing beliefs can be associated with other tools, such as monetary and non-
monetary incentives, this research claims that rhetoric represents the main tool 
applied in this form of incentives that distinguish it from the other forms. 
 
3.3.2 Preparatory Incentives 
 
The second form of incentives used to change behaviour and mobilize actors is 
preparatory incentives. This form of incentives acts as an activating agent that 
triggers or enables other incentives. It mediates between context and end goal to 
manipulate the former to attain the latter (Brickson, 2000). Preparatory incentives 
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therefore assume that actors already have incentives to perform the desired goal. 
However, some actions need to take place to either boost such incentives or 
eliminate a few roadblocks that are in the way. Providing progress feedback reports, 
for instance, evoke intrinsic incentives such as a sense of mastery and competence 
that can optimize employees’ performance (Kanfer, 1990). Similarly, to increase 
organizational outcomes in demographically diverse settings and encourage 
cooperation, Brickson (2000) shows that certain identity orientation had to be 
provoked to improve diversity dynamics. By restructuring organizational and task 
structure (e.g. organizations based on network structure and team-based tasks), 
organizations can provide the proper context for evoking the desired identity 
orientation that in turn improves performance. 
 
Policymakers are increasingly acknowledging the effectiveness of market-based 
incentives (e.g. supply, demand, competition) over traditional incentive approaches 
that rely on command-and-control (Heine, 2013; Verma et al., 1999). Different laws 
and regulations have been enacted to activate such market-based incentives. Being a 
well-known incentive mechanism for improving quality and lowering prices, 
legislators direct their efforts to enable and improve competition. The passage of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, for example, created a competitive environment in the 
pharmaceutical industry by hastening the time generic drugs can enter the market. 
The act granted generic drug manufacturers the right to challenge existing drug 
patents instead of the usual practice of waiting till the patent gets expired (Hemphill 
& Lemley, 2011). 
 
To encourage innovation and knowledge advancement, governments enact property 
rights laws to grant innovators legal protection against free-riders, creating a safe 
environment for them to reap the benefits of the innovation by exploiting it in 
manufacturing and selling products or through license agreements. Promoting 
innovation will be hard to achieve without a proper mechanism to secure it. 
Innovators seek to utilize their innovation and recoup costs associated with it, and 
when the business environment cannot provide them that, they find investment in 
innovative activities a risky decision (Sichelman, 2010). In a similar vein, product 
market diversification allows organizations to encourage employee firm-specific 
investment behaviour by expanding the scope of the applicability of their resources 
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across multiple businesses, increasing the expected payoff from such investments 
(Wang & Barney, 2006). A preparatory stage is therefore sometimes needed to 
mobilize actors and facilitate the realization of their interests.  
 
By acknowledging different kinds of incentives that have already proved to mobilize 
actors around the desired action, preparatory incentives come as an answer to the 
prerequisites required to activate and boost such incentives (Lindenberg & Foss, 
2011). Property rights laws, for example, do not directly touch upon actors’ interests; 
they do not directly offer a particular financial reward but rather provide contextual 
conditions that enable actors to realize their interests, all under the broader aim of 
attaining the chosen goal. Creating a favourable business environment through the 
provisioning of proper infrastructure (Bachtler & Raines, 1997) is very crucial as 
insecure environment, whether it is legal, political, or social, increases risk, creates 
uncertainty and fails in influencing actors’ behaviour (Alfranca & Huffman, 2003; 
Glaessner & Mas, 1995). 
 
Preparatory incentives therefore aim to manipulate actors’ environment to match 
their interests (Heine, 2013). It can be seen as a strategic manoeuvre to influence 
behaviour without direct intervention, one that shapes the context while giving actors 
the freedom to choose their future direction accordingly (Marengo & Pasquali, 
2012).  
 
3.3.3 Captive Incentives 
 
Another effective mechanism for influencing behaviour is placing the desired action 
to be in actors’ interests’ path. For actors, performing the desired action becomes a 
means to an end; they may not necessarily be interested in the action per se but rather 
the benefits it brings that match their interests (Schneider, 2002). They become 
captives as realizing their interests cannot be attained without performing the action 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Verma et al., 1999). 
 
Collaborative relationships within and across organizations have become a standard 
feature in today’s business environment. This created interdependencies as one 
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actor’s actions can greatly influence those of others. Organizations that focus on unit 
specialization but at the same time want to reap more benefits from integration 
across units reside to manage this interdependence by tying employees’ benefits not 
only to the performance of their unit but also that of other units as well (Kretschmer 
& Puranam, 2008). Actors become part of an interlocking network (Kim & Bearman, 
1997) where incentives are embedded in others’ interests in addition to one’s own 
interest (Beersma et al., 2003; Brickson, 2000). 
 
Captive incentives are used to solve the free-riding problem when mobilizing actors. 
In information security literature, organizations that operate on one network tend to 
invest in protecting themselves from external threats but not ones originating from 
the network, relying on others investment to prevent the latter. This behaviour puts 
the network at risk as it can lead to minimal protection (Kunreuther & Heal, 2003). 
To discourage this behaviour and motivate security investment, fines (subsidies) are 
bound to the party responsible for the breach (invest in security). As it is in actor’s 
best interest to shift the liability for security breaches to others, investing in security 
becomes the channel that allows them to realize this interest (Liu et al., 2014; Zhao 
et al., 2013). 
 
By granting or denying access to private rewards actors can be steered towards the 
end goal. Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) show that firms are not willing to invest 
in open source software unless they can receive something in return. Only those who 
have propriety products that are compatible with the free software will be induced to 
support open source software. Such investment will increase the diffusion of the 
software and thus demand for the firm’s products. Open source software becomes a 
source of a new revenue stream. Naturally firms have the choice of capturing this 
opportunity or not. What matters in captive incentives is that a firm cannot realize 
benefits from open source software without devoting some resources to support it. A 
crucial point to mention here is that the private benefits actors can have from the new 
desired action have to outweigh any costs associated with cooperating in order to 
justify the change in behaviour (Bradford & Ben-Shahar, 2012). Mobilizing actors is 
a process that competes for resources and without a proper justification for the 
required shift or if no interests are at stake, inducing actors’ cooperation is 
questionable (Panke, 2013). 
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Captive incentives are generally based on exchange relationships (Schneider, 2002), 
like ones found in business contracts where organizations offer employees some 
benefits in exchange for their time and effort in meeting organization’s objectives, 
and in insurance plans. Titmuss (1970) found that insured blood plan (or family 
credit plan) is an effective strategy for inducing blood donation. According to this 
plan, donors donate blood now to cover their future blood needs without the burden 
of finding replacement donors. So as long as one donates blood, he is guaranteed free 
access to it when in need. 
 
So the focal point in captive incentives is to tie incentives that represent actors’ 
direct interests - regardless of their nature whether monetary or non-monetary – with 
the new desired behaviour. It is crucial that actors can relate the latter with the 
former in order to ensure the desired behaviour will be seen as something of value 
which increases the effectiveness of the incentive (Verma et al., 1999).  
 
In summary, captive incentives must bind actors’ interests with the desired action in 
a way that makes it difficult to achieve one without the other, in other words, they 
become jointly produced (Broz, 1999) and must be valuable enough in order to 
simulate behaviour and justify reallocation in resources from other competing 
actions (Bradford & Ben-Shahar, 2012).  
 
Table 3-1 provides a summary of the three forms of incentives. 
 
So where do incentives defined in the current security networks literature (cost 
saving, increase demand, signalling, liability shift) stand within these forms. These 
can be classified under captive incentives. Security networks allow actors to reap 
these benefits which they could not have done so without being involved in these 
networks. Organizations would not have access to security breach information (to 
realize cost savings and increase in demand benefits) if they were not a member of 
the network. Likewise, liability shift rules leave organizations no choice but to 
improve their security to avoid being the weakest link and the one to bear the costs 
following security breaches. Signalling differs from the other incentives because it 
offers non-monetary benefits in terms of organizations’ image and reputation. In 
signalling, security networks are used as channels to communicate organizations’ 
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Table 3-1 Summary of incentives forms 
 
security efforts and make them more visible internally and externally (Meyer, 1979). 
In times where security breaches have become pervasive, participating in security 
networks proofs organizations’ commitment to security and helps them retain 
positive image among stakeholders. 
 
The fact that incentives identified in security networks literature fell in captive 
incentives form do not come as a surprise given the literature focus on economic 
models and rational choice theory as discussed before. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
Observers of IS security can quickly note the field’s constant movements that make 
disequilibrium moments prevail. The upheavals the field undergo calls for moving 
away from equilibrium-centric studies to disequilibrium-focused ones. This chapter 
illustrated steps taken towards this move. It explained the theoretical lenses I am 
using to develop a process model on security networks. A process lens promises 
more useful insights on how security networks face and prevent security threats, and 
Form of 
Incentives 
Definition  Target  Focus on Tools applied 
Transformative Any attempt to influence 
behaviour through 
changing actors beliefs to 
become aligned with the 
desired action 
Beliefs What I want  Rhetoric 
Preparatory  Any attempt to influence 
behaviour through 
manipulating the context to 
activate other incentives 
and enable actors to realize 
their interests 
Environment  What you want  Regulations, 
policies, 
institutional 
restructuring 
Captive  Any attempt to influence 
behaviour through tying 
actor’s interests with the 
desired action so that 
attaining one cannot be 
reached without the other 
Actor’s 
interest 
What we want Varies 
according to 
actors’ 
interests (e.g. 
access to 
resources, 
financial 
rewards…) 
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how past events influence future security paths. It furthermore helps to go beyond 
the current focus on rationality and economic incentives, and delve more in depth on 
other forms of incentives for converging actors to collectively achieve security. 
 
This proposed shift in the theoretical lens ought to be followed by a change in the 
methodological approach used. It has been argued that capturing dynamism and 
change requires moving away from quantitative approaches and adopting qualitative 
ones instead (Tieben, 2012). It has been further argued that historical research is 
more equipped to capture disequilibrium moments over time (Meyer et al., 2005) 
and retain the case complexity (Abbott, 2001). Having process theoretical lens in 
focus and applying a longitudinal sensitive method will unfold prevention 
encounters taking place while preventing security threats and help me answer the 
research questions of how security networks achieve prevention and the incentive 
mechanisms needed to converge actors during the process. 
 
The next chapter examines the research method and details the role the developed 
concepts (prevention encounters and the three forms of incentives) had in the data 
collection and analysis process. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter argued that the research objectives are best met by following 
qualitative research methods. In this chapter, I discuss in details of the qualitative 
research approach used in this study. I start with the philosophical position 
supporting the research followed by the rationale for choosing a case study approach. 
I then show the importance of having a historical perspective and the value adopting 
such a perspective had on the research.  Afterwards, I detail the steps followed in 
designing the case study, starting with identifying the research objectives, how to 
select the case, the protocol used in data collection, and ending with data analysis 
strategies. 
 
4.2 Philosophical Stance 
 
Research in information systems field is informed by three main philosophical 
positions; positivism, interpretivism and critical realism (Mingers, 2004; Mingers et 
al., 2013; Wynn & Williams, 2012). This research is based on critical realism 
position. 
 
Critical realism (CR) bridges between positivism and interpretivism, it adopts a 
positivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. CR acknowledges the social 
construction of a given phenomenon and the role of actors’ interpretations in 
explaining it while at the same time not neglecting the existence of independent 
structures that enable or constrains actors’ actions (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
Therefore, to explain a phenomenon in CR is to give a detailed description of the 
processes and events taking place and how they are influenced by contextual 
conditions. 
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CR views reality as an open system that cannot be reduced to a controlled 
environment. Interactions between entities and their inherited mechanisms, and the 
new mechanisms that can emerge from such interactions, make it rare to have an 
identical set of mechanisms that always result in the same outcome (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012). The goal of CR hence is not prediction but explaining how events 
come about under certain contextual conditions. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
there are no general regularities in the world. Lawson (1998) shows that causal 
mechanisms may endure across events resulting in similar patterns, he refers to this 
partial regularity as demi-regularity or demi-reg. 
 
A major aspect in CR is stratified reality into three domains. The real domain 
contains entities with their inherent causal powers (mechanisms). In the actual 
domain, these powers are enacted and generate events. The subsets of events that are 
experienced by humans whether through perception or measurement constitute the 
empirical domain. Accordingly, a key argument in CR is that we cannot reduce all 
events to ones we observe, and mechanisms to actual events. Mechanisms may be 
exercised but never actualized because of countervailing effects of other causal 
mechanisms. Since reality is an open system, it is the interaction between 
mechanisms that generates the presence or absence of events (Mingers et al., 2013, 
p.796). 
 
CR promises to shed new light on research in IS field, it shifts the attention from 
data collection and analysis to real problems encountered and causes behind them 
(Mingers et al., 2013). Therefore, despite the fact that there are multiple 
manifestations of security networks in IS security literature, there is little 
understanding of how these networks prevent security threats. Through adopting 
critical realism this research seeks to uncover the underlying mechanisms of how 
security networks achieve prevention. And as a second step identify the incentive 
mechanisms behind bringing actors in these networks together, and how these 
mechanisms produce their outcome. From a critical realist perspective, entities such 
as social structures and technological artefacts are sources of emerging powers 
(causal mechanisms) that exert causal influence. These causal mechanisms generate 
the events that occur during prevention processes. Explaining the phenomenon 
becomes a matter of identifying these mechanisms and properties of the entities that 
Chapter 4 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 The structure of causal explanation (after Sayer, 1992) 
 
possess them. That is identifying what it is about these entities that give them their 
power (Sayer, 1992). 
Explanation of a phenomenon according to critical realism thus involves identifying 
entities, their properties, mechanisms responsible for producing observed events, and 
conditions that activate these mechanisms. This structure of causal explanation is 
represented in Figure 4-1. 
 
4.3 Case Study Approach 
 
Adopting the appropriate research design is a critical step in any research and one 
that is often guided by the research questions and objectives. Chapter 3 showed the 
lack of knowledge of how security networks prevent threats, how and when actors 
converge and the incentives for convergence. In order to produce this knowledge, an 
extensive description of security threat prevention processes is needed, deeming case 
study an appropriate research approach (Yin, 2014). Case studies are known for their 
ability to give in-depth understanding of the examined phenomenon and therefore it 
is no wonder they become a popular approach for developing new theories 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Moreover, researchers interested in identifying 
causal mechanisms turn into case studies as the method for their investigation 
(Gerring, 2007). 
Generate   Enable  Possess  
Activate 
Mechanisms 
??? 
??? 
Conditions  
??? 
??? 
Entities  
??? 
??? 
Properties  
??? 
??? 
 
Events  
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This research case study approach can be best described as structured and focused 
one (George & Bennett, 2005). The case study is structured because the research 
objectives are sought to be addressed in each of the cases (or sub-cases) under 
investigation, while it is focused since it has a theoretical focus that zooms in on a 
particular aspect of the phenomenon (prevention encounters and incentives) rather 
than another. Having a clear focus is crucial to avoid falling into the trap of 
voluminous data (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is of particular importance given the 
research historical perspective which is discussed next. 
 
4.3.1 Historical Perspective 
 
Interest in historical perspective in information systems field has been promoted 
since the 1990s (Land, 2010; Mason et al., 1997a; Mason et al., 1997b; McKenney 
et al., 1997; Mitev & De Vaujany, 2012). This move towards historical studies is 
strongly evident in the publication of a special issue in Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems in 2012 and two special issues in Journal of Information 
Technology in 2013 dedicated to IS history. 
 
Historical studies examine events occurring over time, how they happened and why, 
and search for patterns in order to gain insights into what actions to undertake while 
facing change opportunities (McDonald in Kantrow, 1986). They can offer 
unexpected insights into current phenomenon challenging existing theories (Mitev & 
De Vaujany, 2012), and by this provoke new questions and generate new knowledge 
(O'Sullivan & Graham, 2010). For example, Jakobs’ (2013) historical approach to 
find out why X.400 email standard failed defied the two popular explanations and 
proposed more detailed and plausible reasons behind the standard failure. Jakobs 
argued that the popularity of the Internet cannot be a valid reason for the failure of 
X.400; the Internet standardization process faced many complexities that made it not 
so much superior to any other standardization process. Further, the X.400 standard 
was largely supported and adopted in Europe in comparison to the small scale 
diffusion of the Internet in the U.S. - back then. Similarly, installed base hostility is 
unlikely to be the primary reason for X.400 failure since the latter was developed to 
allow interoperability between already installed-based individual email systems, and 
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was designed to operate over X.25, the most widespread packet switching network. 
Instead, his historical analysis revealed that X.400 demise cannot be limited to one 
reason but rather a collection of multiple ones (ex. national monopoly, unfortunate 
timing) which all contributed to its end. 
 
The present is a product of past actions, events, and decisions that all interact with 
each other to produce it (Bonner, 2013). Through historical data, we can explain the 
past, draw inferences for understanding contemporary and future phenomena (Porra 
et al., 2014) and make informed decisions (Mitev & De Vaujany, 2012). History is 
thus a valuable source of knowledge for acting intelligently with the future 
(Marwick, 2001; Tosh, 2008). “It is only through a sense of history that communities 
establish their identity, orientate themselves, understand their relationship to the past 
and to other communities and societies. Without history (knowledge of the past), we, 
and our communities, would be utterly adrift on an endless and featureless sea of 
time.” (Marwick, 2001, p.32, emphasis in orginial). 
 
History is a study of change (Porra et al., 2014). Its longitudinal coverage gives it the 
power to appreciate the complexity of social phenomena, confront current wisdom 
held about them (Land, 2010), and reveal “movements from continuity to change and 
vice versa” (Pettigrew, 1990, p.272). By adopting a historical approach on how 
security networks achieve prevention, I will be better equipped to capture prevention 
encounters (as they represent periods of change), explain the prevention process, and 
identify incentive mechanisms to converge actors while facing security threats. In 
addition, as I explain when discussing case selection/building step, the historical 
perspective enabled me to develop sub-cases of my general case and so conduct 
within- and cross-case analysis, which increased the reliability of the research 
findings and the efficacy of the proposed mechanisms relative to alternative 
explanation (Wynn and Williams, 2012). Without this rich historical data, it would 
have been difficult to structure the data around multiple sub-cases. 
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4.4 Case Study Design Process 
 
Case studies are not story-telling; they should be based on profound foundations to 
reflect their status as a methodological tool for conducting research. Researchers 
therefore should carefully design their case study to ensure the reliability of their 
findings. In designing my theory-oriented case study I drew from George and 
Bennett (2005) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) work to identify the required steps in the 
case study design process (see Table 4-1). 
 
4.4.1 Identify Research Objectives and Problem 
 
Specifying the purpose of the research is inevitable step in any research design 
approach (Gerring, 2007). Knowing what the research is expected to achieve and the 
problem to be solved not only guide subsequent steps in the design process but also 
helps researchers regain control lest they went off track while conducting their 
research. This first step gives the research focus. It shows what one wants from the 
data, and helps in delineating the scope of the study. 
 
Of importance is determining whether the research seeks to test hypotheses or 
generate a new theory. Each will have its implications on how the extant literature is 
used in formulating the research questions. Theory testing research adopts a 
deductive approach that searches the literature to specify variables of interests and 
construct relationships between them in terms of hypotheses to be tested by the 
empirical data. Theory building research, on the other hand, focuses mainly on 
theory emerging from the data and follows inductive reasoning. The literature here is 
visited to obtain knowledge about the researched area, identify the problem, and 
possibly develop tentative constructs that shape what the research is about without 
constraining it in a predetermined direction (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The purpose of this research is theory building. As explained in Chapter 3, the study 
seeks to offer a process model on how security networks prevent security threats, as 
well as the incentive mechanisms for ensuring collective security efforts.  
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Table 4-1 Case study design process (adopted from George and Bennett (2005) and 
Eisenhardt (1989)) 
Steps  Activities 
Identify research objectives and problem RO1. Understand the process by which prevention 
measures are developed and adopted over time. 
RO2. Identify actors, their interests, and how the 
latter are aligned to ensure convergence. 
RO3. Identify the role of technology in security 
networks. 
Problem: 1. Identify the process by which security 
networks achieve prevention. 2. Identify incentive 
mechanisms for converging actors in security 
networks. 
Select/build the case General case of credit card fraud with embedded 
cases of prevention encounters created through 
casing process. 
Collect the data Two step process: general and focused search 
1. Search Database. 
2. Identify key events. 
3. Identify major data sources. 
4. Locate data sources. 
5. Create a timeline of key events. 
6. Identify prevention encounters. 
Analyse the data a. 1. Finalize key events timeline. 
b. 2. Code the data 
a. Open coding 
b. Pattern coding 
c. 3. Present the data  
a. Narrative  
b. Visual mapping 
c. Temporal bracketing 
De  4. Within case analysis 
       5. Cross-case analysis 
Enfold literature d. Relate findings with existing literature, both 
conflicting and similar 
 
Accordingly, I defined three research objectives that guided my empirical work and 
allowed me to answer the research questions: 
RO1: understand the process by which prevention measures are developed and 
adopted over time. 
RO2: identify actors, their interests, and how the latter are aligned to ensure 
convergence. 
RO3:  identify the role of technology in security networks. 
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4.4.2 Select/Build the Case 
 
Selecting the appropriate case is a challenging step especially with the lack of 
consensus on what a case is (Gerring, 2004; Ragin & Becker, 1992), or in Yin’s 
(2014) term what the research unit of analysis is. 
 
The case selected should reflect the research problem and objectives since cases are 
selected based on their relevance not merely because they are interesting (Eisenhardt, 
1989; George & Bennett, 2005). Given the focus on examining security networks, 
the chosen case should reflect the notion of networks; it should provide the 
opportunity for studying interactions between heterogeneous actors. In other words, 
the case ought to be prevention encounters rich. If prevention encounters are not 
observable in the proposed case, considering an alternative one would seem 
inevitable to be able to answer the research question. 
 
Taking these issues into consideration, the case of credit card fraud was selected to 
examine and generate a process model on how security networks achieve prevention. 
Specifically, three reasons derived the selection of this case. First is theoretical 
relevance. The heterogeneity of actors involved in the credit card industry 
(technology, banks, regulatory agencies, merchants, and customers) and the 
complexity of their relationships (Lablebici, 2012) make the case ‘prevention 
encounters rich’, which is the heart of this research. Second is practical significance. 
Statistics show that the financial sector is among the top sectors exposed to security 
threats (Choo, 2011; Symantec, 2009). The total credit card fraud losses in the U.S. 
was approximately $7.5 billion in 2015 and this is expected to increase (Statista, 
2016). Furthermore, the number of credit card usage in offline and online 
transactions is in continuous growth (Capgemini & RBS, 2013) making credit cards 
an indispensable technology in our daily lives. Third is future implication. Credit 
cards are considered the technology that ignited electronic value exchange (Naar & 
Stein, 1975), by understanding its case we can draw further implications on 
collective security efforts and incentive mechanisms necessary to face security 
threats arising from continuous innovations in digital payments. 
I should mention that I focused on credit card fraud taking place in the U.S. This is 
because the U.S. is ranked the top in countries responsible for card fraud losses. For 
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instance, in 2012 the U.S. accounted for 47.3% of the worldwide card fraud losses 
(PCM, 2015). A second reason is the richness of data sources available for 
preventing credit card fraud in the U.S. 
 
Credit card fraud represents the general case which then went through casing process 
(Ragin, 1992) to generate embedded cases within the general one (Yin, 2014). Those 
embedded cases (or sub-cases) are exemplified by the research construct ‘prevention 
encounters’, with each prevention encounter signifying an embedded case. This 
theorizing of the research case enables both within-case and cross-case analysis 
improving the reliability of the generated theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cases therefore 
are not merely selected but also inductively built or constructed by the researcher. 
They become flexible and manipulable to allow a particular focus that guides 
empirical work while at the same time be shaped by both theory and empirical 
evidence (Wieviorka, 1992). An important aspect of casing then is delineating the 
case so that one will be able to locate them within the voluminous research data 
(Yin, 2014; Ragin, 1992). When confronting a piece of information, we need to be 
able to judge whether it falls within the scope of the research or not, if it is part of the 
case or external to it, i.e. we need a mechanism that specifies how to cut the general 
case into embedded cases. In investigating the case of credit card fraud, I am 
interested in collective efforts pursued to prevent the phenomenon; specifically, I am 
interested in prevention encounters, so my case or unit of analysis is prevention 
encounters. But since this is a construct developed by the researcher, a mechanism 
had to be established to specify how cases around that construct are built; that is we 
need to know the exclusion and inclusion criteria that set the boundaries of the sub-
case. 
 
One way to draw the case boundaries is available literature, which has already been 
visited during the first step when identifying the research problem and objectives. 
While reviewing the literature, researchers might develop conceptual frameworks 
with constructs of interest. These frameworks are of great value since the same case 
can be seen from different angles and theoretical lens. Frameworks remind 
researchers with the purpose of their research and accordingly what the study should 
be a ‘case of’. Though having predefined constructs may sound contradicting given 
the emphasis on theory generation, initial constructs or frameworks helps in 
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designing a well-defined focused research. They serve as building blocks for 
determining what the case is and is not about (Miles et al., 2014). The aim is thus 
narrowing down what constitute a case leaving analysis and relationships between 
these constructs (along with others identified while analyzing the data) to a later 
stage (Andersen & Kragh, 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Accordingly, to identify the prevention encounters and their boundaries I relied on 
my conceptualizing of the construct. Prevention encounters represent actions taken 
by heterogeneous actors to develop and adopt prevention measures that shake an 
established pattern. They are triggered as a response to certain events that constitute 
a turning key point in security practices. According to this conceptualization, casing 
from credit card fraud is done according to the following three main criteria: 
1. Actors’ actions have to be related to developing and adopting prevention 
measures. 
2. Actions have to be initiated by prevention encounters triggers (social 
pressure, regulations, and technology). 
3. Actions are only seen as prevention encounters if they shake an established 
security practice. 
 
The above protocol was used in the casing process and resulted in creating eight 
prevention encounters. 
 
4.4.3 Collect the Data 
 
After selecting the case and developing the protocol for identifying prevention 
encounters, the next step is collecting the data. I should note here that the design of 
this research, especially with regards to how the case study is conceptualized, was an 
iterative process. That is, throughout data collection and initial analysis, it became 
apparent that actors’ convergence was most observable in interactions within the 
context of developing new prevention measures. This helped me to better 
conceptualize the concept of prevention encounters. 
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The search for relevant data was guided by the three criteria for determining 
prevention encounters enabling consistency in data collection across the different 
sub-cases (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) as well as comparability between them (George 
& Bennett, 2005). This means that I was selective on the kind of data to use in the 
research, which is a normal approach especially in historical studies given their 
voluminous amount of data (Porra et al., 2006). Moreover, as actors involved in 
preventing credit card fraud are numerous, the data collection was focused on Visa’s 
efforts in preventing fraud which naturally involved identifying other actors who 
also have a role in fighting fraud. 
Data collection went through two main steps: general and focused search.  
 
4.4.3.1 General Search 
 
The first step in collecting the data was doing a general search in order to: 
1. Obtain general knowledge of credit card fraud. 
2. Identify key events taking place while preventing fraud. Where key events 
were recognized by comparing them with the concept of prevention 
encounters. Thus, key events should encapsulate prevention encounters. 
3. Extract prevention encounters from key events. 
4. Identify major data sources to be used in focused searched to collect more 
specific data. 
 
To meet these objectives I searched Business Source Premier Database using a broad 
keyword, credit card fraud, and narrowed the search results using the database built-
in limiters. Table 4-2 gives details for the steps followed when doing the general 
search. The 476 final materials were then analyzed. I used Excel spreadsheet to 
report the data that seemed relevant to the research in terms of being possible 
candidates for prevention encounters. The sheet (hereafter data collection sheet) was 
organized based on the reference and date of the event, with a description of each 
event. 
 
Initial analysis of data collection sheet showed that actors interacted in the context of 
developing and adopting prevention measures. Therefore, a new spreadsheet  
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Table 4-2 General search steps 
DB search options Input Output  
keyword credit card fraud (in AB abstract)  
Search options a. Find all my search terms  
Expanders  a. Apply related words 
b. Also search within the full text of the 
articles 
 
Limiters: published date Jan/1950 - Dec/20131  
Search results  2178 
Limit to:   
Subject: Thesaurus Term credit card fraud, fraud, commercial crimes, 
identity theft, internet fraud, computer crimes, 
consumer fraud, data protection, smart cards, 
data security, commercial credit fraud, 
phishing, banking industry-security measures 
1575 
Subject prevention, security measures, false 
personation, corrupt practices, computer 
network resources, safety measures, laws and 
legislation, criminal law, fraud investigation, 
crime prevention, biometric identification, law 
enforcement, case studies, privacy 
476 
1
I extended the data collection period for the last prevention encounter to be till the end of 2014 to 
increase the richness of the data. 
 
(prevention encounters sheet) was created. This sheet was organized according to 
prevention measures used to prevent fraud, with a description of interactions 
between actors that accompanied the development and adoption of these prevention 
measures. Prevention encounters sheet then helped me in drawing a timeline of key 
events (Figure 4-2). The timeline served as a methodological tool (Mason et al., 
1997a) that facilitated data organization and guided the further collection of data. 
 
The initial analysis also identified major data sources to be used in the focused 
search. Those constituted the references of many of the materials returned by the 
data search, and sources that were frequently cited by scholars studying the credit 
card industry. Identified major data sources are: 
1. The American Banker – daily newspaper 
2. ABA Banking Journal – monthly journal 
3. Visa the Power of an Idea – the company’s biography 
4. Birth of the Chaordic Age – Visa’s founder biography 
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Figure 4-2 Chronology of key events 
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Table 4-3 Data sources 
Data sources Description Main value  
Books   Paying with Plastic: The Digital 
Revolution in Buying and 
Borrowing 
 A Piece of the Action 
 Electronic Value Exchange: 
Origins of the Visa Electronic 
Payment System 
 Visa the Power of an Idea 
 Birth of the Chaordic Age 
Provide comprehensive 
historical coverage of credit 
cards which helped in 
understanding the context of 
events taking place and how it 
affected decisions taken. 
 
Trade journals  The American Banker 
 ABA Banking Journal 
Provide the ability to follow a 
certain prevention encounter 
to examine how it evolved 
with time. 
Press 
releases/newsletters 
Online press releases and newsletters 
of Visa and NRF 
Offer recent and up to date 
information regarding 
prevention encounters. 
Government documents Congressional hearings related to 
certain prevention measure 
Provide valuable detailed 
insights on the heterogeneous 
actors involved in preventing 
fraud and perceptions each 
hold about a certain 
prevention measure. 
 
Other data sources that are valuable include: “Electronic Value Exchange: Origins of 
the Visa Electronic Payment System” a book that offers rich data on Visa’s use of 
technology to prevent fraud with useful insights on associated encounters. Books 
about the credit card industry: “Paying with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in 
Buying and Borrowing” and “A Piece of the Action”. Additionally, as the industry is 
highly regulated and contentious, government documents in terms of congressional 
hearings provided detailed data on positions held by various actors which helped 
mitigating data bias (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). I also consulted press releases 
and newsletters (specifically for Visa and National Retail Federation) which were 
useful in capturing data about recent prevention encounters. Table 4-3 summarizes 
the major data sources and the main value derived from each. 
 
In summary, data was collected from these sources: books, trade journals, press 
releases/newsletter, and government documents. These multiple sources of evidence 
help in building a stronger and reliable case and writing a coherent story (Yin, 2014). 
Naturally, every source will tell part of the story that suits its interests, critiquing the 
evidence is thus necessary (Mason et al., 1997a). For this I used different strategies 
Chapter 4 
44 
such as, applying logic, corroborating the event from multiple sources, and assessing 
the overall coherence of the story (Mason et al., 1997a; Porra et al., 2006). In 
addition, it is argued that the fact that these sources are publicly available increases 
the case validity (Porra et al., 2014) and ‘keep the researcher honest’ (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007) as they are openly accessible for scrutiny. Nonetheless, the research 
data remains limited to what has been publicly announced. Moreover, I should 
acknowledge that historical knowledge is open to various interpretations where no 
conclusive meaning of the evidence of the phenomenon can be attained (Marwick, 
2001; Porra et al., 2006).  
 
4.4.3.1.1 Locating Data Sources 
 
Once major data sources were identified, the next mission was locating those sources 
in order to prepare for the second step in data collection; focused search. 
 
Books. Relevant books were purchased online. 
 
Trade journals. I first consulted Warwick Library website to check access to both 
The American Banker and ABA Banking Journal. Access to the latter was available 
from 1964 till present offering a comprehensive coverage. I should note however 
that from 1964 till 1979 the journal was called “Banking”. The monthly periodical 
then changed its name to ABA Banking Journal and it is published under this title 
since then. 
The library has access to The American Banker from 1985 till present. Though this 
covers a wide time span, The American Banker is a daily newspaper that is dedicated 
to the banking industry, which indicates the detailed level of information it provides 
about what is happening in the industry. Also, other data sources (i.e. books) showed 
that the 1970s was a critical period for the credit card. Thus, I started to search for 
access to previous records of the newspaper. In doing so, I consulted COPAC Union 
Catalogue and SUNCAT Union Catalogue, which search a wide range of UK 
libraries to help researchers locate needed materials. After reviewing search results, 
University of Essex library was identified as the sole provider of the needed access 
(access available from 1964 – 1979 in printed form). I contacted the library staff and 
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had the approval for accessing the library’s holdings of the newspaper from 1964 till 
1979. I planned the field trip and spent a week collecting necessary data. For the 
period of 1979 - 1985, the same catalogue search identified availability for online 
access to the newspaper using LexisNexis database. 
 
Press releases and newsletters. Those were accessed through related websites. I 
focused on press releases and newsletters produced by Visa (www.usa.visa.com) and 
National Retail Federation (www.nrf.com).  
 
Government documents. Government documents here refer to congressional hearings 
between legislators and various actors in issues related to credit card security. Books 
and trade journals often cited congressional hearings, and that is when I became 
aware that hearings about a certain matter took place. This initial reference was only 
the start of a thread to draw the complete picture. Gaining full insight was 
challenging as several hearings occur before the final decision is made. To locate 
these hearings1, I referred to the Library of Congress website. The library provides a 
summary of bills introduced as well as information on where to find full records of 
the hearings. For this, I used HathiTrust digital library that offers online and free 
access to a wide coverage of those government documents. 
Though the Library of Congress and HathiTrust provide information about hearings, 
they do not give an indication of the status of the bill. A lot of bills die, i.e. they do 
not pass the Congress, and no law is enacted accordingly. Tracking bills is important 
to know whether prevention encounters were successful or not. To achieve this, I 
consulted GovTrack.us which offers full details on bills history. 
 
4.4.3.2 Focused Search 
 
After identifying key events and locating data sources, I was ready to go through 
focused search step.  
 
 
1Hearings happen at early stages of legislative policymaking where a bill to enact a new law is 
introduced and discussed. 
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Focused search involved using the main data sources to obtain detailed knowledge 
about each event and the underlying prevention encounter. Here I used specific 
keywords that reflected the examined prevention encounters. Examples of these 
keywords are: mass mailing, BASE, magstripe, magnetic stripe, POS terminal, OCR, 
CVV, smart card, chip and pin, SET, PCI standards, VbyV, tokenization. Keywords 
also arose when reviewing the resultant material. For example, the search using 
‘smart card’ resulted in knowing that Visa called its smart card ‘super smartcard’. 
This keyword was subsequently used to obtain more information about this 
technology. 
 
As more data was collected, both data collection and prevention encounters sheets 
went through several rotations of modifications. This step resulted in updating events 
timeline to reflect the new data, clarifying the concept of prevention encounters, and 
identifying eight prevention encounters that are critical in credit card fraud 
prevention lifecycle.  
 
4.4.4 Analyse the Data 
 
Analysing the data started with the data collection (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) since 
initial analysis of the materials generated from the general search was needed to 
conduct the focused search. For instance, I have mentioned before that a chronology 
of key events was drawn to organize the data and guide focused search. Going 
through more detailed information in the focused search led to updating and 
modifying the timeline to correspond more closely with the research construct of 
prevention encounters.  
 
Data analysis was based on process-tracing methodology (George & Bennett, 2005). 
Process-tracing is suitable for analysing complex social phenomenon as it recognizes 
the possible multiple pathways for its occurrence. It thus promotes in-depth 
investigation to narrow down potential causes. In analysing the data, I sought to trace 
processes taking place between actors to prevent credit card fraud, including causes 
and outcomes of actors’ actions as well as how those actions were perceived by 
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different actors. I used Nvivo software to organize all materials and build a database 
of prevention encounters. 
 
The next step was coding the data. I followed Miles et al. (2014) two coding steps; 
open and pattern coding. In open coding, I generated codes that describe what I am 
seeing in the data, whether that was in the form of labels to describe the main idea of 
a certain amount of text, such as information sharing and privacy concerns, or 
processes describing actions taking place, such as mobilizing actors and failing to 
align interests. This resulted in more than 200 descriptive codes. A review of them 
disclosed some repeated and unrelated concepts. Eventually, I had a list of 192 
mutually exclusive descriptive codes. 
 
Unlike open coding, pattern coding is an analytical step. Here, I tried to find 
regularities, relationships between concepts, and identify patterns. As explicating 
elements of social structures is central in CR, this step also involved identifying 
structural entities and their components along with connections among them that 
enabled them to produce the outcome observed (Wynn &Williams, 2012). I further 
wrote memos (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) while coding to reflect initial thoughts rising 
from the data and possible links between codes. In addition, the three forms of 
incentives synthesized from the literature (transformative, preparatory, and captive) 
were used while coding the data to provide evidence of their impact on converging 
actors in security networks. For example, data that represented the use of one or 
more of the rhetorical arguments was directly coded under the appropriate argument 
device (perversity, futility, jeopardy). The data was also coded to reflect the 
vocabulary of motive used to stimulate a particular action (e.g. anti-competitiveness, 
urgency, shared responsibility) which was then grouped under the subcategory of 
vocabulary of motives. The category of transformative incentives hence included 
codes of the three rhetorical devices and the subcategory of vocabularies of motive. I 
used similar coding strategy for preparatory and captive incentives where I tried to 
find what aspect of the environment actors was manipulating to drive collective 
action and how entangled associations between the desired behaviour and actors’ 
interests were created. 
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As process data is often complex, a combination of strategies was used to help in 
making sense of it and ease the process of finding relationships. Presentation 
strategies are: narrative, visual mapping and temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999).  
 
4.4.4.1 Data Presentation Strategies 
 
Data presentation is a significant activity in the analysis process (Miles et al., 2014). 
The richness of process data poses some challenges on how to best understand them 
(Langley, 1999). Therefore, I resorted to multiple data presentation strategies to 
guide me while theorizing from the data. 
 
First, I constructed a thick narrative around key events. I focused on preserving the 
temporal sequence of these events and therefore decomposed the narrative according 
to prevention measures that were developed and adopted to prevent fraud over time 
(i.e. prevention encounters). I also sought to uncover the underlying logic behind 
actors’ actions and discover how those might shape future decisions. The case 
narrative involved; actions, what triggered them and their outcome in an attempt to 
explain how security networks achieve prevention and identify incentive 
mechanisms that come into play to motivate collective efforts to prevent fraud. The 
narrative purpose was therefore not merely descriptive but also analytical.  
 
The second strategy employed was visual mapping. Visual mapping is a graphical 
representation of processes, it helps reduce the complexity of the data and make it 
easier for the researcher to elicit patterns and for the reader to validate the findings 
(Miles et al., 2014). This strategy goes in line with researches based on process 
tracing since the later requires being explicit about events taking place and how they 
link together. Such links are often made visible through graphical representations 
(Gerring, 2007). Visual maps show the plot in events, and can serve as the 
foundation for establishing causal analysis because of its emphasis not only on what 
happened but also how and why (Miles et al., 2014) making it helpful in identifying 
mechanisms. They also facilitate cross-case comparison to notice similarities and 
differences between cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). I produced a graphical representation 
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for each of the eight prevention encounters that displayed the sequence of events and 
how they affect each other (those are presented in the next chapter). 
 
Finally, temporal bracketing is “a way of structuring the description of events” 
(Langley, 1999, p. 703). In my research, temporal bracketing was associated with the 
period of each prevention encounter. That is, from the time it was triggered till the 
time the final decision about the prevention measure was taken. This enabled 
examination of how decisions to prevent fraud in one period were shaped by 
decisions made in a previous one. 
 
Table 4-4 summarizes the data collection and analysis process. 
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Table 4-4 Data collection and analysis process 
Steps  Tasks  Outputs  
1. General 
database 
search 
a. Search Business Source Premier using 
keyword “credit card fraud”. 
b. Output screening through database built-in 
filtration criteria, and title and abstract 
review.  
Database of case 
materials 
2. Identifying 
key events 
a. Use prevention encounters triggers to identify 
key events in the case materials. 
b. Extract prevention encounters from key 
events. 
c. Identify major data sources. 
a. Chronology of key 
events. 
b. List of major data 
sources. 
3. Focused 
database 
search 
a. Search database using specific keywords as 
“POS terminals”, “magnetic stripe”, “smart 
card”. 
b. Use identified data sources in collecting 
further data. 
a. Data that enrich 
understanding of 
prevention 
encounters. 
b. Prevention 
encounters 
database 
4. Presenting the 
data 
a. Write detailed descriptions of prevention 
encounters 
b. Temporal bracketing  of prevention 
encounters 
c. Draw graphical representations of prevention 
encounters 
a. Thick case 
narrative 
b. Temporal 
structuring of 
prevention 
encounters 
c. Visual maps of 
prevention 
encounters 
5. Coding 
process 
a. First cycle coding that summarizes prevention 
encounters into descriptive codes. 
b. Second cycle coding to identify patterns and 
categories within descriptive codes. 
a. A list of 
descriptive codes. 
b. A list of pattern 
codes. 
6. Identifying 
structural 
entities and 
contextual 
triggers 
a. Identify structural entities, their components 
and relationships among them. 
b. Identify and typify contextual conditions  that 
trigger prevention mechanisms 
a. Structural entities 
and their 
properties 
b. Contextual 
conditions 
7. Identifying 
prevention 
mechanisms 
a. Analyze patterns to elicit prevention 
mechanisms 
Three prevention 
mechanisms 
8. Identifying 
incentive 
mechanisms 
a. Analyze prevention encounters and map them 
with synthesized incentive mechanisms 
(transformative, preparatory, captive) 
b. Identify incentive mechanisms in security 
networks 
Incentive mechanisms 
for collective action in 
preventing security 
threats 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Findings 
 
Chapter 5 
52 
5 THE CASE OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a narrative of the research case study. It details Visa’s effort, 
along with others in the credit card industry, to prevent credit card fraud. The 
narrative is structured around the research concept of prevention encounters, which 
illustrate heterogeneous actors’ efforts to develop and adopt prevention measures 
over time. 
 
5.2 The Battle against Credit Card Fraud 
 
A turning point in the card payment industry was the year of 1958. Though buying 
on credit was not an unusual practice before that year with many customers holding 
Diners Club, the only general purpose credit card at that time, 1958 marked the start 
of competition in credit card market upon the decision of one of U.S. largest banks, 
Bank of America (BofA), to issue its own credit card. 
 
5.2.1 Prevention Encounter 1: Credit Card Mass Mailing 
 
Following the success of Diners Club, BofA decided to launch its own credit card 
(called BankAmericard) in 1958. Unlike other cards that targeted a particular market 
segment, usually businessmen and high-class customers, BofA targeted middle-class 
customers seeking to serve a larger customer base. To create this base of cardholders 
and ensure merchants acceptance of their card, BofA resorted to mass mail 
BankAmericard to all its customers. The success of the bank’s experience alerted 
other banks to the new lucrative market, where they also resorted to mass mailing to 
rapidly secure their market share (Weistart, 1972). 
 
With mass mailing becoming the norm to attract customers, the banking industry had 
been typified by their lack of stringent security practices, placing quick profits over 
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customers’ financial safety. The massive fraud rate accompanying mass mailing 
provoked extreme public anxiety for they were responsible for purchases they have 
never made, using a card they have not received or requested. The absence of 
effective security practices for the new innovation adversely affected the banking 
industry, with regulatory bodies recognizing the phenomenon went out of control 
and it is time to interfere to control banks’ behaviour. 
 
Several bills were introduced in the Congress to either restrict or prohibit credit card 
mass mailing (for more information on these bills see (Kennedy, 1969)). Wishing no 
legal intervention in their new business, the banking industry collectively 
participated in congressional hearings through its Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and 
American Bankers Association (ABA), stressing that credit cards need no new 
regulation, and fraud problem has been overestimated. In the defence of their 
practices, the industry representatives asserted that by changing mailing procedures 
to check customer credit-worthiness, banks will be able to control fraud and regain 
stability (Brimmer, 1969). In addition, banks investigations of the public’s attitudes 
towards credit cards concluded that contradictory to the common perception, 
customers were thrilled not anxious about the cards as receiving one signalled a trust 
relationship between them and their banks. Another issue was also raised regarding 
the anticompetitive nature of the new law that refuted legislators’ mission of 
encouraging competition. A ban on mass mailing would put early adopters at a 
competitive advantage, and erect barriers to entry since other means (such as sending 
applications) proved to be ineffective (Banking, 1969; Brimmer, 1967). 
 
Despite these efforts, pressure was building up to ban mass mailing or introduce new 
security practices with the increase in protest letters sent to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the further bills that were introduced in the Congress. With 
all fingers pointing to banks’ reckless behaviour, the latter sought to shift some of 
the security responsibility to the U.S. Postal system; fraud was mainly caused by 
mail theft of credit cards, and banks should not be blamed for inappropriate security 
procedures in the postal system (Banking, 1969). Some bills therefore allowed 
unsolicited mailing with the condition that cards are sent by registered mail, a 
solution that was opposed by financial institutions due to its high costs. Other bills 
proposed sending customers pre-mailers informing them that they will receive a 
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credit card. The bill that received most attention was the one that authorised the FRB 
to specify requirements that determine who can be targeted by mass mailing, and 
limited customer liability to only $50 (Unsolicited Credit Cards, 1969). While the 
FRB and the credit card industry had no objection to the liability argument they 
rejected the other part of the proposition. First, following FRB examiners’ 
instructions to banks on the importance of improving their mailing screening 
practices, which has been done, there was no need for the FRB to have this 
regulatory authority. Second, it was hard to establish a standard for defining 
customer’s credit worthiness in such a diverse industry, and even if this was done it 
would result in high standards that would make it difficult for middle-income people 
to get a credit card. The industry further reiterated to the Congress their previous 
argument regarding the anticompetitive nature of a law that would ban mass mailing. 
Besides, they argued that the message that would spread upon passing the law is that 
innovations in the financial industry were not welcomed by the Congress (Brimmer, 
1969). 
 
The fact that the bill did not prohibit mass mailing rather placed some restrictions, 
made it face additional resistance from those calling for a complete banning 
legislation. To strengthen their arguments, opponents brought legislators’ attention to 
the various negative impact mass mailing had on society, and structured their 
arguments around four pillars. First, the indiscriminate distribution of credit cards 
encouraged criminal activities not only through unauthorized usage but also through 
selling them in underground market to obtain direct cash. Second, credit cards 
induced customers to spend more, which caused an increase in demand and 
subsequently increased inflation rate and personal bankruptcies. Third, unsolicited 
mailing increased credit card diffusion which threatened the economy that has 
always flourished on thrifts. Finally, customers considered this practice an invasion 
of their privacy and one that involuntarily involved them in a new financial 
arrangement they might not seek (Hanley, 1969; Meade, 1969 ). 
 
These arguments succeeded in gaining the Congress attention, who sought during 
multiple hearings to validate these claims with witnesses from the financial and retail 
industry, as well as testimonies from the general public. After nearly three years of 
Chapter 5 
55 
negotiations, a new law prohibiting mass mailing was enacted in 1970. Figure 5-1 
shows prevention encounters in banning mass mailing. 
 
The passage of the new regulation placed further restrictions on banks, who bore 
most of the losses from fraudulent transactions with customers liable to only $50. 
This liability was even activated under stringent conditions. Banks must notify 
customers of their potential liability, and supply them with a self-addressed stamped 
notification form to mail their banks in case the card was lost or stolen. Moreover, 
banks had to prove the card was legitimate, in a sense that it was either requested by 
the customer or has been used (i.e. prove it was not an unsolicited card), and that any 
unauthorized use of the card happened before they received the bank notice 
(Weistart, 1972). Under these conditions, it was very unlikely that banks would go 
through the trouble of asking customers for this liability share as clearly it was not 
worth the effort. Moreover, they feared adverse public reaction if they did not absorb 
the loss. The law thus drove the industry towards adopting better security practices in 
order to reduce their losses. 
 
With the enactment of this new law, the banking industry’s efforts to keep their new 
business under self-regulation failed. Banning mass mailing law reinforced 
regulatory agency’s power over the banking industry expanding its coverage to 
include credit cards as well. This had an influence on future security practices actors 
sought when preventing fraud. 
 
5.2.2 Prevention Encounter 2: Automating Card Transactions 
 
Before its ban, mass mailing allowed BofA to obtain a large customer base for its 
BankAmericard. This base was nevertheless geographically constrained by federal 
and state regulations that prohibited banks from branching across states. To achieve 
its vision of a national recognition of its credit card, in 1966 BofA licensed its 
BankAmericard program to banks across different states. A security challenge 
quickly arose; license agreement meant participating banks had to honour cards 
issued by any licensee (Abouchar, 1969; Stearns, 2011). Failing to provide an 
effective mechanism for authorizing transactions threatened the achievement of  
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Figure 5-1 Prevention encounters in banning mass mailing 
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BofA’s vision of a card used anytime anywhere in the U.S. Two alternatives were on 
the table, either create a centralized database of all licensee cardholders’ data, which 
meant BofA would have full control over banks financial data, an option favoured by 
neither licensees nor legislators, or maintain the decentralization of cardholders’ 
information and make it acquirers’ (merchant’s bank) responsibility to direct 
authorization requests to issuing banks (Stearns, 2011). 
 
Going for the second alternative made the authorization process works as follow 
(Stearns, 2011; Wiegold, 1971). When a customer presented his credit card for 
payment, the clerk had first to consult a “hot card” list showing numbers of cancelled 
credit cards that should not be honoured. Once the card was cleared, the clerk 
checked the transaction amount; if it was less than the floor limit no authorization 
was required (from the issuing bank). If otherwise, the clerk called the acquirer 
authorization center and verbally communicated the card number and transaction 
amount. The operator on the merchant bank side checked whether the transaction 
was local (the credit card was issued by the merchant bank) or interchange (card 
issuer was another bank). If the transaction was local, the operator consulted pre-
printed reports that displayed customer account history and credit limit/balance, as 
well as checking hot card list. If the transaction was authorized, the operator gave the 
merchant clerk (who waited on the phone during the whole process) an authorization 
code to write down on the sales draft, acting as evidence that the authorization 
process has actually taken place. The clerk was also supposed to check customer’s 
signature on the sale draft against that on the card. 
 
If the transaction was an interchange, the acquirer operator telexed or called the 
issuing bank authorization center and conveyed the transaction details. The operator 
on the issuer side would perform the same activities mentioned above; 
communicated the authorization code to the merchant bank authorization center, who 
then communicated it back to the merchant clerk. Such authorization process took 
between 5-20 minutes. In cases where the operator could not make a decision on his 
own (for example the transaction amount exceeded customer credit limit), he had to 
consult a supervisor who, using the reports, decided the appropriate action. 
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This authorization mechanism proved its ineffectiveness. In their efforts to satisfy 
and show respect to their customers, merchants tended to drop hot card list checking 
from the authorization process (Bartling, 1967; Sutherland, 1981), and sometimes 
the whole authorization procedure realizing that the massive increase in sales volume 
made banks too occupied to note replications in authorization codes (Chutkow, 
2001). Apparently, security practices for interchange transactions were not carefully 
thought about, especially with the differences in times zones across states that made 
them inapplicable as some authorization centers could be simply closed. Licensee 
rebelled against BofA for its lack of proper security controls that made them lose 
millions to fraud instead of making profit from the new business. 
 
To tackle the problem, a new self-governing member-owned organization, called 
National BankAmericard Inc. (NBI)1 was formed with the responsibilities of 
facilitating the program’s operation and marketing functions nationwide, and 
developing an interchange system to reduce fraud. The prevalence of authorization 
problems across banks however made some of them suggest pursuing a joint effort 
instead of an individual one to collectively plan for a nationwide authorization 
system. In April 1970, BofA and American Express sent letters to Master Charge, 
Diners Club, BofA licensees informing them about the joint effort plan and seeking 
their support (Brooke, 1970b). This attempt did not echo very well. NBI questioned 
BofA’s real intentions as it was specified one of the reasons for forming the new 
organization was developing an effective authorization system (Hock, 1999). 
Additionally, Master Charge perceived this action as an attempt to compete with its 
own authorization system run by Omniswitch Corp. BofA and American Express 
stressed their plan does not aim to replace or compete with Omniswitch 
authorization system, but rather complement it by offering early warnings on fraud 
activities on a national level instead of regional one, and lower communication costs 
due to shared usage (Brooke, 1970a). These efforts failed to meet their purpose and 
sentenced BofA and American Express plan to a dead end. The goal of building a 
single authorization system persisted and soon after a committee of representatives  
 
 
1
Renamed to Visa in 1976 
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from BofA, American Express, NBI, Master Charge and other large card issuers 
along with major merchants were formed to resolve any conflicts and reach a 
solution (Hock, 2005). 
 
Fear of creating a monopoly in the card industry that would invite undesirable 
intervention of regulatory agencies drove NBI to abandon the joint effort and 
announce a unilateral pursuit to develop its own authorization system (Stearns, 2011; 
The American Banker, 1971). Though this announcement incited competition 
between software and hardware vendors, who got the opportunity to submit their 
proposal to meet an explicit need, failing to meet NBI’s specifications pushed the 
latter to reject the 13 submitted proposals and internally develop the new system 
called BankAmericard Authorization System Experimental (BASE) (Stearns, 2011; 
The American Banker, 1972). 
 
BASE went operational on April 1, 1973 exploiting information technology’s power, 
and acting as a central traffic coordinator transforming the authorization process that 
became as follow. When a customer presented his credit card to a merchant and the 
amount required authorization, the clerk called his local/acquirer authorization center 
and relayed the card number and transaction amount, the operator in the 
authorization center typed this information on a terminal and submitted the inquiry 
through BASE. Using the first four digits of the card number, BASE determined the 
issuer and forwarded the authorization request to its authorization center. If the 
transaction was legitimate, an authorization code was transmitted back to the 
acquirer center, and the operator then communicated it to the clerk. With BASE, the 
authorization process that took from 5-20 minutes required less than 60 seconds to 
be completed (Brooke, 1973a; Chutkow, 2001; Stearns, 2011). Prevention 
encounters in developing authorization system are depicted in Figure 5-2. 
 
In its first year of operation, BASE saved members more than $30 million in fraud 
prevention (Chutkow, 2001). Despite this, BASE was mainly a system for 
automating interchange transactions, replacing telex or telephone communication 
with a computerized one. Actual authorization procedures depended on whether 
banks had automated their local authorization processes or not. Further, the process 
at merchant’s side remained inefficient; they had to consult hot card lists which were 
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only getting larger, and call authorization center to complete the transaction. Above 
all, floor limits still existed which meant most under limit transactions were being 
processed without authorization (as mentioned previously merchants usually ignored 
consulting hot card list due to its impracticality and fear of sales loss). To solve this 
problem, there was a need for a more effective and efficient method for 
communicating data between merchants and banks (Brooke, 1973a; Stearns, 2011). 
 
5.2.3 Prevention Encounter 3: Automating POS Terminals 
 
Since the early 1970s, the card industry was occupied with developing different 
technologies to fight fraud. Efforts were directed either towards developing 
authorization systems (as BASE) or technologies for capturing and transmitting data 
from merchants’ sites to issuing banks (i.e. automating point-of-sale (POS) 
terminals) (see Figure 5-3). There was an agreement in the card industry that the 
latter should not require human intervention; the whole authorization process should 
be automated to eliminate human error and reduce chances of fraud (Stearns, 2011). 
The encoding technology should also be a viable solution across the industry’s 
various players, i.e. it should be a standardized one to enable cheap and unified 
terminal implementation and facilitate coordination between different authorization 
networks. This agreement drove experimentations in machine readable card 
technologies. To evaluate the various encoding technologies and offer 
recommendations on which one to become the industry standard ABA formed a card 
standardization task force (Stearns, 2011; The American Banker, 1970). 
 
From the forty-four proposals submitted to the ABA task force, offering a total of 
twenty-one distinct encoding technologies including: embossment, magnetic stripe, 
optical codes, and embossed magnetic, the task force decision came to favour 
magnetic stripe as the best encoding technology for machine-readable credit card and 
the one that should be adopted by the credit card industry. The decision was taken 
according to various criteria. First was proved technology. Magnetic stripe (or 
magstripe) could not be considered a new technology; it was used in computer 
systems, and IBM had successfully developed magnetic tape plastic cards prototyped 
by American Express and American Airlines. Further, the banking industry was 
Chapter 5 
61 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Prevention encounters in developing authorization system 
Need for a 
new PM
Need for a 
new PM
Compete 
with
Merchants’ 
dissatisfaction with 
authorization 
process drive 
slackness in 
following security 
procedures 
Licensees rebel 
against BofA due to 
large amount of 
money lost to fraud
Forming NBI to 
develop an 
authorization system
Shared authorization 
problems across 
banks
BofA and 
AmericanExpress 
invite key players to 
join their plan for a 
joint effort
MasterCharge 
authorization system
Failing to gain 
support lead first 
proposal to a dead 
end
challenge
A committee of 
BofA, American 
Express, NBI, 
MasterCharge, 
among others is 
formed to resolve 
conflicts
NBI abandon joint 
effort and pursue a 
unilateral approach 
to develop an 
authorization system 
Antitrust laws
Drive
Trigger Encounters Outcome 
Chapter 5 
62 
familiar with magnetic technology as it used magnetic ink for processing their 
checks. Therefore, magnetic technology was well established in the market with 
capable manufacturers and encoding equipment and terminals that were already 
available. Second was data capacity. The selected technology had to be scalable in 
order to meet future needs. Magstripe had the capacity to incorporate multiple 
recording tracks making it flexible and adaptable.  Third was security. While other 
encoding techniques relied on the embossed character on the card, data in magstripe 
was invisible making it difficult to alter, thus more secure. Fourth was production 
volume. The production of plastic cards, applying the magstripe, and finally 
encoding the data on the stripe could be done at high speed. Fifth was cost. 
Compared to other technologies, the task force concluded magstripe was the most 
feasible encoding technology in terms of cost (Banking, 1973; Brooke, 1971b; 
Bureau, 1971; Stearns, 2011). 
 
ABA task force endorsement of magstripe was contested by multiple actors who 
invested in other POS systems and encoding technologies, leaving the industry by 
this in flux. Retailers opted for optical character recognition (OCR) for reading card 
data, and many were already installing OCR POS terminals. Retailers were 
accustomed to OCR as they used it to read data on card sales drafts. They supported 
their technology by confirming that card embossed characters were already printed 
in an OCR readable format. Banks therefore would not bear any new costs as it 
would have with magstripe (Stearns, 2011). This latter claim vanished when banks 
declared the authorization process required both account number and expiration date. 
While account number font was OCR compatible, expiration date was not. Applying 
OCR would therefore incur new production costs, and so it had no advantage over 
other suggested technologies pertaining to this aspect. Moreover, standardizing font 
to comply with OCR requirements was opposed by cards manufacturers who 
produced different types of fonts, and standardization would force them to lose part 
of their business. 
 
This however did not completely burn OCR bridges of becoming the standard as 
concerns about magstripe security were on the rise. A representative of Western 
States Bankcard Association questioned whether the new standard was preventing 
fraud or facilitating it. The simplicity of security principles behind magstripe made 
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copying card data from one card to another an easy task. In addition, the probability 
of fraud increased with the inconsistency between data used for authorization (data 
in magstripe) and data used for settlement (card embossed characters in sales draft), 
a risk that did not exist with OCR which used the same embossed data for 
authorization and settlement (Brooke, 1971a). 
 
For ABA simplicity was inescapable to make POS terminals economically feasible 
to all merchants, especially low-volume ones who could not afford a more 
sophisticated technology. Nevertheless, the task force acknowledged that no 
technology was 100% secure or enough to attain security, experiments underway 
should guide future improvements in magstripe security, while banks security 
procedures for detecting fraud should work to complement it. ABA’s lack of concern 
regarding these claims can be explained by the cashless society vision other banks 
might have ignored. In a cashless society, all financial transactions would be 
automatically performed by Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) system. Sales draft 
thus would only act as a sales receipt for customers, not a device for claiming funds, 
so the inconsistency claim would be irrelevant (Stearns, 2011). 
 
Debates over magstripe security did not settle, and concerns were reverberated again 
nearly two years after when in April 1973 Transaction Technology Inc. (TTI), a 
subsidiary of First National City Corp., planned a competition among students for 
breaking the security of magstripe. In a press release, TTI announced the security of 
magstripe could be compromised using simple cheap devices (Brooke, 1973b). With 
this announcement Citicorp challenged the industry standard and introduced its more 
secure technology (called Magic Middle), and started developing and installing 
compatible POS terminals in various merchants and bank branches sites (Tyson, 
1973). 
 
These continuous security challenges kept the industry from stabilizing on a certain 
standard, offering no clear direction of how securing card transaction was going to 
be achieved, hindering POS terminal automation. Banks through their testing 
experiments concluded that for POS automation to be economically justifiable, 
terminals needed to be shared between banks, and standardization would enable this 
sharing. Further, POS was part of a larger system, EFT, and any problems in 
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automating POS would only cause delays in implementing EFT systems (Brooke, 
1973c; Stearns, 2011). So there was an urgent need to approve on a standard 
technology. Various actors sought to end this limbo state; bank leaders reiterated 
their support for magstripe stressing the overall value of the technology outweighed 
the security concerns (Brooke, 1973c), and ABA set criteria for any accepted credit 
card technology. First, the technology had to be publicly available to any card issuer 
with no fees or licensing agreements. Second, it must have enough capacity to record 
all needed information. Third, it must be open to issuers outside the banking industry 
as well (The American Banker, 1973). Apparently the criteria were tailored to match 
only magstripe and foreclose any competing technologies. Citicorp new credit card 
was based on a proprietary technology violating the first criteria. Embossed 
character recognition (through OCR) did not meet data capacity condition. Finally, 
besides meeting the first two criteria, magstripe was already in use in other 
industries, such as airlines, formally claiming itself the sole legitimate nationwide 
standard.  
 
While agreement on an industry standard was crucial for allowing the development 
of POS terminals to progress, the industry faced another complication that 
interrupted POS terminal automation. In May 1973, the Department of Justice (DoJ) 
antitrust department declared it would not permit any joint efforts to develop unified 
POS terminals, and it could seek court support to prevent this kind of action. A joint 
venture was presumed to weaken competition, produce a monopolized system, kill 
incentives to develop new innovative POS terminals and deny consumers the right to 
choose a system that best serves their needs and by so burdening them with extra 
costs of services they might not use. The department also argued that electronic 
banking was an emerging phenomenon and running into the conclusion that sharing 
POS was the optimal solution was still early to decide. Instead, regulations should 
ensure the survival of various competing systems and let the public choose ones that 
would stay in the market (Baker, 1974). 
 
From the banks perspective, DoJ confused functions banks compete through with 
those they do not. Automating POS terminals was a technical task for building a 
unified switch and processing center, and this resided outside banks competition 
territory. Banks compete through their products (credits, loans, overdrafts) not 
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technologies that deliver these products. A joint venture for shared POS terminals 
could not therefore be considered violating antitrust laws. In addition, sharing would 
facilitate the enrolment of small-size financial institutions who could not tolerate the 
technology’s high development costs, giving customers the freedom to choose from 
a large base of financial institutions (Brown, 1972; Fisher, 1974). 
 
The implications of DoJ announcement threatened the automation of POS terminals. 
If sharing was disqualified, banks would either need to develop a new mechanism 
for authorizing transactions or develop different terminals that would be piled up at 
merchants’ checkout counters. This latter proposition was completely opposed by 
both parties. Merchants set a single POS terminal that accommodates all banks’ 
cards on the top of their demands for enrolling into POS automation project (Asher, 
1974; Banking, 1975). And without collaboration, banks would find it economically 
infeasible to develop their own POS as mentioned previously. 
 
To resolve the endless clamour over POS terminals along with other issues regarding 
EFT, the Congress established National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer 
(NCEFT) in October 1974 to investigate and develop a national policy for EFT. The 
investigation that lasted for 21 months concluded sharing POS terminals would be 
pro-competitive, and served the interest of both the consumers and the industry as a 
whole. However, it maintained the right to challenge this pro-competitive sharing on 
a case-by-case basis as the effect on competition varies according to the geographic 
and product market, and the number and size of sharing players (National 
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, 1977). The commission’s decision 
removed another obstacle deterring the development of POS terminals, after which 
the process moved smoothly allowing merchants to authorize all transactions (floor 
limit became zero) and shifting the liability for fraudulent transactions to issuing 
banks. Nevertheless, the high cost of these terminals that could reach up to 
$2000/each drove reluctance in adopting them, especially for low-volume merchants 
(Stearns, 2011).  
 
As no prevention measure would be useful if it was not diffused, Visa took several 
actions to solve this problem. Among these was relying on competition between 
technology vendors to develop cost effective terminals. GTE, Northern Telecom,  
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Figure 5-3 Prevention encounters in automating POS terminals
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Sweda, and TalTek offered their prototypes for a pilot test, with the goal of 
evaluating these low-cost terminals and ensuring a workable authorization system 
(ABA Banking Journal, 1980; Stearns, 2011). The company also lowered its 
interchange fee increasing by this merchants’ profitability (Neumann, 1983; Stearns, 
2011). These efforts paid off and by mid-1980s POS terminals were widely adopted, 
all transactions were authorized and fraud dropped significantly. 
 
5.2.4 Prevention Encounter 4: Smart Card vs. Magstripe 
 
After nearly ten years of announcing it the industry standard, and with fraud losses 
reaching up to more than $2 billion in mid-1980s, the card industry started 
considering whether magstripe had become obsolete and it was time to adopt another 
technology (Kutler, 1986d) (see Figure 5-4). Smart cards, mainly adopted in Europe, 
used an embedded microprocessor chip that authenticated cardholders through 
personal identification number (PIN), proved to offer a higher level of security 
against fraud as the card’s chip could not be easily duplicated or copied (Walker-
Leigh, 1982). 
 
The card industry’s response to the new technology was controversial. MasterCard 
was one of the biggest supporters for smart cards; its experiments showed that 
participating members witnessed a significant decrease in fraud losses. The 
company’s high investments in experimentations reflected its belief in the 
technology perceiving it as an effective solution to staggering fraudulent activities 
that had plagued the industry. Smart cards could not only address counterfeiting but 
also credit loss problems. The card could be programmed to shut down when 
cardholders reach their credit limit (Kutler, 1986c; 1986d). 
 
Visa, on the other hand, was more sceptical about smart card’s feasibility. The result 
of a study the company sponsored along with other organizations revealed security 
alone could not render smart card economically feasible; investing in smart cards 
cost nearly $15/card while magstripe cost was less than $1/card; the card had to offer 
other new services to make its costs justifiable (Kutler, 1986b; 1986c). Upon these 
findings, Visa contracted with Smart Card Internationals to produce a multi-
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functional chip embedded card (called super-smart card) that would incorporate 
other services such as a calculator, a clock, and a calendar. The card would further 
store information regarding numerous account types (credit, savings, check), and be 
designed with a keyboard and a screen display to enable cardholders to access and 
manage their different accounts (Berglund, 1987; Weinstein & Marshall, 1985). 
Proponents of the technology however claimed that economic feasibility should not 
be a problem when considering magstripe shorter expiration cycle that significantly 
adds to its costs in comparison to smart cards (Kutler, 1986a; 1988). 
 
Debates between Visa and MasterCard continued with Visa stressing the industry 
not to rush in taking the decision to transition to smart cards and reminding it about 
the massive investments incurred in magstripe while MasterCard criticising the 
clinging on to an obsolete technology and advocating smart card’s feasibility and 
effectiveness in cutting fraud. The contradiction between the two card associations’ 
approaches, Visa’s evolutionary and MasterCard’s revolutionary, rendered the 
industry in limbo with no clear path of whether smart cards would replace magstripe 
or not. The vision got clear in 1988 when Visa announced that smart card was still 
an immature technology and magstripe would be the primary payment technology in 
the 1990s, opening the opportunity for technology vendors to arm it with further 
security features (Kleege, 1993; Kutler, 1988). 
 
5.2.5 Prevention Encounter 5: Strengthening the Legal System 
 
Though automating the authorization process contributed immensely in preventing 
fraud, the industry found itself facing a new wave of fraud that was accelerating. 
Card counterfeiting and alteration became the dominant modes of conducting fraud. 
Criminals obtained card account number by stealing cards and copying information 
encoded in the magstripe through handmade skimmers, or by simply looking for 
carbon sales draft in trash cans (called dumpster-diving). This information was then 
used to produce counterfeited cards, or use the card account number in phone or mail 
orders. Visa estimated that losses from such activities could cost the banking 
industry more than $10 billion in 5 years. 
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Despite Visa’s efforts to strengthen the security of the magstripe card by adding 
different security features, such as holograms, fine line printing, and an encrypted 
numeric value called Card Verification Value (CVV) encoded in the magnetic stripe, 
fraud remained staggering high. The legal system did not consider illegal use of 
credit card numbers a criminal activity; credit cards were restricted to “any card, 
plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining 
money, property, labor, or services on credit” (Truth in Lending Act, emphasis 
added). Since credit card number is not a device, courts could not press charges on 
fraudulent use of card numbers. This encouraged fraudulent use of card numbers, 
Visa’s statistics revealed that losses from card counterfeiting jumped from $750000 
in 1981 to $10.9 million in 1982. Similarly, MasterCard reported an increase in 
losses of $19.8 million in 1982 in comparison to losses in 1981. With these 
staggering losses Visa along others in the card industry relayed their concerns that 
weaknesses in the legal system had a central role in intensifying the phenomenon. 
Acknowledging these problems and the need for reinforcing current prosecution and 
preventive tools, legislators initiated several congressional hearings proposing 
different bills on how to best address these weaknesses (See: the Credit Card 
Protection Act (1983); Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (1983, 1984); the Credit and Debit Card Counterfeiting and Fraud Act of 1983 
(1983); and Joint Resolution (1984)). During these hearings that involved a wide 
range of actors such as, card associations, ABA, National Retail Merchants 
Associations, Credit Bureau, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 
concerns were raised regarding the inadequacy of current statutes that are used to 
prosecute credit card fraud. Truth-in-Lending Act, mail fraud and wired fraud 
statutes currently used by prosecutors did not accommodate fraud committed using 
credit card number, not the card itself. It was not a federal crime to deal and traffic in 
card account number. Law enforcements’ efforts to fight credit card fraud were 
hindered by such gaps in the legal system. This deficiency further played a role in 
mobilizing criminal activities. The lack of federal laws made it difficult to trace 
criminals. Local law enforcement efforts were bounded by their jurisdiction, a 
constraint that criminals could easily bypass by shifting their activities to another 
state. With the absence of federal laws Attorney General was hesitant to become 
engaged in prosecuting these types of criminal activities. The geographic scope of 
credit card fraud expanded to cover the whole nation threatening the integrity of the 
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entire payment system. Credit card fraud evolved from being solo-crimes to 
organized-ones with fraudsters mobilizing their activities across the nation. 
 
Realizing the enormous impact the current legal system had on fraud, actors 
negotiated different approaches to strengthen the legal system. Besides discussing a 
redefinition of what a credit card fraud was, other loopholes that could be used to 
avoid prosecution were also important to close. This involved criminalizing the 
possession of counterfeited cards and counterfeiting equipment, determining the 
conditions under which these crimes were entitled to federal intervention, whether 
amending current statutes used to fight fraud is sufficient or more comprehensive 
revision was needed, and whether computer crimes should be associated with credit 
card fraud. 
 
The hearings resulted in enacting Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, a chapter in U.S. 
Code (Figure 5-5 displays prevention encounters in enacting the new law). The act 
solved the narrow definition of credit card fraud by using the term ‘access device’ 
instead of ‘device’ when determining card fraudulent activity, and defined access 
device by “any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access 
that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain 
money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a 
transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument)”. The 
act further criminalized possession of counterfeited equipment, and expanded federal 
jurisdiction to cover an aggregate value of $1000 or more in fraudulent activities 
regardless of the number of credit cards used to obtain it (previously the $1000 was 
conditioned to a single card fraud) (Joint Resolution, 1984).  
 
5.2.6 Prevention Encounter 6: Security in Card-Not-Present Environment (E-
commerce) 
 
The card industry’s fight against fraud remained mainly concentrated on situations 
where the card was present at the time of the transaction. Radical change to this 
security approach occurred in mid-1990s with the emergence of the Internet and the 
opportunity to do business in a virtual environment. 
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E-commerce rendered many of the security innovations that targeted credit card 
itself (e.g. hologram, fine-printing, CVC) useless. Merchants and financial 
institutions who rushed to exploit the new business opportunity only found the 
current security procedures inapplicable to online payment. A new technology that 
secured credit card transactions in a card-not-present environment had to be 
developed (see Figure 5-6). 
 
With increase pressure on card associations to provide a secure channel for accepting 
payments over the Internet (Kutler, 1996), Visa collaborated with Microsoft and in 
1995 released Secure Transaction Technology (STT), a protocol to secure cards 
payment transactions in cyberspace. Banks did not respond favourably to Visa’s 
STT. Most of them were also members of MasterCard, which itself and in 
collaboration with Netscape, IBM, Cybercash and GTE developed another protocol 
for securing e-commerce (Secure Electronic Payment Protocol). The two protocols 
were not compatible; banks had to bear the cost of installing two systems and 
manage working on two different operating procedures. They rejected this 
unnecessary cost and forced the two card association to cooperate and develop a 
single standard (Bloom & Kutler, 1996; Merkow, 2004). 
 
In February 1996, Visa, MasterCard, GTE, IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, SAIC, Terisa 
Systems, RSA, and VeriSign established Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) 
consortium to resolve the conflict between the two protocols and develop a unified 
one.  In 1997, Visa and MasterCard released SET protocol announcing it the 
standard for securing e-commerce transactions. SET authorized transacting parties 
based on digital certificates and a digital signature that validated the identity of all 
participants through the use of encryption keys (Cerne, 1996). Upon this 
announcement, vendors like IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard started 
developing different security solutions based on the new standard (Kutler, 1997a; 
1997b; Tracey, 1997).  
 
This situation did not last long. The application of digital signature to secure online 
transactions faced a roadblock. States started regulating the use of the technology, 
setting different conditions on when digitally signed documents were considered 
legal. For instance, some states (e.g. Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan) required the 
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application of public key cryptography for the digital signature to have the same 
legal effect as manual signatures, others (e.g. California, Florida, Georgia) left the 
choice of the technology open. This fragmentation meant that technology vendors 
need to develop their security products in multiple ways to conform to different 
states regulation. Such an unnecessary increase in implementation costs would stifle 
development efforts and eventually hinder the growth of e-commerce. Furthermore, 
no transacting party would risk getting involved in a contract that could be 
challenged elsewhere (SEAL, 1998). 
 
At first, legislators were not convinced of the need for a federal law and how state 
regulations regarding digital signature were hindering e-commerce growth. Visa, 
financial institutions and technology vendors all had to participate in multiple 
congressional hearings to change this passive attitude (Anason, 1997; Power, 1997). 
Those actors aired their concerns of how inconsistent regulations added more 
financial burden on those seeking to secure the Internet and the fact that it could 
make the infrastructure more vulnerable to threats as it constrained the application of 
digital signature with a certain technology (e.g. public key cryptography) that could 
become obsolete given the rapid advancements in information technology. In 
addition, having a nationwide validation of digital signature could not be considered 
an extraordinary claim as foreign countries had already done so, leaving the U.S. 
only behind (Electronic Authentication and Digital Signature, (1997); The Federal 
Role in Electronic Authentication, (1997); SEAL, (1998); E-SIGN, (1999)). 
 
Actor’s efforts paid off with the enactment of Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act in 2000. The Act validated the use of digital signature 
technology giving it the same legal effect as manual signatures. The act further 
maintained flexibility and adaptability to changes in technologies by being 
technology-neutral with no specific technical requirements on digital signature (E-
SIGN, 1999). This legal certainty allowed heterogeneous actors to contribute to 
securing credit card transactions by either acting as a “Certificate Authority” (CA) to 
issue and validate digital certificates, or developing security products end users can 
implement to ensure safe online payment transactions. The technological neutrality 
also increased competition among technology vendors who were free to keep pace 
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with technological evolution and embrace any authentication technology to offer 
solutions that best serve the needs of their customers. 
 
Passing this legal complexity, Visa sought to diffuse the adoption of SET standards 
by eliminating chargeback fees on online transactions that comply with SET. 
Chargeback fees became unnecessary since SET ensured that each transacting party 
possessed a digital certificate authenticating its identity, therefore preventing 
repudiation. Visa also eliminated consumer liability in an initiative to alleviate their 
fear about the security of e-commerce transactions (Credit Card News, 1998). 
 
5.2.7 Prevention Encounter 7: Shifting Security Direction: Unified Industry 
Standards 
 
The use of credit cards in online transactions further increased the ubiquity of the 
technology as a payment medium. This made it challenging to develop a certain 
technological solution that accounts for the different needs of the business 
environments where the card was being used. In June 2001, Visa announced its 
Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP) specifying security standards 
members, merchants, and service providers had to follow in order to ensure the 
security and privacy of cardholders’ information wherever it resides (Credit Card 
Management, 2001). Similar programs were initiated by other card companies; such 
as Site Data Protection for MasterCard and American Express’ Data Security 
Operating Policy. The multiplicity of security standards made compliance efforts 
less successful, merchants and acquirers raised their concerns about the costs 
associated with complying with different standards that in their core sought to meet 
the same goal. To end this fragmentation and ease actors’ anxiety, Visa collaborated 
with MasterCard among other card companies to align the multiple standards and 
produce unified global security requirements. The joint efforts resulted in 
announcing Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) in 2004. The 
standards cover various technical and operational areas aiming to offer best security 
practices for securing cardholder information. 
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Figure 5-6 Prevention encounters in securing e-commerce transactions 
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Nevertheless, the standards suffered from different interpretations and contradictory 
requirements, subsequent versions had to be released to address those issues along 
with new security threats. In 2006, actors in the joint effort decided to shift the 
responsibility for maintaining and distributing the standards to a newly formed 
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) while maintaining 
responsibility for validation and enforcement tasks. 
 
The Council’s responsibilities span over multiple security standards such as: Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS), Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-
DSS), and PIN Transaction Security (PTS) requirements. Various actors; such as 
merchants, financial institutions, technology companies, trade associations, 
processors, can play a part in developing and changing these standards by acting as 
“participating organizations”. After releasing the standard, the industry is given 
almost a year to implement and assess the proposed changes. Through Community 
meetings participating organizations share their views and provide feedback to the 
Council from their experience with the new standard and suggest improvements or 
modifications especially in light of evolving security threats. The feedback is 
compiled and reviewed by the Council’s PCI DSS Technical and Working Group 
(TWG) who determine the appropriate course of action (no action, issuance of new 
version, issuance of revision, developing supporting documents (ex. best practices)) 
(PCI SSC, 2010). By this, PCI standards not only provide one referral point to 
comply with multiple card associations’ security requirements, but also reflect the 
needs and concerns of the various stakeholders involved. 
 
Involving such a wide range of actors made the standards prone to multiple 
interpretations that can hinder its implementation. To lessen this ambiguity, the 
Council manages different training programs for firms or experts who seek to be 
qualified data security companies or professionals. Once certified, those, and only 
those, will be considered qualified to validate compliance with PCI standards, and be 
listed in PCI SSC website (PCI SSC, 2016). 
 
Despite solving the fragmentation in security requirements, PCI DSS received wide 
criticism of its high compliance costs. It is estimated that tier 1 merchants spend on 
average $225,000 on PCI auditor expenses alone (Ponemon, 2010). Table 5-1 shows  
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Table 5-1 PCI standards compliance criteria and requirements (Source: Visa U.S.A) 
Level  Merchant criteria Validation requirements 
1 Merchants processing more than 6 
million transactions annually. 
Annual compliance report by Qualified 
Security Assessors (QSA) and quarterly scan 
by Approved Scanning Vendors (ASV). 
2 Merchants processing 1 to 6 million 
transactions annually. 
Annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) 
and quarterly network scan by ASV. 
3 Merchants processing 20000 to 1 
million e-commerce transactions 
annually. 
Annual SAQ and quarterly network scan by 
ASV. 
4 Merchants processing less than 20000 
e-commerce transactions annually and 
all other merchants processing up to 1 
million transactions annually. 
Compliance validation requirements set by 
merchant bank. Other validation requirements 
such as annual SAQ and quarterly scan by 
ASV are recommended. 
 
Visa’s compliance criteria and requirements which vary according to transactions’ 
volume and potential risk. In an attempt to address this and accelerate compliance, in 
December 2006 Visa announced its Compliance Acceleration Program offering 
financial incentives to acquirers whose level one or two merchants (consuming more 
than 60% of Visa’s transactions) are certified as compliant by March 31, 2007 or 
August 31, 2007 and had not been involved in security breach incidents. The 
program however deprived those acquirers from Visa’s best interchange rate in case 
of noncompliance after 30 September, 2007, and they might also find themselves 
eligible to $25000 fine per noncompliant merchant (Cardline, 2007; Wolfe, 2006). 
Prevention encounters surrounding the industry security standards are displayed in 
Figure 5-7. 
 
5.2.8 Prevention Encounter 8: Beyond Magstripe: Tokenization and Chip 
Cards 
 
Despite the card industry’s efforts to maximize the security of cardholder 
information through PCI standards and merchants’ substantial investments to 
achieve compliance, security breaches remained pervasive with much of the costs 
borne by merchants. Facing this complexity, merchants started to rethink their 
security doctrine. In a letter to PCI SSC, National Retail Federation (NRF) conveyed 
merchants’ concerns about the industry’s current security approach and whether it 
was how security is best attained. The letter raised a critical question of why it was 
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merchants’ responsibility to protect financial institutions’ data and spend millions of 
dollars to achieve that though the data was not theirs and security was not their core 
competency. Merchants claimed they were forced to retain card information as part 
of dispute resolution process where banks ask merchants for details about a certain 
transaction identified through the credit card number. NRF pleaded for a use of a 
different technology that would eliminate merchants’ need to store card information 
while retaining the ability to distinguish each transaction, primarily through the use 
of tokens (substitute identifiers). Adopting such a concentrated security approach 
that reallocates sensitive data to reside on few locations instead of being distributed 
across the nation was expected to offer better security (Hogan, 2007). Moreover, 
they urged for a need to keep pace with the rest of the world in adopting chip and 
PIN technology and abandoning the obsolete magstripe that was only adding to fraud 
losses. 
 
Merchants’ change proposal did not resonate very well and was dismissed. The 
matter took a more serious turn in 2009 following a congressional hearing regarding 
the effectiveness of PCI standards in fighting security threats (Do the payment card 
industry data standards reduce cybercrime, 2009). In their opening remarks, 
members of the Congress advocated the transition to chip and PIN that had been 
successful in thwarting fraud. Merchants again reiterated their concerns about the 
industry’s security doctrine and that change was needed to move the fight against 
fraud forward. The first step to achieve that was to consider the implementation of 
emerging technologies such as tokenization, chip and PIN and end-to-end encryption 
(See also: Privacy in the Digital Age, (2014); Protecting Personal Consumer 
Information from Cyber Attacks and Data Breaches, (2014); Safeguarding 
Consumers’ Financial Data, (2014)). 
 
Calls for change were better perceived with PCI SSC acknowledging the need and 
working with technology vendors to evaluate the proposed solutions and how they 
could strengthen and simplify security requirements. Nonetheless, the Council stated 
that due to the high cost associated with implementing end-to-end encryption it 
would be impractical to mandate its usage in the standards as small merchants do not 
have the required resources.  Visa also clarified that it does not require the storage of 
card account number, and merchants should work with their acquirers/processors in 
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producing a token to reference transactions’ details. In addition, the company 
released guidelines and best practices to aid actors who wish to use tokens (Visa, 
2009; 2010). 
 
Despite supporting the need for rethinking security practices where technological 
solutions (as tokenization) were no longer directed towards protecting a valuable 
asset but rather depriving it of its value, and therefore making it less attractive to 
criminals, this did not exceed being a lip service with no serious intentions in taking 
efforts to develop the technology further. To be able to implement tokenization, 
significant changes in the payment infrastructure needed to take place with the 
engagement of all actors to ensure consistent and compatible solutions. With no 
collaborative efforts to agree on how tokens are generated and mapped to the 
original card number, and who is responsible for the card-token vault, adopting 
tokenization to improve the payment system’s security is doubtful. 
 
Serious efforts to go beyond magstripe and adopt tokenization and chip technologies 
started with a change in the marketplace evident in the prevalence of digital payment 
devices, such as mobile phones and tablets, offering opportunities for contactless 
payments that chip technology facilitated. In preparing the payment infrastructure for 
mobile payments, Visa announced in August 2011 its plans to accelerate migration 
towards contact and contactless chip technology. Plans included expanding its 
Technology Innovation Program to U.S. merchants. The program waived merchants 
whose at least 75% of their Visa transactions originate from chip-enabled terminals 
from annual validation of compliance with PCI standards. In addition, new fraud 
liability shift rules would apply to actors not adopting chip (Visa, 2011). To 
accelerate the adoption of tokenization and ensure interoperability across payment 
systems around the globe, in 2013 Visa, MasterCard, and American Express 
collaborated to develop tokenization standard to allow the industry’s different 
players to offer secure and reliable payment experience with no fear of compatibility 
problems (Visa, 2013). 
 
Figure 5-8 depicts prevention encounters in moving beyond magstripe. 
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Figure 5-8 Prevention encounters in moving beyond magstripe 
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6 ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter described prevention encounters in the credit card industry 
since its inception till 2013. In this chapter, I develop a process model of how 
security networks achieve prevention. I first provide a summary of the eight 
prevention encounters in the case of credit card fraud. I then, following CR 
approach, present an analysis of structure and context which is seen essential to 
derive prevention mechanisms. The three prevention mechanisms are then 
introduced and discussed. After that, I draw on the empirical analysis to further 
develop the three forms of incentives synthesized from the literature and better 
explain how actors are mobilized to prevent fraud despite their diverged interests. 
Finally, I present the process model of prevention encounters. 
 
6.2 Prevention Encounters in Developing and Adopting Prevention 
Measures 
 
The case study shows that security threats prevention is a continuous process that 
necessitates the involvement of heterogeneous actors. With each having particular 
perspective on how credit card fraud is best prevented, negotiations and conflict 
resolution become a characteristic of prevention encounters. 
Table 6-1 lists the eight prevention encounters identified while preventing credit card 
fraud and the incentive mechanisms used to mobilize actors towards supporting a 
certain prevention measure. 
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Table 6-1 Prevention encounters 
Period Prevention 
encounters  
PE triggers Description Changes 
(interruptions) in 
security approach 
Actors  Incentive mechanisms 
1958 - 
1970 
Credit card 
mass mailing 
Public outrage 
drove legal 
attention to the 
ineffectiveness 
of banks 
practices in 
preventing 
fraud (social 
pressure) 
The rampant fraud rate, resulting from 
mass mailing of credit cards due to theft 
and improper use, instigated an 
investigation of the phenomenon. After 
several negotiations and debates between 
banking industry and legislative 
authorities, where the former tried to offer 
solutions banks can undertake to prevent 
fraud that keeps legislators at arm’s length, 
the latter considered them not enough and 
took a decisive decision that enacted a new 
law to ban mass mailing of credit cards. 
Moving from a 
situation where 
financial 
institutions were 
the responsible 
actor for card 
security to one that 
made legal 
intervention part in 
preventing fraud. 
General public, 
financial 
institutions, FRS, 
ABA, FTC, 
regulators, US 
post 
Actors supporting a 
banning law sought to 
mobilize others by 
showing the negative 
consequences credit cards 
have on society. Those 
against it tried to change 
those beliefs by stressing 
the perverse effect of a 
banning law 
(Transformative). 
 
1966 - 
1973 
Automating 
card 
transactions 
Prevalence of  
different  
authorization 
problems across 
banks called for 
a different 
approach to 
prevent fraud 
(social 
pressure) 
Increased fraud losses, due to slow 
authorization procedures, drove banks to 
call for joint efforts to address the shared 
problem and create a nationwide 
authorization system. Banks, cards 
associations, and merchants participated in 
discussing the different proposals for the 
joint effort. Fear of competition and 
antitrust laws however caused Master 
Charge and National BankAmericard Inc. 
(NBI) (later becomes Visa) to reject these 
joint effort proposals. NBI consequently 
adopted a unilateral approach to develop 
an authorization system (BASE), which it 
launched in 1973. 
 
Revolutionizing 
authorization 
procedure by using 
technology to 
coordinate traffic 
between 
authorization 
centers. 
Merchants, 
customers, 
financial 
institutions, NBI, 
BofA, American 
Express, Master 
Charge, law, 
BASE 
Though a unified 
authorization system 
might seem favourable to 
actors NBI changed this 
perception and stated that 
a joint effort to develop 
an authorization system is 
counterproductive as 
involved actors will be 
liable to antitrust laws 
(Transformative). 
    Chapter 6 
85 
1970 - 
1977 
Automating 
POS 
terminals 
 
 
Prevalence of  
different  
authorization 
problems across 
banks called for 
a different 
approach to 
prevent fraud 
(social 
pressure) 
With the need for a machine readable card 
to fully automate the authorization process, 
different merchants and banks submitted 
their proposal to American Bankers 
Association (ABA) card standardization 
task force that was formed to evaluate the 
different encoding technologies. Based on 
certain criteria the force announced 
magnetic stripe as the encoding technology 
to be adopted in the banking industry. 
However actors challenged the security of 
the new industry standard and offered their 
own more secure solutions. ABA task 
force worked to reconfirm the legitimacy 
of magstripe as the encoding technology 
and respond to these challenges. After 
intense negotiations the industry stabilized 
again on magstripe. Automating POS 
terminals was further interrupted by DoJ 
announcement that sharing POS terminals 
may be subject to antitrust action. 
Following considerable debates between 
the banking industry and DoJ, the 
Congress established National 
Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer 
to investigate the subject matter. The 
commission declared sharing POS 
terminals is legal allowing development 
efforts to proceed. 
Eliminate human 
intervention in 
authorization 
process by 
automatically 
capturing and 
transmitting data at 
merchants’ site, 
allowing 
authorization of all 
transactions. 
ABA task force, 
encoding 
technologies, 
merchants, 
financial 
institutions, 
Western states 
bankcard 
association, City 
Corp, DoJ, 
regulators, 
NCEFT 
Full automation of 
authorization process was 
indispensable to eliminate 
floor limits, hot card lists, 
and shift liability for 
fraudulent transactions 
from merchants to issuing 
banks (Captive). 
 
Opponents of magstripe 
tried to change actors’ 
beliefs about the security 
of the technology and 
how in fact it increases 
fraud (Transformative).  
In response to 
countermoves supporters 
stressed that reaching a 
consensus on an encoding 
technology is needed to 
pursue the vision of 
cashless society 
(Captive). Further, they 
argued that security 
should be seen resulting 
from the payment system 
as a whole not only the 
card encoding technology 
(Transformative).  
Supporters of magstripe 
were able to mobilize 
actors towards accepting 
the technology ending by 
this the instability in the 
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market facilitating 
automation efforts to 
continue (Preparatory). 
 
Financial institutions 
sought to clarify 
misconceptions held by 
the DoJ about sharing 
POS terminals and how it 
ensures the involvement 
of all actors regardless of 
their size 
(Transformative). The 
negotiations resulted in 
legalizing sharing 
providing with this legal 
certainty for the 
worthiness of investment 
in this technology 
(Preparatory). 
1982 - 
1988 
Smart card 
vs. magstripe 
Staggering 
fraud rate 
forced banking 
industry to 
consider a new 
technology to 
prevent fraud 
(technology) 
The evidence of the effectiveness of smart 
cards in preventing fraud drove the 
industry to start experimenting with the 
new technology. With the two card 
associations adopting different approaches, 
Visa supporting an evolutionary approach 
while MasterCard a revolutionary one, and 
each actor trying to counter-argument the 
other, the industry was in a limbo; not 
knowing which direction to take. 
Supported by the heavy investments in 
magstripe that made banks skeptical about 
smart cards, as well as results from its 
experiments with the technology, Visa was 
Changing industry 
standard by 
proposing chip-
enabled cards to 
replace magstripe 
in preventing fraud. 
Smart card, Visa, 
MasterCard, 
financial 
institutions 
Proponents of magstripe 
mobilized actors around 
the technology and 
maintained belief that 
magstripe is the best 
technology for preventing 
fraud by highlighting the 
big investments the 
industry endured in 
magstripe and the fact that 
smart card is for offline 
environment rather than 
U.S. online one 
(Transformative). Visa 
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able to end the limbo state and re-stabilize 
the industry by reconfirming its 
commitment to magstripe while 
encouraging banks and technology vendors 
to come up with new ways of increasing 
magstripe security. 
also incited competition 
in strengthening the 
security of magstripe by 
announcing it the standard 
for the next decade 
(Preparatory) 
1983 - 
1984 
Strengthening 
the legal 
system 
Industry players 
lobbied for 
stronger laws 
after 
recognizing 
weaknesses in 
the legal system 
that added to 
fraud (social 
pressure)  
Several congressional hearings took place 
with the participation of different actors to 
address gaps in the legal system and how 
best they can be closed. Actors held 
different perspectives on this matter; some 
advocated the need for comprehensive 
card fraud law revision, while others opted 
for minor amendments. The hearings 
resulted in approving and passing Credit 
Card Fraud Act to redefine fraudulent 
activities by criminalizing illegal use of 
card account number or possession of 
counterfeited equipment. 
Redirecting 
security efforts 
towards protecting 
what is of real 
value in the 
technology, which 
is the credit card 
number itself rather 
than merely 
protecting its 
materiality as with 
previous PM that 
focused on card 
design security 
features.  
Visa, 
MasterCard, 
National Retail 
Merchants 
Associations, 
DOJ, FRS, ABA, 
US Post 
The enactment of a new 
law armed law 
enforcement agencies 
with tools necessary to 
fight fraud (Preparatory) 
1995 - 
2000 
Security in 
card-not-
present 
environment 
(e-commerce) 
Banks and 
merchants 
wanting to do 
business online 
pressured card 
associations to 
develop a 
secure online 
payment 
infrastructure 
(social 
pressure) 
Given the pressure for a secure online 
payment infrastructure, the two giant card 
associations each collaborated with 
technology vendors to produce a secure 
protocol. The incompatibility between the 
two protocols caused banks to reject them, 
and force the two card players to merge 
their efforts and produce a unified standard 
called Secure Electronic Transaction 
(SET) in 1997. With the standard in place 
technology vendors started developing 
security products. This was interrupted 
however by states’ inconsistent approach 
Challenges to 
conventional 
security methods 
due to the 
emergence of a 
new lucrative 
virtual business 
environment that 
called for new 
security approaches 
to tackle fraud in 
card-not-present 
environment. 
Financial 
institutions, 
Technology 
vendors, Visa, 
MasterCard, SET, 
regulators 
To enable competition 
between technology 
vendors in developing 
innovative technologies to 
secure e-commerce 
transactions, Visa and 
MasterCard announced an 
industry standard to act as 
a baseline for security 
products (Preparatory).  
 
Proponents of digital 
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towards digital signature (one of SET 
component) that created unnecessary extra 
cost for compliance. Actors went through 
multiple negotiations to convince 
legislators how such inconsistency was 
affecting the industry and the security of 
online financial transactions. In 2000, 
Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act was passed to 
give digital signatures the same legal status 
as written signatures, legitimizing by this 
the use of the technology.To encourage the 
adoption of SET, Visa changed its 
chargeback policy to eliminate chargeback 
fees for merchants complying with SET. 
signature worked to 
legitimize the technology 
and gain legislators 
support by signifying the 
perverse effect current 
state behaviour had on the 
growth of e-commerce 
and how the current 
fragmented state 
threatened the efficiency 
of the nation’s payment 
system (Transformative). 
Actors further confirmed 
that without a consistent 
approach towards digital 
signature there will be no 
e-commerce (Captive). 
 
Adopting SET to secure 
online credit transactions 
was encouraged by tying 
cost savings with the 
technology (Captive). 
2004 Shifting 
security 
directions: 
unified 
industry 
standards 
Widespread 
usage of credit 
cards, as well 
as the 
multiplicity of 
security 
programs drove 
major card 
associations to 
combine their 
efforts and 
To ensure the security of cardholder 
information wherever it resides, major card 
associations resorted for security programs 
that industry players should conform with. 
Disparities between these programs made 
them less successful in achieving their 
goals and attaining compliance. Given the 
shared purpose of all them, the major card 
associations coordinated their efforts and 
produced a unified standard called 
Payment Card Industry Standard Data 
Relying on general 
standards rather 
than a specific 
finalized 
technological 
solution to prevent 
fraud, expanding 
by this fraud 
prevention network 
to include all those 
storing/processing 
Card 
associations, 
security 
standards, 
merchants, 
acquirers, PCI 
standards, PCI 
SSC 
Recognizing the diversity 
of business environment 
and its security needs, 
security standards was 
introduced to give actors 
the flexibility they need to 
adopt security practices 
that best match their 
requirements. To further 
support actors’ 
commitment to fighting 
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produce a 
unified standard 
(technology) 
Security Standard (PCI DSS) in 2004. In 
2006, Payment Card Industry Security 
Standard Council (PCI SSC) was formed 
to maintain and distribute the standards as 
well as producing multiple versions to 
address rising security concerns. Through 
Community meetings members provide 
feedback on the different versions of the 
standards. 
 
credit card 
information. 
fraud, major card players 
announced a unified 
version of the various 
security standards 
reducing with this 
compliance cost 
(Preparatory). Visa also 
tied favorable interchange 
rates with compliance to 
PCI standards (Captive). 
2007 - 
2013 
Beyond 
magstripe: 
tokenization 
and chip 
cards  
Continuous 
data breach 
incidents in 
merchants’ 
system caused 
them to rethink 
security 
practices and 
push for new 
technologies 
(social 
pressure) 
In a letter sent to PCI SSC, National Retail 
Federation (NRF) aired merchants’ views 
about the constant data breach incidents 
despite all investments made to comply 
with the industry standards, urging the 
council to rethink how the fight against 
credit card fraud should proceed. NRF 
accused card companies of having a role in 
the continuous breaches since it is their 
rules that required merchants to store card 
details, making them attractive targets. The 
effectiveness of PCI standards in 
preventing security threats was further 
challenged by legislators. Visa clarified it 
does not require the storage of card data by 
merchants, and the latter should work with 
their banks to develop an alternative for 
distinguishing card transactions other than 
card number (mainly through 
tokenization). PCI Counsel emphasized its 
commitment to security through its 
feedback mechanism with participating 
organizations and collaboration with 
technology vendors on the possibility of 
Adopting a new 
approach to 
security that 
devalues the 
technology by 
replacing its most 
critical element 
(credit card 
number) with a 
token reducing its 
attractiveness to 
criminals. 
NRF, PCI SSC, 
PCI standards, 
regulators, Visa, 
MasterCard, 
American 
Express, 
tokenization 
standards, Chip 
cards 
NRF sought to attract 
mobilization against PCI 
standards and gain 
support for new 
technological solutions by 
claiming that banks 
procedures propagate 
security breaches not 
thwart them 
(Transformative). Visa 
and PCI Counsel stressed 
the complexity of security 
threats and that security is 
a shared responsibility.  
The emergence of mobile 
payments incited Visa to 
support migration towards 
Chip cards. Visa also 
collaborated with 
MasterCard and American 
Express to introduce 
tokenization standard to 
capture this business 
opportunity (Captive).  
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incorporating new technologies within the 
standards. The advent of mobile payment 
was followed by more serious attempts to 
adopt tokenization and chip card., Visa, 
MasterCard and American Express 
introduced tokenization standards to 
ensure compatibility among different 
payment systems. Visa expanded its 
Technology Innovation Program to 
accelerate the migration to chip 
technology. Also, merchants who apply 
tokens can save costs by waiving 
compliance with PCI DSS. 
The standard allowed 
technology vendors and 
merchants to pursue their 
development effort and 
ensure interoperability 
between various solutions 
(Preparatory). Merchants 
are induced to adopt 
tokenization and chip 
cards by coupling it with 
certain financial savings 
(Captive). 
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6.3 Structural and Contextual Analysis 
 
According to CR, mechanisms emerge in virtue of the nature of the entities that 
possess them. Part of explaining therefore becomes identifying entities’ properties 
that enable the prevention mechanisms to exist. These properties should be 
differentiated from contextual conditions that trigger mechanisms. Sayer explains 
“although causal powers exist by virtue of the objects which possess them, they are 
contingent on conditions for activating them”. In other words, the role of properties 
is enabling mechanisms while the role of context is activating them. Following CR, 
there are two tasks to undertake: “to explain the causal properties of each entity in 
terms of its internal structure and to explain the occurrence of particular events in 
terms of conjunctures of the causal properties of various interacting mechanisms” 
(Porpora, 1998, p.343). Besides identifying properties and mechanisms, we also need 
to identify contextual conditions that activate the mechanisms. In what follows I 
identify entities’ properties and the contextual conditions that are seen causally 
relevant in the events taking place while preventing credit card fraud. I then integrate 
them with the prevention mechanisms and explicate their role in the emergence of 
the three prevention mechanisms in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3.1 Entities and Properties 
 
In identifying properties of the structural entities that enable prevention mechanisms, 
I seek to answer the following question: “What is it about the structures which might 
produce the effects at issue?” (Sayer, 1992, p. 95). As structures (constitute entities 
of interest) are at the center of attention here, decomposing them first to their 
constituent elements such as, actors, organizations, systems, relationships, is 
necessary (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
 
Elements of structure, or structural entities, in security networks include: regulatory 
agencies (FTC, FRB), financial institutions, laws, operating procedures, prevention 
technologies (BASE, PCI standards), card associations (Visa, MasterCard), 
customers, merchants, technology vendors. These elements are assembled into three 
groups: social actors, operating system, and technology. Social actors involve 
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individuals such as legislators, customers, merchants or organizations as FTC, Visa, 
financial institutions that interact in security networks to prevent threats. Operating 
system refers to laws, rules and regulations that govern and shape actors’ 
interactions. For example, in the second prevention encounter branching laws 
prohibited banks from opening branches in different states. This forced BofA to 
expand its card business through license agreements which had implications on the 
authorization procedures and fraud rates. Finally, technology refers to the collection 
of technological solutions developed over time to prevent fraud. 
 
Analysis of these three structural entities identified three properties that are causally 
relevant to events taking place while preventing fraud: heterogeneity of role, 
inherited complexity, and technological novelty (summarized in Table 6-2). 
 
By definition security networks comprise heterogeneous actors as seen clearly from 
the case study. These actors are positioned differently in the network and therefore 
inhabit different roles and interests. These roles are defined within the context of the 
network they belong to (Callon, 1991). Actors can be challengers, arbitrators, 
stabilizers or enablers. While those assuming the challenger role contest prevention 
measures and refuse to inhabit roles assigned to them by other actors, arbitrators 
seek to formally resolve conflicts between actors through examining the contested 
issue and evaluating possible alternatives in order to make a final verdict. Others 
work as enablers to provide foundational cornerstones that other actors can utilize to 
build prevention measures. Finally, stabilizers confront interruptions in security 
networks prevention efforts and work to re-establish stability to allow actors to 
continue their efforts in implementing a particular prevention measure.  
 
Inherited complexity describes the interconnected nature of the legal system that 
transcends to interfere with security network’s prevention efforts. Inherited 
complexity is derived from the U.S. legal system that is based on interrelated 
systems of legislative, judicial and executive branches that exist on both federal and 
state level. The legislative system is responsible for making laws and is represented 
by the Senate and House of Representatives, which together form the Congress. 
These laws are interpreted and applied by the judicial system represented by state 
and federal courts. The executive system headed by the president legitimizes and 
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enforces the laws. As a product of federalism, each state has its own constitution and 
legal system. Controversies across states are expected, and thus the U.S. constitution 
specifies the conditions where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
This multi-layered structure of the legal system where there is a branch for enacting 
laws and another for interpreting them create an atmosphere of uncertainty as actors 
lack definite knowledge of how actors in the legal system would react to actions they 
undertake to prevent fraud. Moreover, laws by themselves are intertwined and can 
lessen the impact of one another. Enacting or modifying one law can create ripple 
effects throughout the legal system. For example, the enactment of a new law that 
would allow federal law enforcements to investigate fraudulent activities clashed 
with Right to Financial Privacy Act that restricts financial institutions from reporting 
crimes and thus hindering federal agencies’ card losses investigations as it constrains 
their access to financial records. Amending Right to Financial Privacy Act then 
becomes inevitable to enable the progression of investigation efforts. 
 
Finally, technological novelty captures the dynamisms in security networks and the 
necessity to keep pace with new emerging threats. It shows how new technologies, 
whether they are payment technology, preventive technology or medium technology, 
shape collective security efforts. Given the rapid innovations in information 
technologies the subject of new technologies receives wide attention in both 
academic and business world (Rotolo et al., 2015) where the concept is often 
associated with a multiplicity of definitions. In this research technological newness 
refers to the use of a new principle to achieve a similar purpose (Arthur, 2007). That 
is for a technology to be considered new it has to build on or need different basic 
principles to prevent security threats than those used before. This definition 
corresponds with the research conceptualization of prevention encounters as the 
latter denote challenges in current security practices that call for re-evaluating 
existing prevention measures. 
 
Novel (new) technologies thus have a disruptive impact on established social, 
economic and legal practices. They challenge existing institutions as knowledge 
about their applicability and outcomes is incomplete (Garcia & Calantone, 2002) 
making them ambiguous with uncertain future. Actors try to sense their way through 
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experimenting different solutions to prevent fraud to gain better knowledge about the 
technology and its consequences. In addition, new technologies are known of being 
interpretively flexible (Pinch & Bijker, 1987) and so ascribed with different and 
sometimes conflicting meanings. They therefore create confusion over future 
directions for security efforts and necessitate time and interactions between actors to 
develop a common understanding of the technology. At the same time, novel 
technologies can transform organizations’ business model and offer new business 
opportunities and lucrative markets (Arthur, 2007) creating new security challenges. 
 
Table 6-2 Properties of structural entities in security networks 
Property Definition 
Heterogeneity of role Different positions actors occupy in security networks to achieve 
prevention that range between challengers, arbitrators, stabilizers and 
enablers. 
Inherited complexity The multi-level nature of the legal system that transcends to interfere 
with security network’s prevention efforts. 
Technological novelty  Newness of the technology that requires the use of different 
principles to prevent security threats. 
 
In summary, the effect of technological novelty is observed in terms of 
experimenting with the technology, the different interpretations ascribed to it, and 
business opportunities it offers. 
Evidence of these properties across the case study is described in Table 6-3. 
 
Table 6-3 Structural entities properties mapped with prevention encounters 
Prevention 
encounter 
Heterogeneity of role Inherited complexity Technological 
novelty 
Credit card mass 
mailing 
 Actors such as FRB 
and FI acted as 
challengers and 
contested solutions 
proposed by 
legislators. 
  The novelty of 
credit card stirred 
various 
interpretations of 
the technology and 
its impact on 
economy.  
Automating card 
transactions 
   The 
advancements in 
computer 
technology drove 
experimenting its 
use in automating 
transactions  
 A unified 
authorization 
system was 
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interpreted 
differently among 
actors. 
Automating POS 
terminals 
 ABA task force was 
formed to evaluate 
the technologies 
and give 
recommendations 
(arbitrator) 
 Some actors’ 
challenged 
magstripe security 
and called for a 
different standard. 
 
 DoJ considered 
sharing POS 
terminals 
anticompetitive and 
liable to antitrust 
laws (challenger) 
 
 ABA task force role 
shifted to defend its 
endorsed 
technology 
(stabilizer) 
 
 Financial 
institutions clarified 
they do not 
compete over 
technology 
products (stabilizer) 
 
 NCEFT was formed 
with the role of 
investigating the 
issue and resolve 
conflicts over 
legitimacy of 
sharing POS 
terminals 
(arbitrator) 
 
 
 Although the 
executive branch 
of the legal 
system considered 
sharing POS 
terminals against 
antitrust laws, the 
legislative branch 
nonetheless 
required further 
information to 
judge whether it 
resides within 
antitrust laws or 
not. 
 The need for new 
encoding 
technology in 
card authorization 
drove 
experimentations 
of multiple 
technologies. 
 
 The fact that 
magstripe was 
not an established 
technology 
opened chances 
for considering 
other alternatives 
to become the 
standard. 
 
 POS terminals 
revolutionized 
how merchants 
and banks 
interact and 
blurred industrial 
boundaries which 
allowed actors to 
view the 
technology in 
different ways 
(interpretation). 
 
 DoJ argued that 
POS terminal is 
an emerging 
technology and 
so there is still 
room for 
experimenting 
with other 
technologies that 
may better serve 
the public. 
Smart card vs. 
magstripe 
 Visa wore the 
stabilizer hat and 
announced smart 
card is still a 
premature 
technology and 
magstripe is the 
standard for the next 
decade. 
  The emergence of 
smart card as a 
new technology to 
prevent fraud 
drove actors to 
experiment with 
the technology in 
order to gain better 
understandings of 
its potentials and 
test its technical 
and economic 
feasibility. 
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 While some actors 
perceived smart 
cards as the new 
fraud prevention 
technology others 
interpret it as a 
solution finding a 
problem. 
Strengthening the 
legal system 
  The mobility of 
credit card fraud 
across the nation 
was facilitated by 
the layered nature 
of the legal 
system where 
fighting fraud is 
present only on 
state level but not 
federal level 
drove actors to 
call for federal 
intervention.  
 
 Different 
approaches for 
federal 
intervention 
between 
legislative and 
executive 
branches enabled 
negotiations to 
determine the best 
approach to 
follow. 
 The innovative 
forms of credit 
cards fraud drove 
actors to 
reinterpret what 
constitute a credit 
card and credit 
card fraud. 
 
 The use of 
computers to 
conduct fraud was 
new and required 
a legal definition 
of a computer. 
Nonetheless, 
actors negotiated 
an exclusion of 
some proposed 
solutions that 
relate to the use of 
computers as 
shared 
understanding on 
the meaning of the 
technology has 
not been 
developed yet 
(interpretation). 
 
Security in card-not-
present environment 
(e-commerce) 
 Financial institutions 
challenged Visa’s 
and MasterCard’s 
proposed security 
protocol and argued 
for a need of a single 
standard 
(challenger) 
 
 Card associations 
played as 
infrastructure 
providers and 
through SET 
consortium offered 
technology vendors 
a security protocol 
they can use when 
developing their 
 The multi-layered 
nature of the legal 
system produced 
inconsistent 
approach towards 
digital signature 
and forced actors 
to re-negotiate 
security over the 
Internet. 
 The internet gave 
rise to new 
business 
opportunity to do 
commerce for 
merchants and 
banks, and for 
technology vendor 
to develop 
solutions to secure 
online 
transactions. 
 
 Due to the novelty 
of the Internet 
legislators needed 
multiple hearings 
to give meaning to 
the technology 
and understand 
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own prevention 
measures (enabler). 
 
 The legal 
complexity 
surrounding digital 
signature hampered 
developing security 
products efforts, the 
industry 
consequently 
worked to gain legal 
certainty to allow 
implementation 
efforts of prevention 
measure to proceed 
(stabilizer). 
how different state 
regulations hinder 
the growth of e-
commerce 
(interpretation). 
 
Shifting security 
directions: unified 
industry standards 
 To facilitate the 
adoption of PCI 
standards, PCI SSC 
maintain and update 
the standards and 
ensure shared 
understanding of the 
security 
requirements 
through training 
programs 
(stabilizer). 
 
 PCI DSS TWG 
works to evaluate 
the thousands of 
inputs from 
participating 
organizations related 
to proposed changes 
and prepare a draft 
for the new standard 
(arbitrator). 
  Following the 
release of a new 
standard actors 
start assessing it in 
order to give their 
feedback and 
propose changes 
to be discussed in 
Community 
meetings 
especially in light 
of new security 
threats 
(experiment). 
Beyond magstripe: 
tokenization and 
chip cards 
 Merchants rebelled 
against PCI 
standards and drove 
adoption of another 
technology 
(challenger). 
 
 PCI SSC contested 
claims about the 
ineffectiveness of 
PCI standards and 
worked to clarify the 
Council’s 
commitment toward 
security and keeping 
pace with advanced 
security solutions 
(challenger) 
 
  Tokenization gave 
actors the 
opportunity to 
capture new 
revenues through 
securing mobile 
payments. 
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 Visa, MasterCard, 
and American 
Express cooperated 
to provide 
technological 
infrastructure for 
tokenization. 
(enabler) 
 
6.3.2 Contextual Conditions 
 
Mechanisms’ effect is contingent on conditions responsible for activating them. The 
analysis showed actors’ actions in prevention encounters were triggered by 
dissatisfaction with current prevention measures and the fragmented approaches 
towards security. Those two were further behind the prevention encounters triggers 
witnessed in the case. 
 
Dissatisfaction with prevention measures stemmed from the fact that they were no 
longer effective in preventing fraud as ways of countervailing them were on the rise. 
For instance, the slowness of early authorization procedure coupled with the lack of 
proper control over the process allowed merchants to bypass it, proving its 
ineffectiveness in thwarting fraud, which called for a new prevention measure. 
Similarly, the continuous security breaches despite the implementation of PCI 
standards drove the need for another more effective prevention measure. 
Inapplicability of current prevention measures to a certain environment is another 
source of dissatisfaction. The fact that laws defined credit cards as a device made it 
difficult to apply them when prosecuting criminals on cases that contained an illegal 
use of credit card numbers. Laws therefore were unable to maintain their deterrence 
effect. Likewise, prevention measures that relied on the physical presence of the card 
at the time of transaction were useless in an e-commerce environment. In both cases, 
it was the inapplicability of prevention measures that drove actors’ actions in 
security networks to develop another prevention measure that matches the new 
context. 
 
Dissatisfaction with prevention measures was not the only condition for triggering 
collective efforts in security networks. Fragmented security approaches were a 
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source of frustration for actors that initiated prevention encounters. When states 
started regulating the use of digital signature specifying when it is considered legal, 
actors swiftly acted and lobbied for a unified approach towards the technology. 
Along the same line, the numerous security programs initiated by card associations 
to protect card information which in their essence had the same goal placed 
unnecessary extra costs on merchants and processors suggesting a need for a change. 
 
After understanding events in fraud prevention and identifying entities and 
properties that had a significant role in outcomes observed along with the contextual 
conditions that triggered prevention encounters, I will move now towards identifying 
prevention mechanisms. 
 
6.4 Prevention Mechanisms 
 
Analysis of prevention encounters showed that there are three mechanisms that 
explain how security networks achieve prevention. To facilitate the explication of 
these mechanisms, I describe the relationship between them and entities’ properties 
that support them. I show how context, structural entities and their properties interact 
to produce the outcome observed. 
 
Figure 6-1 shows the structure of causal explanation after identifying the missing 
elements. 
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Figure 6-1 The complete structure of causal explanation in security networks 
 
6.4.1 Proposing Solutions Mechanism 
 
The first mechanism identified is proposing solutions mechanism. This mechanism 
emerged from the interactions between actors on how best to tackle the issue at hand. 
It refers to the process by which actors realizing the need for a change in security 
practices propose different solutions to prevent security threats. 
 
It was apparent with the huge outrage that followed the introduction of credit cards 
to the market that a change in banks security practices is needed. What the change 
would be varied according to how actors interpreted the new payment technology 
(technological novelty). As providers of credit cards, financial institutions’ 
suggestion of modifying mailing procedures to include a more rigorous check of 
customers’ credit worthiness reflected their desire to protect their new business from 
any legal intervention and constraints that might be placed on their actions. This 
proposition nevertheless conflicted with how legislators perceived the new 
technology. For members of the Congress, the credit card was an inflationary device. 
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Through cards, customers gained easy access to a considerable amount of money 
which could increase their spending and eventually inflation rate. Besides, 
contractual agreements between merchants and acquirers and acquirers and issuers 
involve paying merchants an amount less than the price of the merchandize. There 
were further concerns that merchants will pass on this loss to customers through 
higher prices, which can add to inflation. As legislators seek to protect the interests 
of the general public, which for them could be only ensured by enacting a new law 
that regulates credit cards, sponsors of the new law aimed through it to reduce the 
number of credit cards circulated. This should result in lessening the negative 
ramifications credit cards have.  
 
The novelty of credit cards as payment devices continued to be seen even after years 
of its introduction. Being a new technology, it was not easy to envisage ways in 
which credit card fraud can be conducted. This was complex not only due to the 
newness of the credit card itself but also to the advancements in information 
technology that could be used to infiltrate credit cards. For example, strengthening 
the legal system prevention encounter showed the different bills introduced to tackle 
the system’s weaknesses. While some focused on redefining credit cards and 
prohibiting buying, selling, or possession of equipment used to produce fraudulent 
cards or accounts, others in addition to these modifications recognized developments 
in information technology and understood credit card fraud in conjunction with 
computer crime and so included a prohibition of the use of computers to commit 
fraud or disclose information without authorization in their proposals. 
 
The role of technological novelty in the emergence of proposing solutions 
mechanism is not limited to the technology interpretive flexibility aspect but can 
extend it to include other aspects as well as evident in automating POS terminals 
prevention encounter.  The benefits credit cards offered made them desirable to 
banks, merchants, and technology vendors (business opportunity). For banks and 
technology vendors they provided a new mean of doing business and increasing 
profits, while for merchants they released them from back office headache 
concerning administrative and accounting functions. Therefore, when there was a 
need to electronically transmit card information between merchants’ sites and 
issuing banks, merchants, financial institutions, and technology vendors collectively 
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engaged in enhancing the efficiency and security of the authorization process and 
participated in experimenting with a variety of technologies for encoding card data. 
This process resulted in proposing 44 solutions to ABA task force for evaluation. In 
a similar vein, when computers processing power starting to be evident in late 1960s, 
processors began experimenting with computers to revolutionize credit card 
authorization process and test computers capabilities. Omniswitch started offering its 
services in 1970 and National Data Corporation (NDC) joined Omniswitch two years 
later. These experiments proved the feasibility of this technical solution and 
accordingly NBI and other card associations worked to propose their own 
authorization system. 
 
Business opportunities accompanying new technologies proved crucial in driving 
actors to engage in proposing solutions that would maintain credit card security. 
When merchants in 2007 rebelled against PCI standards and called for adopting 
tokenization to prevent fraud, card associations’ response came only to verbally 
support merchants’ claims and delegating the responsibility of negotiating and 
implementing the new solution to acquiring banks, and no further action was taken. 
It was only when the diffusion of tablets and smartphones offered new means of 
payment and opportunity to expand services and increase credit cards usage that card 
associations took tokenization (as well as chip cards) seriously and started 
collaborating to offer a standard that would facilitate the utilization of tokens to 
secure mobile payments. This was also the case in securing transactions over the 
Internet where Visa and MasterCard rushed to propose their security protocols in 
order to capture the new revenue stream. 
 
Although technological novelty is the dominant property for enabling proposing 
solutions mechanism to emerge, heterogeneity of role and inherited complexity 
played a role in some prevention encounters. On the one hand, moving beyond 
magstripe prevention encounter showed that actors can rebel against roles defined to 
them and seek to reorganize the network around a different prevention measure. 
Merchants, who suffered from continuous security breaches, defied PCI standards 
and proposed tokenization and chip cards as alternative technologies to prevent 
fraud. 
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On the other hand, looking at the prevention encounter in strengthening the legal 
system show how the legal system can have a hand in exacerbating fraud. The 
structure of the legal system that is divided into state and federal laws enabled 
proposing solutions mechanism to emerge. Despite the presence of state laws that 
criminalized fraudulent activities, the mobile nature of credit card fraud made it 
bypass state jurisdictions. Counterfeiting the cards, for instance, can be based in one 
state while distributing them in another. The fact that federal laws did not 
criminalize such activities opened opportunities for actors to offer different 
proposals on how federal laws can be amended to fight fraud. 
 
Through collective efforts to enhance current situation and prevent fraud in a more 
effective way, proposing solutions mechanism was manifested in actors’ attempts to 
sense their way to credit cards security through offering different prevention 
measures. This was mainly driven by the uncertainty associated with novel 
technologies that made it difficult to know in advance the prevention measure that 
would best prevent fraud and meet actors’ interests. Actors therefore were forced to 
experiment with different solutions to obtain knowledge about their feasibility and 
effectiveness. In addition, the presence of opportunities to increase profits incited 
competition and supported the rise of multiple solutions. 
 
Table 6-4 summarizes entities properties that enabled proposing solutions 
mechanism to emerge in each prevention encounter. 
 
Table 6-4 Structural entities properties in proposing solutions mechanism 
Prevention 
encounters 
Heterogeneity of role Inherited complexity Technological 
novelty 
Credit card mass 
mailing 
  Actors held different 
interpretations of 
credit cards, for 
example, legislators 
perceived it as an 
inflationary device 
while FI perceived it 
as an innovative 
payment method. This 
directed the solutions 
each proposed.  
Automating card 
transactions 
  With the rise of 
computers processing 
power actors started to 
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experiment the use of 
computers to 
automate the 
authorization process. 
Automating POS 
terminals 
  Use of a card 
encoding technology 
to automate 
authorization changed 
interactions between 
merchants and banks 
and resulted in 
experimenting with 
different encoding 
technologies. 
Smart card vs. 
magstripe 
  The emergence of 
smart card as a new 
technology to prevent 
fraud drove actors to 
experiment with the 
technology in order to 
gain better 
understandings of its 
potentials and test its 
technical and 
economic feasibility. 
Strengthening the 
legal system 
 The mobility of credit 
card fraud across the 
nation was facilitated 
by the layered nature 
of the legal system 
where fighting fraud 
was present only on 
state level but not on 
federal level. This 
drove actors to call for 
federal intervention. 
The innovative forms 
of credit cards fraud 
forced actors to 
reinterpret what 
constitute a credit card 
and credit card fraud 
and propose 
prevention measures 
accordingly. 
Security in card-not-
present environment 
(e-commerce) 
  The Internet disrupted 
actors’ business 
model and called for 
means to secure the 
new environment. 
Visa and MasterCard 
each rushed to capture 
this business 
opportunity to expand 
the use of their cards 
and hence offered 
security protocols. 
Shifting security 
directions: unified 
industry standards 
  Following the release 
of a new standard 
actors start assessing 
it in order to give their 
feedback and propose 
changes to be 
discussed in 
Community meetings 
especially in light of 
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new security threats 
(experiment). 
Beyond magstripe: 
tokenization and 
chip cards 
Continuous security 
breaches even with the 
adoption of PCI 
standards made 
merchants question the 
effectiveness of the 
standard and call for 
new prevention 
measures (challenger). 
 Innovations in 
payment technology 
necessitated new 
prevention measures 
to secure mobile 
payments and be able 
to take advantage of 
the new revenue 
stream (business 
opportunity). 
 
6.4.2 Resolving Dissonance Mechanism 
 
The entangled relationships between actors and the availability of different solutions 
to prevent fraud forced actors to engage in a negotiation process to reach consensus 
on which prevention measure to adopt. This was a complicated task as actors 
challenged each other’s solution in an attempt to rule out all others except theirs. 
Proposed solutions went through several iterations of exclusion and refinements 
before the network sealed on one of them. Resolving dissonance mechanism 
emerged from diverged perspectives on means of achieving security and preventing 
fraud. It refers to the process by which actors engage in negotiations to solve 
conflicted views about the proposed prevention measures to reach consensus on the 
best approach to take to prevent security threats.  
 
As described in the prevention encounters, different positions were held on how 
credit card fraud should be tackled. Having these conflicted views drove actors to 
negotiate and find their way into a solution that satisfies them all.  Throughout these 
negotiations, actors sought to develop a shared understanding of the technology itself 
and how the problem at hand can be best approached. When legislators introduced a 
bill that constrained mailing credit cards by means of registered mail and only in 
response to written application, the financial industry rejected such a bill as 
registered mail was too costly, and experiments with other means to enter the credit 
card market such as what was proposed in the bill (sending applications) proved to 
be ineffective and generated low response rate when compared to mass mailing 
(heterogeneity of role). Failing to reach consensus, financial institutions proposed 
sending a pre-mailer to notify customers and make them aware of their credit cards. 
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This method ensured customers become knowledgeable of the credit card and gave 
them the freedom to either accept or reject it and hence could not be considered an 
invasion of privacy. Legislators however did not see any difference between this new 
distribution method and mass mailing. They argued sending pre-mailers placed a 
burden on customers to respond in situations where they do not wish to receive the 
card and perceived this as an inconvenient practice.  
 
Legislators faced similar situations representing opportunities for multiple 
interpretations in automating POS terminals and strengthening the legal system 
prevention encounters. In the former, the use of POS terminals completely changed 
the conventional form of communication between merchants and banks creating 
confusion over where the boundaries lie anymore and opening the opportunity to 
negotiate whether sharing POS terminals was anti-competitive or not. In the latter, 
bills proposed to strengthen the legal system involved acknowledging the role of 
computers in conducting fraud. The newness of the technology however made actors 
(DoJ, FBI, Department of Treasury, states representatives) reluctant to support such 
bills as agreement on a definition for a “computer” and what would constitute a 
computer crime had not been reached yet and was still under investigation. They 
accordingly negotiated for segregating computer fraud problems and addressing 
those related specifically to credit card fraud. 
 
While the above mentioned prevention encounters demonstrate how the newness of 
the technology allowed it to be perceived in multiple ways and therefore affecting 
the network’s prevention efforts, security in card-not-present environment showed 
that because the technology (the Internet) was new legislators were unable to ascribe 
it with a specific meaning. Several hearings had to take place to provide necessary 
information for them to develop an understanding of the technology and be able to 
judge whether federal intervention was needed or not. 
 
Failing to reach common understanding prolonged the negotiation process and 
increased the number of solutions proposed. Besides the multiple interpretations 
surrounding credit card and its prevention measures (technological novelty), 
heterogeneity of role further supported resolving dissonance mechanism, whether 
that was through actors’ rejection to take a role in the network or the emergence of 
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entirely new roles. Consensus was thought to be reached when ABA supported a bill 
that allowed unsolicited mailing with the conditions that the FRB prescribes 
regulations for customers illegible to unsolicited cards. However, the unwillingness 
of the FRB to take responsibilities in the area of consumer protection, along with the 
continuous social pressure rising from the large number of letters that were 
repeatedly sent to the FTC complaining about banks’ mailing behaviour, and 
testimonies from various actors regarding the role of credit cards in individual 
bankruptcies and criminal activities, drove legislators to be more stringent on their 
ruling and the bill was eventually modified to ban mass mailing all together. 
 
Challenger role was strongly evident in several other prevention encounters denoting 
its pivotal influence on the emergence of resolving dissonance mechanism. The 
simplicity of magstripe security features and the significant investments undertaken 
in other prevention measures made actors contest magstripe as the industry standard 
and opened the doors for considering other prevention measures. Likewise, PCI SSC 
challenged claims about the ineffectiveness of PCI standards in preventing security 
breaches and through negotiation sought to clarify the role of the Council including 
its initiatives towards incorporating different solutions in new versions of the 
standards. 
 
Security was not the only aspect that attracted challenges to a certain prevention 
measure. In automating POS terminals, it was the anti-competitive nature of the 
prevention measure (sharing POS terminals) not its security aspect that drove DoJ to 
contest its legality and encourage searching for other solutions. And in securing 
online transactions, the incompatibility between STT and SEPP was the driver for 
banks’ rejection of the proposed solutions and the basis for negotiating for a single 
security protocol. 
 
In addition to rejecting (challenging) roles, resolving dissonance mechanism was 
supported by the emergence of new roles that enrolled new actors to the network. 
The multiplicity of change proposals created a need for a formal body to evaluate 
them and determine what the future change would be. Arbitrator role thus emerged, 
and accordingly actors such as ABA task force and PCI DSS TWG arose to occupy 
that position. 
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Sudden exposure to new technologies incited conflict and negotiation. The 
possibility of introducing smart cards to the U.S. credit card industry was behind the 
extensive experimentations Visa and MasterCard undertook to check its applicability 
to the U.S. environment. Through these experimentations, actors developed 
assumptions and meanings of the technology which shaped the negotiation process. 
MasterCard was convinced smart cards were the new revolution in fraud prevention. 
Its heavy investments echoed its belief. Visa’s position, in contrast, showed how it 
interpreted the technology through its economic feasibility rather than its security 
promises. Building a whole new infrastructure to support smart cards could not be 
justified based on security reasons solely. Based on this reasoning, negotiations were 
enriched by Visa’s call for discovering new card applications that can make the 
technology more economically feasible. Proponents of magstripe saw smart cards as 
a solution that is finding a problem. It was a success in Europe because it solved 
poor communication lines problem between merchants and financial institutions that 
made online authorization impossible, a problem that did not exist in the U.S. The 
hazy future of smart cards with opponents and proponents and the conflicted 
approaches of the two major card players gave actors the opportunity to raise their 
concerns or interests regarding the technology so that a unified approach towards it 
can be reached. 
 
Prevention encounters surrounding alternative encoding technologies that challenged 
magstripe is another example that shows how technological novelty enabled 
resolving dissonance mechanism to emerge. Encoding card information with 
magstripe was not an established practice and magstripe had not yet been widely 
diffused in the credit card industry. Its announcement to become the standard came 
after ABA’s task force recommendations. This timeframe between its announcement 
and its wide diffusion gave the opportunity to negotiate other alternative 
technologies before it was too late. Consequently, actors against magstripe rushed to 
propose other technologies such as OCR and Magic Middle that can address security 
weaknesses in magstripe.  
 
Building shared understanding during negotiations can be challenging when 
considering the nature of the industry’s operating system. The legal system that 
governs the banking sector had constrained many efforts for collective action to 
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prevent fraud (inherited complexity). When negotiations for developing a unified 
authorization system for interchange transactions were underway, actors soon 
excluded this solution because of antitrust laws. Such collaborative efforts if 
presumed could be viewed by the DoJ as a collusive practice that creates a monopoly 
and hinders fair competition. This was also seen in automating POS terminals where 
different branches in the legal system held different views on the legality of the 
sharing behaviour. While the executive branch perceived sharing terminals anti-
competitive and liable to anti-trust laws, the legislative one saw that little is known 
about this behaviour and what alternative solutions lie on the table and thus required 
more information to determine its legality. Divergent approaches between the 
executive and legislative branches stemmed negotiations in prevention encounters in 
strengthening the legal system as well. Although actors reached consensus on the 
need for a stronger federal presence in fighting credit card fraud, they nevertheless 
had to negotiate the conditions that would warrant federal intervention. Federal 
thresholds suggested in proposals were in terms of either the possession of a 
particular number of counterfeited cards (10 or more, 5 or more) or an aggregate 
amount of fraudulent activities ($5000) or both (10 or more and $5000). Despite 
recognizing the standard procedures in the Federal Government where specifying the 
loss amount is necessary to ensure its enrolment, actors representing the DoJ opted 
for a more flexible solution that would give them the ability to be involved in 
situations regardless of the loss amount. Legislators however argued that states can 
have better prosecution laws and enforcement procedures that should not be 
overruled by federal regulations. Therefore, there should be a policy that clarifies 
when a federal jurisdiction is triggered. Following these discussions, consensus was 
reached and a new law was enacted that limited federal intervention to crimes that 
involve the possession of 15 or more counterfeited access device and have an 
aggregate value of $1000 in fraudulent amount.   
 
The effect of inherited complexity on resolving dissonance mechanism is not limited 
to interactions on the federal level but can also rise from those occurring at the state 
level. The divergence of the U.S. legal system into 50 state laws where each state 
started to regulate the use of digital signatures created a plethora of inconsistent 
regulations that hindered the implementation of the prevention technology and 
stirred actors to demand a federal law that would pre-empt states conflicting laws. 
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A summary of entities properties that enabled resolving dissonance mechanism to 
emerge in each prevention encounter is presented in Table 6-5. 
 
Table 6-5 Structural entities properties in resolving dissonance mechanism 
Prevention 
encounters 
Heterogeneity of role Inherited complexity Technological 
novelty 
Credit card mass 
mailing 
Actors such as FRB 
and FI acted as 
challengers and 
contested solutions 
proposed by 
legislators. 
 The different 
interpretations 
assigned to the new 
credit cards 
distribution methods 
enabled resolving 
dissonance 
mechanism. 
Automating card 
transactions 
  Actors negatively 
interpreted the joint 
efforts plans and 
perceived them as a 
mean to control the 
industry. 
Automating POS 
terminals 
ABA task force acted 
as arbitrator to evaluate 
proposed encoding 
technologies and 
decide on an industry 
encoding standard. 
 
Banks and merchants 
who invested in an 
encoding technology 
other than magstripe 
challenged the security 
of the technology in an 
attempt to redirect the 
industry towards their 
solution (Challenger). 
 
DoJ considered sharing 
POS terminals 
anticompetitive and 
liable to antitrust laws 
(Challenger) 
Although the 
executive branch of 
the legal system 
considered sharing 
POS terminals against 
antitrust laws, the 
legislative branch 
nonetheless required 
further information to 
judge whether it 
resides within antitrust 
laws or not. 
As magstripe was still 
not established in the 
credit card industry; 
that is it has not been 
widely diffused and 
adopted for a long 
time, allowed 
negotiations of 
alternative 
technologies to 
emerge. Space for 
experimenting with 
other technologies still 
existed. 
 
POS terminals 
revolutionized how 
merchants and banks 
interact and blurred 
industrial boundaries 
which allowed actors 
to view the 
technology in 
different ways 
(interpretation). 
DoJ argued that POS 
terminal is an 
emerging technology 
and so there is still 
room for 
experimenting with 
other technologies that 
may better serve the 
public. 
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Smart card vs. 
magstripe 
  While some actors 
perceived smart cards 
as the new fraud 
prevention technology 
others interpret it as a 
solution finding a 
problem. 
Strengthening the 
legal system 
 Different approaches 
for federal intervention 
to criminalize credit 
card fraud between 
legislative and 
executive branches 
enabled negotiations 
to determine the best 
approach to follow. 
The use of computers 
to conduct fraud was 
new and required a 
legal definition of a 
computer. 
Nonetheless, actors 
negotiated an 
exclusion of some 
proposed solutions 
that relate to the use 
of computers as 
shared understanding 
on the meaning of the 
technology has not 
been developed yet 
(interpretation). 
Security in card-not-
present environment 
(e-commerce) 
Financial institutions 
challenged Visa’s and 
MasterCard’s proposed 
security protocol and 
argued for a need of a 
single standard 
(challenger). 
The multi-layered 
nature of the legal 
system produced 
inconsistent 
approaches towards 
digital signature and 
forced actors to re-
negotiate security over 
the Internet. 
Due to the novelty of 
the Internet legislators 
needed multiple 
hearings to give 
meaning to the 
technology and 
understand how 
different state 
regulations hinder the 
growth of e-commerce 
(interpretation). 
Shifting security 
directions: unified 
industry standards 
PCI DSS TWG works 
to evaluate the 
thousands of inputs 
from participating 
organizations related to 
proposed changes and 
prepare a draft for the 
new standard 
(arbitrator). 
  
Beyond magstripe: 
tokenization and 
chip cards 
PCI SSC contested 
claims about the 
ineffectiveness of PCI 
standards and worked 
to clarify the Council’s 
commitment toward 
security and keeping 
pace with advanced 
security solutions 
(challenger). 
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6.4.3 Paving the Way Mechanism 
 
The case analysis showed that once conflicts were resolved and consensus on the 
mean to prevent fraud was reached, efforts to take the prevention measure into 
practice started. Paving the way mechanism refers to the process by which actors 
engage in materializing the agreed on solution and eliminating obstacles that may 
derail development efforts. 
 
The agreement on a prevention measure amongst a pool of measures available 
enabled actors to concentrate their resources and delineate their future security path. 
Upon announcing magstripe the encoding technology standard technology vendors 
focused on developing POS terminals that could read magstripe rather than any other 
technology. Vendors such as GTE, Northern Telecom, Sweda International, and 
AT&T started marketing their terminals to banks who then sold them to merchants. 
Large scale pilot tests ran through the industry to evaluate the authorizing network, 
the low-cost terminals, as well as ensuring merchants’ satisfaction. 
 
Events taking place in this mechanism are mainly supported by the heterogeneous 
roles actors inhabited with a strong presence for stabilizer and enabler roles (see 
Table 6-6). The analysis showed that in certain prevention encounters taking the 
prevention measure into practice involved the enrolment of new actors to the 
network as new roles emerged. The agreement on developing a unified standard to 
secure e-commerce transactions created a need for an actor to be responsible for 
combining the two proposed protocols (STT and SEPP) and resolve compatibility 
problems, and so SET Consortium was formed to inhabit this role. Developing the 
protocol was vital because other actors in the network depended on it to pursue their 
security efforts (enabler). Technology vendors awaited the release of SET to 
incorporate it into their security products before offering them in the market. 
Microsoft, for instance, announced its secure e-commerce payment solution, 
Microsoft Wallet, based on SET. Similarly, Verifone, the leading POS terminal 
manufacturer, incorporated SET in its financial software vGATE. Interdependencies 
among actors continued with a new role emerging from the release of SET itself. The 
technology used digital signatures and digital certificate to secure online financial 
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transactions. Certificate Authorities that issue and validate these digital certificates 
were thus enrolled in the network. 
 
Putting the prevention measure into practice did not always run smoothly however 
and in some prevention encounters it was interrupted forcing actors to re-negotiate 
their security practices. These interruptions were driven mainly by the novelty of the 
technological solution that offered space for re-negotiations as with the magstripe 
security case discussed in resolving dissonance mechanism, or because the 
technology caused many old barriers to fall creating confusion in the network. For 
instance, the use of POS terminals introduced not only a new technology to the 
market but also a new process for handling credit card transactions. It revolutionized 
how merchants and banks interacted, confusing the functions of each. It was no 
wonder therefore that sharing POS terminals was interpreted by the DoJ as anti-
competitive behaviour though the development of POS terminals does not lie within 
banks tasks. This misinterpretation associated with implementing an unfamiliar 
approach in authorizing credit card transactions necessitated re-negotiating the 
industry’s security practices to clarify and redress the meaning of the new prevention 
measure. During this process, financial institutions acted as a stabilizer seeking to 
regain stability which was critical for the progression of the development efforts. 
Their efforts nonetheless were to no avail, the irreconcilable differences between 
actors while negotiating sharing POS terminals created a need for a thorough 
investigation of the phenomenon to formally resolve the conflict. NCEFT was 
formed and assumed a new role (arbitrator) that after two years of examination 
announced the legality of sharing POS terminals and allowed the implementation 
efforts to proceed.  
 
Stabilizer role turned to be critical in this mechanism as interruptions to 
implementation efforts were evident in several prevention encounters. Because there 
should be legal acceptance of technologies used in electronic authentication, states 
rushed to regulate digital signature technology. This resulted in a multiplicity of 
inconsistent laws that undermined certainty and hindered the implementation of 
SET. Facing these conditions, actors as financial institutions, card associations, and 
technology vendors moved to stabilize the environment and obtain national 
uniformity towards electronic authentication. They engaged in negotiations with 
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legislators claiming the need for a law that would provide certainty and flexibility to 
adapt to innovations in information technology. Their efforts came to fruition and 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act was enacted legalizing 
digital signatures with no specifications on the kind of technology that should be 
used. 
 
Interruptions in security networks prevention efforts were also seen in situations 
where a state of vagueness dominated the industry and clarifications on how to move 
forward were needed. Following the intense experimentations in smart cards by the 
major card associations, confusion whether it would replace magstripe prevailed in 
the network. Technology vendors lacked knowledge on which technology they 
should direct their investments. To end this state, Visa wore the stabilizer hat and 
announced magstripe the industry standard and that all efforts should be directed 
towards making it more secure giving technology vendors the stability and security 
they need for their financial investments. Likewise, the possibility of interpreting 
PCI standards in multiple ways hindered their implementation. PCI SSC hence 
provides training programs to ASV and QSA to ensure unified understanding of the 
meaning of the standards that would facilitate compliance with the agreed on 
prevention measure (stabilizer). 
 
It is important to mention that actors’ roles are not static and can shift to match the 
new context. During the negotiations of the best encoding technology to adopt, ABA 
task force acted as arbitrator to evaluate the several proposed encoding technologies. 
However, due to challenges the task force faced upon announcing its 
recommendation that disrupted the legitimacy of magstripe, the force shifted its role 
to act as a stabilizer to regain endorsement of magstripe. The task force resorted to 
solve the conflicts by tailoring the requirements for the industry standard in a way to 
exclude other solutions except magstripe. It by this succeeded in re-establishing the 
network stability needed to continue investments in and implementation of the 
technology.   
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Table 6-6 Structural entities properties in paving the way mechanism 
Prevention 
encounters 
Heterogeneity of role Inherited complexity Technological 
novelty 
Credit card mass 
mailing 
   
Automating card 
transactions 
--- --- --- 
Automating POS 
terminals 
Facing interruptions 
from challengers, ABA 
task force acted as a 
stabilizer to regain 
endorsement of 
magstripe from the 
industry’s actors. 
 
FI sought to clarify the 
area where they 
compete in order to 
relax DoJ 
anticompetitive 
concerns (stabilizer) 
and allow 
implementation to 
continue. 
 
Facing the multiple 
views on sharing POS 
terminals held by actors 
in the legal system and 
actors in the credit card 
industry NCEFT acted 
as an arbitrator to 
evaluate the different 
possible solutions and 
announce a final 
verdict of the legality 
of the contested issue. 
  
Smart card vs. 
magstripe 
Following the 
confusion created in the 
card industry of 
whether smart card will 
overrule magstripe Visa 
announced the latter to 
continue to be the 
industry standard and 
urged actors to direct 
their efforts to make the 
technology more secure 
(stabilizer). 
  
Strengthening the 
legal system 
   
Security in card-
not-present 
environment (e-
commerce) 
Card associations 
played as infrastructure 
providers and through 
SET consortium 
  
         Chapter 6     Chapter 5 
116 
offered technology 
vendors a security 
protocol they can use 
when developing their 
own prevention 
measures (enabler). 
 
The legal complexity 
surrounding digital 
signature hampered 
developing security 
products efforts, the 
industry consequently 
worked to gain legal 
certainty to allow 
implementation efforts 
of prevention measure 
to proceed (stabilizer). 
Shifting security 
directions: unified 
industry standards 
To facilitate the 
adoption of PCI 
standards, PCI SSC 
maintains and updates 
the standards and 
ensures shared 
understanding of the 
security requirements 
through training 
programs (stabilizer). 
  
Beyond magstripe: 
tokenization and 
chip cards 
Visa, MasterCard, and 
American Express 
acted as infrastructure 
providers and offered 
tokenization standard to 
facilitate the 
implementation of 
payment solutions 
based on tokenization 
(enabler). 
  
 
Table 6-7 summarizes the definition of each prevention mechanism. 
 
Using Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) conditions-mechanisms-outcome structure, Figure 
6-2 presents a tentative process model of how security networks achieve prevention. 
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Table 6-7 Prevention mechanisms 
Preventive mechanism Definition 
Proposing solutions The process by which actors realizing the need for a change in 
security practices propose different solutions to prevent security 
threats. 
Resolving dissonance The process by which actors engage in negotiations to solve 
conflicted views about proposed prevention measures to reach 
consensus on the best approach to take to prevent security threats. 
Paving the way The process by which actors engage in materializing the agreed on 
solution and eliminating obstacles that may derail development 
efforts. 
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Figure 6-2 A process model of prevention encounters (tentative)
Interruption   
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6.5 Incentive Mechanisms 
 
The process model of prevention encounters showed that security networks’ work 
processes involve interactions between heterogeneous actors who inhabit different 
roles and have divergent interests. Fraud prevention processes were therefore full of 
contestation and disagreements. To maintain the network stability and ensure 
collective security efforts, it was critical not only to align actors’ interests but to 
continuously do so as the case showed interruptions may disrupt an already stable 
network. This alignment and re-alignment processes to mobilize and recruit actors to 
prevent fraud were achieved by utilizing a collection of incentives to influence 
actors’ behaviour and motivate them towards the desired goal. Drawing on the initial 
conceptualization of incentives I now detail the mobilization processes. In doing so 
and in cases where the spokesperson of the actors is not self-evident, I will adopt the 
viewpoint of the financial industry in general and Visa in particular and describe 
processes they/it undertook and incentives used to build a network of allies (Latour, 
1987). I first present the three incentive mechanisms and what do they mean drawing 
on insights from the case, then I detail which of these incentives were used in each 
prevention encounter to mobilize actors. 
 
Transformative Incentive Mechanism 
 
The first incentive mechanism is transformative incentives. The case showed that 
actors in security networks held various beliefs on actions either pursued or needed 
to prevent fraud; some were supportive while others were obstructive. This 
mechanism emerged as actors got engaged in a negotiation process to resolve 
differences and correct, what they viewed as, misconceptions held about their actions 
or technologies developed in order to transform old beliefs and replace them with 
new supportive ones. 
 
“Rhetorical war” can best describe many of the events taking place in security 
networks. Efforts to mobilize actors were confronted with counter-mobilization ones 
that sought to take the industry in another direction. Transformative incentives 
mechanism refers to efforts taken to mobilize actors towards a certain issue by 
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changing their belief about it through adopting one or more rhetorical devices and/or 
drawing on vocabularies of motive repertoire.  
 
Preparatory Incentive Mechanism 
 
The second mechanism to converge actors in security networks is preparatory 
incentives. This mechanism emerged as actors sought to smooth the path for 
developing prevention measures. The analysis showed preparatory incentives came 
in two forms, either to provide legal certainty or operational certainty.  
 
Legal certainty refers to the condition where a stable legal framework exists to foster 
collective security efforts and protect actors’ security investment, while operational 
certainty refers to the condition where a baseline for security efforts is established 
through the provisioning of foundational standards and laws that direct future 
security path. Preparatory incentive mechanism therefore refers to efforts taken to 
mobilize actors towards a certain issue by manipulating their environment to make it 
more legally and operationally desirable. 
 
Captive Incentive Mechanism 
 
The third incentive mechanism is captive incentives. Actors employing this 
mechanism sought to influence behaviour by placing the prevention measure 
(technology) between actors and their interests, making enrolment an inevitable 
outcome. Captive incentive mechanism refers to efforts taken to mobilize actors 
towards a certain issue by making the latter indispensable for them to achieve their 
personal goals.  
 
6.5.1 Prevention Encounter 1: Credit Card Mass Mailing 
 
As described in the first prevention encounter, following public outrage and 
regulatory intervention due to massive fraud rates, the credit card industry found 
itself in a situation where it has to defend its practices and change current beliefs 
about their passive attitude to prevent fraud (transformative incentive). In doing so, 
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different actors from the industry participated in rhetorical wars to mobilize 
legislators and fight against a prohibition law. They based their debates on perversity 
and futility arguments, while adopting a variety of vocabularies of motive along the 
way (see Table 6-8). 
 
In their negotiations, the financial industry (represented by FRB, ABA, banks) de-
escalated problems arising from mass mailing while problematizing the proposed 
solutions by escalating the negative future consequences that would follow a 
complete ban on this practice. They argued that legislators’ optimum role is ensuring 
the benefit of the public through enacting rules and regulations to meet this aim. 
However, enacting a law to ban mass mailing seems to contradict with this mission 
and leave the industry and the public in a worse situation (perversity). The proposed 
law would give financial institutions that have already resorted to mass mailing a 
competitive advantage over ones that yet seek to enter the credit card market. It was 
well known among financial institutions that mass mailing is the most effective and 
efficient solution to enter the new market as it had high response rate compared with 
other entry solutions, as applications sent by mail. Without mass mailing, Interbank 
(currently known as MasterCard) would not have been able to acquire a large 
customer base and so compete with BankAmericard. Legislators who always 
defended competition will now only hurt it by erecting barriers to entry. 
Furthermore, enacting such a law would reflect legislators’ position regarding 
innovations in the financial industry and send a negative signal that discourages 
institutions from investing in innovative payment solutions. 
 
The financial industry also utilized futility argument in their defence. They stated 
banks already have self-motivation to prevent fraud to protect their profits and 
reputation. Corrective actions were already in place making the new regulation of 
little impact to thwart fraud or incite banks to enhance their security controls. 
 
Though these arguments seemed solid enough to transform held beliefs, the industry 
faced counter-mobilization efforts from supporters of the new law who also utilized 
a collection of rhetorical arguments and developed their own vocabularies of motive 
to reinforce legislators’ current beliefs and forbid transformation efforts. Statements 
from state representatives and bankruptcy division stressed the importance of the  
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Table 6-8 Belief transformation tools in credit card mass mailing 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against banning law Perversity, futility Role conflict, anti-
competitiveness, self-motivation, 
problem de-escalation 
Supporting banning law Perversity, jeopardy  rapid growth (urgency), spawning 
problems 
 
new law which without the society would only suffer more (perversity). The 
arguments revolved around the threat the rapid diffusion of the new payment 
technology had on society.  Credit cards, and the act of unsolicited mailing, did not 
only increase criminal activities but also spawned economic problems such as 
inflation and bankruptcies. Credit cards increase purchasing power and decrease 
savings trends, and so they jeopardize the country’s whole economy which is based 
on thrifts (jeopardy). Besides this national impact, mass mailing could also threaten 
consumers clean credit records and credit rating as shown by the statement of the 
director of President’s Committee on Consumer Interests, 
 
The principle problem is of jeopardy or potential jeopardy to a consumer’s credit 
rating, since the intended recipient of an unsolicited credit card may not be aware an 
account has been opened in his name if he never gets the card (Meade, 1969, p.64 ). 
 
These actors collectively pressed the urgency for legislative intervention to control 
banks’ behaviour as the phenomenon is growing rapidly. 
 
The strength of the counter-movement arguments, which was supported by real 
evidence such as statistics of economic consequences, for example for bankruptcies, 
and a considerable amount of consumers’ complaint letters, precluded any disruption 
in legislators’ beliefs regarding the danger mass mailing had on society and helped in 
reinforcing them giving legislators comfort about their ruling. 
 
6.5.2 Prevention Encounter 2: Automating Card Transactions  
 
The second prevention encounter presented the use of transformative incentives as 
well. However, it showed the failure of BofA’s attempts to mobilize actors towards 
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joining its proposal for a unified effort to build a national authorization system 
instead of developing different systems that serve the same goal. BofA’s efforts were 
not received well by actors in the credit card industry, especially the two newly 
established card associations. NBI and Master Charge sought through rhetoric to 
change beliefs about the proposed prevention measure. They raised scepticism about 
BofA’s true intentions and spread the word that this was a move by the bank to 
control the industry and centralize power in one actor. Moreover, joint efforts 
proposals neglected the regulatory environment that governs banks’ actions. 
Antitrust laws prohibit collusive practices, and cooperation between the industry 
players to develop one unified system could be considered one (anti-
competitiveness). Such efforts will then be ineffectual since they will be liable to 
legal scrutiny that could dissolve them (futility). 
 
These arguments and the lack of counter-mobilizing moves from BofA and 
American Express (Table 6-9) succeeded in shaking actors’ beliefs about the value 
of the joint efforts and enabled NBI to convince banks that pursuing unilateral 
authorization path is the most viable solution.  
  
Table 6-9 Belief transformation tools in automating card transactions 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against unified system Futility Scepticism, anti-competitiveness 
Supporting unified system --- --- 
 
6.5.3 Prevention Encounter 3: Automating POS Terminals 
 
This prevention encounter provided evidence of the use of the three incentive 
mechanisms in response to how automating POS terminals process was evolving.  
 
The beginning of the process revealed how captive incentives facilitated actors’ 
engagement in the process. When there was a need to transform the authorization 
process during the early days of credit cards, banks and merchants both had interests 
to collaborate with each other in this reform. The authorization process still required 
human intervention to communicate transaction details to the issuing bank. The 
process was prone to human error that would only prolong authorization and lower 
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customer satisfaction. Moreover, as part of fraud prevention procedures, merchants 
were still required to consult hot card list for transactions below the floor limit. This 
did not reflect a trust relationship between them and their customers and in many 
situations they bypassed this authorization step taking the risk in cases where the 
card was fraudulent. Merchants therefore were eager to automate merchants-banks 
communication through card encoding technology. This allowed them to ensure 
high-quality customer service, increase store traffic and shift the liability for 
fraudulent transactions to issuing banks. 
 
For banks, full automation of the authorization process would help in reducing credit 
card fraud losses that were massive. Using a card encoding technology to transmit 
data between merchants and banks eliminated the need for a floor limit allowing all 
transactions to go through issuing banks for authorization. In addition, hot card lists 
themselves were not up-to-date, and it took several days for a card to be registered 
on the list. Full automation would enable them to realize higher profits from the 
credit card business. With these mutual benefits, experimenting with different 
encoding technologies to automate merchants-banks communication witnessed 
active engagement by both parties.  
 
 The alignment of interests between actors however did not last. After announcing 
magnetic stripe as the card encoding technology, negotiations started of whether 
magstripe was the best alternative available to prevent fraud. As described in the 
third prevention encounter, actors who have already invested in other encoding 
technologies did not want their investments to go in vain, and they worked to change 
how others see magstripe. Opponents’ debates focused on whether a drastic change 
in the card design is in need to fight fraud. They argued why would banks incur extra 
costs associated with redesigning the card and developing new POS terminals when 
an available familiar technology (OCR) was already in use and would so relief both 
banks and merchants from an unnecessary financial burden. Banks who seek to 
increase their profit margin can find in OCR a mean to do so. Another attempt to 
disrupt beliefs in magstripe shifted towards focusing on the simplicity of the 
technology that even an amateur could break its security features. They aimed to 
raise scepticism about the security of magstripe and illustrate how its crudeness, in 
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fact, encouraged criminal activities and increased fraud rather than fight them 
(perversity). 
 
Proponents of magstripe had to stand up against these belief transformation attempts 
in order to secure the path for magstripe as the credit card industry standard (see 
Table 6-10). To restore network stability and belief in its standard, ABA task force 
stood against these claims and started refuting them one after the other. Through this, 
both transformative and captive incentive mechanisms were utilized to mobilize 
wide acceptance of magstripe. 
 
The task force claimed that while adopting OCR was presumed to save costs, it 
actually did not since the card needed to be redesigned in any case to make the 
expiration data in OCR format (futility). Therefore, OCR had no superiority over 
magstripe regarding this aspect. Also, the task emphasized that to ensure fairness 
and equality across all actors in the industry; especially small merchants who could 
not afford a sophisticated solution, the technology had to be simple to allow 
maximum enrolment. Although magstripe has its vulnerabilities, fraud prevention 
measures in participants institutions should mitigate security risks and support 
building a safer payment system. By this, the task force shifted the locus of security 
from one about the encoding technology to one involving the entire payment system. 
 
In addition, ABA task force drove the attention away from magstripe security to the 
visionary future of cashless society. Regardless of what encoding technology was to 
be adopted, banks and merchants both shared the same interest of automating not 
only the authorization process but also clearing transactions. Allowing money to 
transfer seamlessly and electronically among actors in the industry promised great 
reductions in administrative costs and facilitated timely settlements. A standard 
technology to transmit data across the network was the first step in achieving this 
vision (captive incentive). Conflicts that prevailed over the industry standard at that 
time were seen as a road block between actors and their interests. This created a 
sense of urgency to reach consensus and resolve disagreements regarding magstripe, 
as it was the fastest way for actors to attain their interests. 
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Table 6-10 Belief transformation tools in challenging magstripe 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against magstripe Perversity  Scepticism, simplicity, availability 
Supporting magstripe Futility  Fairness and equality, locus of 
security 
 
The task force strategic manoeuvre in shifting the argument from one about security 
to one of a higher goal was a clever move that along with transformative incentives 
succeeded in gaining actors support for magstripe and sealing the network on this 
encoding technology.  
 
As work on automating POS terminals proceeded the network stability was disrupted 
again by DoJ antitrust division unanticipated enrolment to the network that 
challenged actors’ security behaviour specifically regarding sharing POS terminals. 
The division worked on creating a network of allies around its belief of how security 
should be attained. To achieve this, it employed perversity argument to convince 
legislators of the need to put an end to banks’ behaviour of sharing POS terminals. 
Its arguments sought to frame sharing as an anti-competitive behaviour, which 
contradicted with legislators’ role of encouraging competition and free market. If 
sharing behaviour was to continue, actors in the credit card industry would have no 
incentives to develop innovative solutions. It would be natural for them to prefer 
joint ventures to minimize their risk, sharing thus kills competition. The emerging 
nature of EFT supported DoJ attempts to mobilize legislators to their side. As an 
emerging phenomenon, spaces for experimenting with other innovations existed. It 
would be too early therefore to judge that sharing was the best alternative to serve 
consumers’ demand (temporal fitness). 
 
Questioning the legitimacy of sharing POS terminals had its ramifications. 
Preventing fraud depended highly on technology vendors to manufacture and 
develop terminals that can be implemented at merchants’ sites. The rapid diffusion 
of credit cards gave vendors a new business opportunity to increase their profits and 
acquire new customers. As a result, competition spurred and multiple brands were 
available in the market. This state however was disrupted by DoJ announcement that 
created an obstacle to continuing technology vendors’ developments efforts. It was 
known in the industry that sharing allowed investment in POS terminals to be 
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economically feasible. The technology was expensive; it was not only composed of 
terminals but also cards, telecommunication lines, computer processing facilities, 
and switches to route the message across the network. Technology vendors realized 
that without sharing, banks would opt for another more feasible technology. 
Therefore, when the legitimacy of sharing was on the line, they had no more 
incentives to continue their development efforts in POS terminals. 
 
There was a need therefore to mobilize legislators (transformative incentive) to 
legitimize sharing and re-enrol technology vendors to the network and allow them to 
pursue their efforts (preparatory incentive). To achieve the former, the industry 
players’ competing discourse focused on the perverse effects of DoJ’s arguments 
(see Table 6-11). While DoJ claimed sharing denies consumers their freedom of 
choice, reality was the other way around. Small financial institutions who do not 
have sufficient resources to develop their own terminals conveyed their concerns of 
being excluded from market competition if they were not given access to other’s 
POS terminals. Sharing then would allow the enrolment of more financial 
institutions giving consumers more choices. It was necessary to decrease market 
power concentration and foster a healthy competitive environment that supports 
fairness and equality. The industry’s discourse also challenged DoJ’s competition 
appeal. They argued the debates regarding competition were based on an incorrect 
belief, questioning by this the validity of the arguments. POS terminals are delivery 
systems for banking functions, and banks competed on the latter not the former. 
Sharing terminals therefore could not be considered anticompetitive. 
 
Arguments supporting sharing were well-perceived and succeeded in changing 
conceptions about banks’ behaviour as evident in NCEFT recommendations that 
came to legitimize sharing POS terminals and restore the network’s stability. This 
Decision created a relatively certain legal environment that can ease vendors 
concerns and facilitated the progression of POS terminals development. 
 
Table 6-11 Belief transformation tools in sharing POS terminals 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against sharing POS Perversity  Role conflict, Anti-
competitiveness, temporal fitness 
Supporting sharing POS --- Fairness and equality, validity 
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6.5.4 Prevention Encounter 4: Smart Card vs. Magstripe 
 
This prevention encounter demonstrated the tension in the card industry following 
the recognition of a new technology that could achieve better results in preventing 
fraud. Visa and MasterCard held different beliefs about smart cards, and each 
worked to gain actors’ support to their side (Table 6-12). The latter perceived it as 
the future of payment cards. Its arguments tried to drive the industry toward a radical 
change by following a revolutionary adoption approach. MasterCard believed 
magstripe had become an obsolete technology. The continuous and mounting fraud 
losses because of magstripe high vulnerability to counterfeiting (perversity) were not 
going to be solved by adding more security features to the card. The technology 
proved its ineffectiveness in countering innovations in fraud techniques, and the 
industry should be looking for ending not extending its life. Smart cards could offer 
a comprehensive solution to many problems troubling banks. Its chip technology 
made it difficult to counterfeit and intelligent enough to block transactions when 
consumers reach their credit limit, saving banks from massive losses. At the same 
time, MasterCard acknowledged the concerns over the high production costs of 
smart cards. But it claimed they could be countered by the derivative value of the 
technology that enabled the extension of the card expiration lifecycle and thus 
cutting re-issuance costs. 
 
Visa took an opposite position. It employed the three rhetorical devices, perversity, 
futility and jeopardy to update actors’ perception of smart cards and their beliefs of 
how the industry should move forward. The major card association challenged the 
reduction in losses obtained through smart cards. It argued an abrupt transition to 
smart cards would leave financial institutions $40 million worse off than they were 
currently (perversity). This was due to the high costs associated with this transition 
that included card renewal, modifying and installing new POS terminals. Moreover, 
credit card business volume was growing at a faster rate than that of fraud losses. 
The problem hence had been overstated (de-escalating problem). 
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Table 6-12 Belief transformation tools in smart card vs. magstripe 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against smart cards Perversity, futility, jeopardy Problem de-escalation, problem 
redefinition, temporal fitness 
Supporting smart cards Perversity  Obsolete technology, 
comprehensiveness, derivative 
value 
 
Visa continued refuting MasterCard’s arguments and finding weak points in its 
debate. For instance, it admitted that credit losses were high in number, nevertheless 
no technology whether it was magstripe or smart card had to do with tackling this 
matter (futility). It was rather banks’ credit policies that were responsible for any 
credit losses, a problem that could be prevented through internal procedural change 
(redefining the problem). Despite the fact that the latter problem was argued to be 
solved through smart cards, banks would be reluctant to utilize the technology’s 
blocking feature as it deprived them of one main revenue stream in the credit card 
business (jeopardy). 
 
Besides refuting MasterCard’s arguments, Visa presented its own as well. It offered 
a powerful claim on how the new technology jeopardized the great investments and 
immense efforts the industry incurred in magstripe (jeopardy). Smart card would 
require restructuring the whole card payment system that took the industry more than 
a decade to stabilize. It meant abolishing the long-standing infrastructure only to 
start constructing a new unnecessary one. It would be a bad investment to dedicate 
resources to a technology that was designed to operate in a contradicting 
environment than the one featured in the U.S. This rendered smart card impractical 
to apply (futility). To further support their belief transformation efforts, Visa focused 
on shifting the argument from that of adoption decision to one about the time of 
adoption. Visa acknowledged the superiority of smart cards in reducing losses 
however it questioned whether it was the appropriate time for transitioning to smart 
cards. Its research showed that for smart cards to be a feasible solution the card has 
to offer benefits besides security. Smart card was an emerging technology in the U.S. 
and time should be allowed to innovate and incorporate new services to the card to 
increase its economic value. 
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Visa’s persuasive arguments that utilized a variety of rhetorical devices reinforced its 
belief system and facilitated its transference to other actors, who after that perceived 
the new technology through Visa’s eyes. This allowed Visa to take a decisive 
decision and announce that magstripe will continue to be the standard for the next 
decade, and that new technological solutions should be directed towards making 
magstripe cards more secure. 
 
The impact of this announcement was crucial because the strident debates between 
Visa and MasterCard left the card industry in limbo, and technology vendors at a 
crossroad not knowing where to direct their investments. For them, committing 
resources to both magstripe and smart card to satisfy both card associations was not 
viable not only because of the economic burden it placed on vendors but also 
because one technology would eventually prevail, leaving investments in the other a 
costly missed opportunity. The announcement came to re-stabilize the industry and 
re-enrol vendors to fraud prevention network. It provided the operational certainty 
vendors needed to efficiently direct their resources, and returned to the market its 
positive state of one that offers favourable conditions for organizations to compete 
and derive business value (preparatory incentive). Accordingly, the 1990s witnessed 
the emergence of multiple technological innovations targeting magstripe security. In 
1994, Visa and Citibank started testing ‘watermark magnetics’ that could determine 
whether information in the magstripe has been tampered with. Similarly, card 
associations were invited to test ‘magnetic fingerprint’ that relied on the physical 
properties of magnetic stripe itself and its particles arrangements to validate the card. 
Other fraud protection technologies included ones that measure the magnetic field 
the card emitted to ensure its authenticity and holomagnetic that encoded card data in 
a hologram as well, making the card difficult to counterfeit. 
 
6.5.5 Prevention Encounter 5: Strengthening the Legal System 
 
This prevention encounter showed the importance of preparatory incentives in 
prosecuting fraudsters. The case was triggered by the inadequacy of existing federal 
laws that were used to fight credit card fraud such as Truth-in-Lending Act and the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act in addressing emerging innovative ways in 
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committing fraud as credit card counterfeiting. The absence of a reliable legal 
infrastructure for prosecuting criminals contributed significantly to staggering fraud 
rates. Not only because existing laws could be circumvented but also because some 
activities, such as fraudulent use of credit card numbers, were not even covered by 
any law. Actors in courts and law enforcement agencies level of involvement and 
investigative and prosecution efforts were constrained by these deficiencies. This 
contributed to the mobility of criminal activities across the nation. Assistant State 
Attorney from Miami attested, 
 
… I think one of the reasons you need Federal legislation is that the very existence 
of the statute becomes a “power on” switch for the prosecutor and without it, you 
don’t have any power on (Falco, 1984, p.222). 
 
There was a need therefore to heighten the legal environment. The enactment of the 
new law supplied those actors with new tools to attack criminals and strengthened 
their prosecution case by basing it on a clear legal foundation. 
 
6.5.6 Prevention Encounter 6: Security in Card-not-Present Environment 
 
As with automating POS terminals, this prevention encounter revealed the use of the 
three incentive mechanisms following the evolution of the prevention efforts. 
 
The opportunity to do business over the Internet opened up a new revenue stream for 
technology vendors the same as it did for merchants and financial institutions. 
Nonetheless, the anonymity of the medium required a new generation of prevention 
measures to ensure security in situations where neither the card nor its holder is 
present during the transaction. Given the universal acceptance of credit cards as a 
payment method, there was a need for global guidelines and frameworks that would 
lead the development of online security products. To recruit vendors and enable 
them to achieve their goal, the card associations were committed to laying the 
foundations of a secure financial infrastructure over the Internet (operational 
certainty). They developed SET protocol to serve as a building block for technology 
vendors’ security products. With SET different products for e-commerce security 
         Chapter 6     Chapter 5 
132 
became available in the market such as Microsoft’s walletPassport and Yahoo! 
Wallet. 
 
To encourage the adoption and diffusion of the standard, Visa took several initiatives 
to mobilize merchants and customers. The card association tied the exemption of 
chargeback fees on online transactions with adopting SET-based security products. 
This constituted a compelling motivation for merchants as chargeback fees 
consumed a considerable amount of their e-commerce revenues. To motivate 
customers to purchase through online channels, Visa relieved them from any liability 
in situations where fraudulent activities took place (captive incentive).  
 
The favourable environment for developing security products based on SET did not 
last long. In building confidence in e-commerce, it was important to have legal 
recognition of electronic authentication and digital documents. Accordingly, states 
enacted laws that legally validated electronic authentication technologies. These 
laws however were inconsistent with one another as enacted or during judicial 
interpretation. Furthermore, federal laws themselves were subject to multiple 
interpretations by the judicial system, and cases showed that courts did not consider 
the use of technology in communication between transacting actors as binding or 
legally valid because contracts were not “signed in ink”. This interstate 
inconsistency and federal regulation deficiency disrupted the ongoing efforts to 
develop security products to secure online transactions. It created an unfavourable 
climate for investing in electronic authentication by increasing compliance costs for 
actors, such as Certification Authorities, and limiting their ability to operate 
nationally. The presence of fifty different regimes further impeded the mobilization 
of new market entrants in e-commerce business.  The Internet revolutionized the way 
organizations did business, and its openness and geographical breadth should be 
reflected in the legal environment to enable the private sector to compete and serve 
the nation. A national uniformity was thus necessary to mobilize businesses to take 
part in this new technologically-enabled market reform. Chairman Bennett observed, 
 
Unfortunately, financial institutions and other businesses across the country have 
hesitated to fully invest in the available technologies. Why? Because the law on 
         Chapter 6     Chapter 5 
133 
electronic authentication does not currently provide the support necessary to justify 
such a substantial investment (Bennett, 1998, p.1). 
 
The importance of having a proper environment with favourable competitive 
conditions was also seen in calls for adopting a technology-neutral approach that was 
not legislatively biased towards a particular technology as with some states laws, 
 
In addition to the problems of inconsistency … another unfortunate and perhaps 
unintended effect of certain of the current States' initiatives has been to impose by 
the force of statute business requirements and/or technical standards that may prove 
inconsistent with the rapid change in the business and technology environment. 
These statutory standards will be difficult to revise as technology changes, and as 
market forces develop new products and useful roles for electronic authentication 
(Lieberman, 1998, p.8). 
 
To restore the network stability and realign actors’ interests, federal intervention was 
needed. Through congressional hearings, actors ensured to build a robust and 
flexible legal infrastructure that is both consistent and predictable in terms of how 
electronic authentication is treated. In doing so, they employed transformative 
incentives and relied on perversity and jeopardy arguments as well as captive 
incentives to change legislators’ beliefs about the technology and what their role 
should be. 
 
In hearings about electronic authentication and digital signature and the federal role 
in this technology, representatives from financial institutions, technology vendors, 
and card associations among others applauded states fast initiatives to enact laws that 
support e-commerce. Nonetheless, they stressed electronic authentication should be 
viewed within the context of a rapidly changing economy that was shaped by 
technological innovations. E-commerce cut across state and federal jurisdiction and 
the current fragmented regulatory environment was not supporting but rather 
hindering the development of e-commerce (perversity). This effect was noted by 
actors supporting the need for federal intervention. In his testimony, the associate 
counsel for government affairs of one of credit companies noted, 
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Recent advances in electronic and digital technology severely test the ability of the 
most diligent government policymakers, regulators and legislators to remain 
knowledgeable. Moreover, these rapid developments easily outdistance the 
traditional legislative and regulatory process. Therefore, all too often laws, 
regulations and rules designed to stimulate and encourage commerce have, on the 
contrary, become outdated at best, impediments at worst (Mossburg, 1997, p.4). 
 
Mobilization attempts further involved invoking a common national interest. Actors 
(ex. Electronic Commerce Forum, financial institutions, card associations, certificate 
authorities) tied their claims about the need for federal intervention to enforce a 
unified approach with the national goal of economic prosperity. They argued without 
national recognition of digitally signed documents, the growth of e-commerce would 
stifle. The U.S. legal system that has always fostered an attractive business 
environment that contributed significantly to the country’s economic prosperity will 
only now and because of its unstable regulatory framework hinder the realization of 
one significant opportunity for economic growth. Doing business online required a 
mean to authenticate the identity of the transacting parties. Providing the technology 
to achieve that was not sufficient alone, there had to be a consistent legal acceptance 
of the use of the technology nationwide. Without nationally recognizing the 
legitimacy of electronic authentication technologies, both technology vendors and 
consumers would be reluctant to take advantage of e-commerce and the U.S. would 
fall behind this new age of commerce. As the vice president of the Technology and 
Intellectual Property legal area for Citibank put it: 
 
It is our view that electronic commerce won't happen without electronic banking, 
and electronic banking, particularly Internet banking, won't happen without 
electronic authentication, and in turn electronic authentication won't happen unless 
we have some sort of national uniformity in this area (Nugent, 1997, p.8). 
 
The mobilization discourse also emphasized that inconsistent laws led to 
incompatible and less secure authentication systems which threatened not only the 
efficiency of the nation’s payment system but also the leadership position the U.S. 
always enjoyed in terms of supporting technological advancements (jeopardy), 
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The European Commission has recognized this potential for chaos and is aggressively 
working to bring Europe into the forefront of electronic commerce by writing the first 
internationally applicable standards for regulation of digital signatures ... In fact, with 
all of the activity surrounding electronic commerce in Europe, including extensive 
government sponsored pilots and studies, it is clear that Europe has established itself 
as a leader in this area (Konstantaras, 1997, p.6). 
 
Several countries; Japan, Italy, Germany, were providing legal recognition of 
electronic authentication technologies facilitating competition. If U.S. companies 
were to compete globally, uniformity needed to exist at a national level first. Further, 
international negotiations were undergoing regarding an international law for 
electronic authentication, and for the U.S. to take part in these negotiations and 
maintain its technological leadership position it had to correct its fragmented 
approach first as noted by the representative of Electronic Commerce Forum: 
 
However, before the United States can play a significant role internationally, it is 
necessary to examine the wisdom of the current multiplicity of state laws. The lack 
of uniform nationwide rules may inhibit America’s ability to influence 
developments beyond its borders. As a result, it may be appropriate to consider the 
establishment of a federal standard or guidelines (Dorey, 1997, p.4). 
 
Actors also showed the role national uniformity had on fostering a competitive 
environment that promoted values of fairness and equality. Differing state laws 
increased the cost of conducting business over the Internet. Where large actors might 
be able to bear unnecessary compliance costs, it was doubtful that smaller ones 
could. A unified approach would facilitate the participation of all actors in e-
commerce. Supporters further strengthened their case by relating it to the 
presidential policy on global information infrastructure. Their claims for federal 
intervention to enact a unified approach were consistent with the policy’s principles 
that called for a predictable legal environment for e-commerce. 
 
These rhetorical arguments (Table 6-13) succeeded in overcoming legislators’ 
scepticism about the need for an overarching federal law and resulted in passing 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act that nationally 
legitimized the use of electronic authentication.  
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Table 6-13 Belief transformation tools in legitimacy of digital signature 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Supporting consistent and 
universal approach towards 
digital signature 
Perversity, jeopardy Role conflict, leadership, fairness 
and equality, national goal, 
national payment system 
 
The legal certainty provided by the enactment of Electronic Signature in Global and 
National Commerce Act realigned actors’ interests and re-stabilized the network. 
The act facilitated the use of digital signature and other electronic authentication 
technologies in e-commerce allowing technology vendors to resume their 
development of technological solutions to ensure security over the Internet. 
Furthermore, its technology-neutral approach gave the private sector the flexibility 
needed to adapt to market changes and technological advancements and encouraged 
competition among electronic authentication service providers. 
 
6.5.7 Prevention Encounter 7: Shifting Security Directions: Unified Industry 
Standards 
 
In the year 2000 and what follows, securing credit card data rested in card 
associations announcing security requirements merchants and other actors who store 
or transmit card information had to follow. Despite providing the flexibility for 
actors to adopt the technology that best serves their business environment, the 
network stability started to fade. Merchants began complaining about the various 
card protection programs they must comply with and the burden that added on their 
financial resources. The card associations agreed to collaborate and introduce a 
single standard that would re-enrol actors in security networks and ensure the 
network’s durability. Having a unified security standard for the whole industry 
helped to favourably influence merchants’ behaviour by altering their assessment of 
the environment. Instead of perceiving it as complex and driving confusion and cost, 
PCI standards provided a simple environment that made it easy for actors to adopt 
the prevention measure.  
 
To further build a supportive compliance environment, PCI SSC offers training 
programs to firms and experts so that they can help merchants and other actors in 
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their compliance efforts and ensure correct interpretation of the standards. Moreover, 
the Council facilitates the adoption of the standards by providing a list of secure 
devices merchants and financial institutions can consult when making the purchase 
decision. By this, PCI SSC’s efforts aim to provide actors a general framework to 
guide their security decisions while ensuring them their efforts meet the industry’s 
best practices (operational certainty).  
 
Besides the use of preparatory incentives to motivate actors to adopt PCI standards, 
Visa (along with other card associations) offered a collection of financial incentives 
through its compliance acceleration program (as mentioned previously in the case 
narrative). The program which targeted acquiring banks rather than merchants 
directly tied financial rewards and penalties to the compliance of their merchants. 
Being the enforcement agency of PCI standards, merchants’ banks worked to 
ascertain the compliance of their merchants in order to be entitled to the favourable 
interchange fees or to be waved from costly penalties (captive incentive). 
 
6.5.8 Prevention Encounter 8: Beyond Magstripe: Tokenization and Chip 
Cards 
 
Following the continuous data breaches at merchants’ sites even after adopting PCI 
standards shook the network’s stability and stirred questions regarding the 
effectiveness of PCI standards in thwarting fraud and the financial industry’s true 
intentions in safeguarding consumer private data. Efforts to push the industry 
towards new prevention measures commenced and involved the use of the three 
incentive mechanisms. 
 
While legislators focused their attention on policy procedures such as notification 
laws, NRF sought to reorient their focus and argued that the real problem did not lie 
in how fast the industry should notify consumers about the breach. The vital question 
that needed to be asked was why these breaches keep happening despite immense 
investments in fighting fraud (redefining the problem). NRF General Counsel and 
Senior Vice President claimed the answer lied in the U.S. outdated card payment 
system. When compared with the rest of the world, the U.S. stands oddly alone in 
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terms of fraud prevention technologies. Chip and PIN cards were proved to 
significantly prevent fraud and were “already deployed successfully in nearly all of 
the industrialized world (and much of the Third World)” (Duncan, 2014). Yet, the 
U.S. card payment system was still outdated relying on the vulnerable and obsolete 
signature and magstripe. 
 
Realising where the problem is was further emphasized by a consumer advocate, 
who stressed that offering after fraud services should not be mixed with security 
solutions against fraud, 
 
The provision of credit monitoring … really creates a false sense of security. It will 
not stop fraud on your existing accounts, and it will not stop identity theft 
(Mierzwinski, 2014, p.21). 
 
From this point of view, the problem was not related to PCI standards per se but 
rather to the fact that these standards were associated with an obsolete technological 
platform. The credit card market that is based on duopoly pursues solutions that 
serve the interests of its two major card associations and refuse to widen the 
competition base lessening competition. Migrating to another safer technology was 
thus challenging. Further, policymakers should encourage investments in new 
technologies to prevent fraud so that the U.S. does not lag further behind the rest of 
the world. 
 
Facing these charges, the financial industry started to counter this negative publicity 
and correct perceptions about its security measures (see  
Table 6-14). In responding to reasons why the U.S. lagged behind the rest of the 
world in adopting chip and PIN despite facts of its effectiveness in preventing fraud, 
Visa argued that it was the U.S. advanced telecommunication infrastructure in terms 
of high speed and efficiency that allowed this delay. The reliable infrastructure 
facilitated real-time network authorization and fraud analytics making the benefits 
offered by chip and PIN less prevalent (futility). Nonetheless, witnessing the 
increase in breach incidents the card industry is shifting towards chip-enabled cards, 
encouraging signature and chip rather than PIN and chip. In her testimony, Visa’s 
chief enterprise risk officer and chief legal officer, acknowledged that about 70% of 
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fraud in brick and mortar stores is caused by counterfeited cards. As PINs reduce lost 
and stolen card fraud it does not do anything in preventing card counterfeiting, 
which is the big problem (redefining the problem), a point that was also confirmed 
by PCI SSC. She further argued that constant debates about signature vs. PIN and 
the focus on the latter will only slow the migration process and increase overall costs 
(perversity). 
 
Table 6-14 Belief transformation tools in tokenization and chip cards 
 Rhetorical devices Vocabularies of motive 
Against PCI standards and 
financial industry’s position --- 
Problem redefinition, outlier, 
outdate card payment system, 
anti-competitiveness 
Supporting PCI standards 
and financial industry’s 
position 
Perversity, futility, jeopardy Commitment, shared 
responsibility, collective work, 
locus of security, validity, 
problem redefinition, threats 
complexity 
 
In congressional hearings held to investigate what security practices and 
technologies were used to strengthen the security of the payment system, ABA 
emphasized the industry’s commitment to security: 
 
Even with the recent breaches, our payments system remains strong and continues 
to support the $3 trillion that Americans spend safely and securely each year with 
their credit and debit cards, and with good reason: Customers can use these cards 
confidently because their banks protect them by investing in technology to detect 
and prevent fraud, reissuing cards and absorbing fraud costs (Reuter, 2014, p.18). 
 
ABA representative further stressed that banks were often the first to be blamed for 
security breach incidents since in many times suffered retailers’ identity are 
intentionally not revealed leaving banks to take the reputation hit themselves. 
Security is a shared responsibility and should not be mistakenly perceived to fall 
solely under the financial industry’s arena, 
 
Protecting the payments system is a shared responsibility. Banks, retailers, 
processors, and all participants in the payments system must share the 
responsibility of keeping the system secure. That responsibility should not fall 
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predominantly on the financial services sector. Banks are committed to doing our 
share, but cannot be the sole bearer of that responsibility (Reuter, 2014, p.19). 
In a similar vein, the chief technology officer of the PCI SSC underlined the 
complexity of security threats that made collective efforts inevitable,  
 
… the recent breaches underscore the complex nature of payment card security. A 
multifaceted problem cannot be solved by a single technology, standard, mandate, 
or regulation. It cannot be solved by a single sector of society. Business, standards 
bodies, policymakers, and law enforcement must work together to protect the 
privacy interests of consumers (Leach, 2014, p.24). 
 
Visa as well acknowledged the shared responsibility of fraud prevention and the 
seriousness of the phenomenon as the continuous threats jeopardize consumers’ trust 
in the payment systems actors collectively worked to establish over the last 50 years 
(jeopardy). The major card association faced its critics by stating the different 
prevention measures the company applies in protecting cardholder information. It 
assured other players that it does not require the storage of credit card information as 
has been claimed. On the contrary, in 2006 Visa promoted “drop the data” campaign 
to discourage merchants from storing sensitive information while acknowledging 
that they should remain tentative since data can be stolen in transit (locus of 
security). Accordingly, a shift in security practices was taking place, and the industry 
was moving from data protection to data devaluation approach. This shift was 
strongly evident when the innovation in payment methods through the use of 
smartphones and tablets to make contactless payment created a gap in security 
solutions that tokenization and chip technologies offered to fill (captive incentive). 
To capture the new business opportunity and ensure its worldwide dominance, Visa 
got more engaged in both technologies. The card association collaborated with 
MasterCard and American Express to release a global standard that supported new 
payment products such as Apply Pay and Google Wallet while maintaining the 
compatibility with the existing infrastructure.  
 
Releasing tokenization standards by the card association and announcing guidelines 
for implementing the technology by PCI SSC was critical for taking the technology 
into practice (preparatory incentive). First, the standards provided the tools needed to 
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build an interoperable environment. They offered a consistent framework between 
transacting actors on how tokens are generated and processed allowing the payment 
process to run smoothly. Issuers, for instance, need to be able to authorize tokenized 
transactions regardless of the devices or operating systems used in the payment 
process, or the tokenization solution adopted by processors. Tokenization standards 
enabled issuers’ participation in the new wave of digital payment. This was crucial 
as issuers are the ones who inhabit the authorization role and their enrolment was 
necessary to progress with digital payment. The standard therefore allowed scaling 
up the technology to enlist and serve more actors. Second, despite the availability of 
security systems based on tokenization, merchants were reluctant to implement this 
technology although it promised them better security and reduction in compliance 
costs. Merchants are under contractual obligation to comply with the industry’s 
security standards. With the absence of formal guidance within PCI standards on 
tokenization, they lacked the incentive to invest in a technology that might not 
conform to future changes in security requirements. PCI SSC guidelines relaxed 
merchants’ fears and offered a baseline for evaluating the different tokenization 
solutions available in the market while at the same time reassuring merchants of 
their compliance with PCI security requirements.  
 
To further encourage the move towards tokenization and chip cards, Visa waved 
merchants who adopt the new technologies from certain security requirements under 
PCI standards. This allowed merchants to evade a complex, costly and mandatory 
prevention measure and achieve considerable savings in security investments 
(captive incentive). In 2011 Visa announced the expansion of its Technology 
Innovation Program to merchants in the U.S. to accelerate the migration to chip 
cards and therefore adoption of mobile payments. 
 
What can be deduced from these encounters is that the card industry succeeded in 
changing beliefs about its PCI standards and commitment to security. There was a 
consensus among actors that finger pointing is not going to solve contested issues. 
One can also infer that retailers as well succeeded in creating necessary pressure for 
adopting chip technology. Actors agreement that chip-enabled cards, with or without 
a PIN, remains better than the current magstripe, can lead us to presume that Visa, at 
the present time, was able to convince actors to adopt chip and signature. I should 
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note however that debates surrounding PIN vs. signature is not over and continues 
after 2014 which marks the end of the data collection period for this prevention 
encounter. 
 
Figure 6-3 incorporates the three incentive mechanisms and offers a complete view 
on the process model of prevention encounters. 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
Drawing on the case of credit card fraud and how its prevention measures developed 
over time, this chapter presented an analysis of how security networks achieve 
prevention and what incentives come into play to ensure convergence and network 
stability. The analysis showed that preventing security threats revolves around three 
prevention mechanisms: proposing solutions, resolving dissonance and paving the 
way, that interact with one another. Being a social and political process, collective 
security efforts do not go smoothly and can sometimes be interrupted prolonging the 
prevention process. The chapter further showed that the structure of security 
networks in terms of their constituent entities and their properties have a great 
influence on the networks’ prevention efforts. Properties of security networks such 
as heterogeneity of actors’ roles, the complexity of the legal system and 
technological novelty enabled prevention mechanisms to emerge. Their impact 
however was not constant but varied across the three prevention mechanisms.  
 
Bringing actors together to prevent credit card fraud was challenging. Convergence 
process relied on employing a variety of incentives. In transformative incentives 
mechanism actors mobilized others by adopting different rhetorical arguments and 
vocabularies of motive in an attempt to change their belief to one that supports their 
case. In a different context, manipulating the environment to make it more 
favourable was the key for actors’ enrolment in security networks. Captivating actors 
to the network by tying their interests with the desired behaviour was another 
successful convergence strategy.  
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In the next chapter, I discuss the knowledge gained from the process model and 
relate it with the relevant literature.  
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Figure 6-3 The process model of prevention encounters with incentive mechanisms for convergence
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the current security networks literature, collective security efforts are manifested 
in information sharing alliances, outsourcing relationships, and vulnerability 
disclosure networks. This literature adopts an equilibrium-focus approach in 
studying security networks where variance models that take a snapshot view of the 
phenomenon constitute the foundation for knowledge about these security networks. 
Accordingly, little is known about how security networks achieve prevention. This 
research adopted a disequilibrium process-oriented approach and developed a 
process model of prevention encounters in security network. The model offers a 
detailed explanation of the prevention process. It explicates prevention and incentive 
mechanisms along with contextual conditions that trigger collective security efforts. 
In this chapter, I discuss the research findings with the current literature and show 
how they support and extend knowledge of security networks, while at the same time 
challenge common wisdom offering new insights. First, I discuss the prevention 
process in security networks. Then I move to examine the structure of security 
networks. Incentives for converging actors in collective security are discussed next. 
The chapter concludes with a brief examination of contemporary security threats to 
substantiate the findings under different settings.  
 
7.2 Prevention Process in Security Networks 
 
The prevention process starts with a dissatisfaction of current prevention measures 
because they are no longer effective or applicable in thwarting security threats. 
Furthermore, the common goal of attaining security and preventing threats made 
fragmented security approaches trigger collective security efforts. Realizing a need 
for a change in their security practices, and driven by captive incentives where 
taking action is necessary to realize personal benefits, actors in security networks 
start to experiment with innovative technological solutions that are more capable of 
facing the rising security threat. Proposing solutions mechanism results in a variety 
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of security approaches. Accordingly, actors have to negotiate and discuss these 
different propositions in order to reach consensus on the best approach to follow. 
This is a challenging process because of many reasons. The interpretive flexibility of 
the proposed technologies facilitates a multiplicity and often conflicted beliefs about 
what should be the next prevention measure. Actors in resolving dissonance 
mechanism acted as challengers and refused to accept roles assigned to them by the 
network. Challengers therefore can drive the network back to proposing solutions in 
order to offer new alternatives. Furthermore, the presence of challengers give rise to 
a new role, arbitrator, who formally investigate the conflicted issue and resolve 
conflicts in the network. The complexity of the legal system, with its three 
interrelated branches that exist on both state and federal level (in my case), also 
played a role in instigating conflicts in the network. The prevalence of conflicted 
views in resolving dissonance mechanism make transformative incentives essential 
to shape others’ beliefs and mobilize their support towards a certain prevention 
measure. Once actors are mobilized and consensus has been reached, actors start to 
take the agreed on prevention measure into practice. The prevention process does not 
end here however as prevention efforts can be interrupted triggering paving the way 
mechanism. In here, actors face these disruptions by renegotiating the prevention 
measure and acting as stabilizers and enablers to re-stabilize the network and allow 
the prevention efforts to proceed. Preparatory incentives hence become important to 
create a favourable environment that enable security efforts to move forward. 
 
The prevention process offers several insights about security network’s prevention 
efforts that contrast, compliment, or confirm the current literature. This is discussed 
next. 
 
In their prevention efforts, actors are rational; they have predetermined objectives 
that maximize their benefits (Gordon et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014), and the path to 
reach these objectives among available options is known (Lee et al., 2013). Actors 
relationships in security networks are thus governed by the extent to whether the 
issue at matter meets their goals or not (Cezar et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013) and so 
are based on a ‘take it or leave it’ approach. For instance, MSSPs offer their services 
to clients who have the freedom to accept or reject them (Zhao et al., 2013). My 
study indicates however that goals and interests are not static and actors shape them 
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in response to the context they find themselves in. Prevention process is hence fluid 
and actors can be lenient. Whereas banks’ interest was initially to protect their credit 
card business from any legislative intervention, continuous debates and interactions 
with other actors made them more flexible, and they started negotiating the 
formation of the new law.  Actors are not solely takers but they try to manipulate 
options to make them better fit their interests, which have already shifted in the 
course of the prevention process. 
 
Interactive communication is thus critical in how security networks achieve 
prevention. Actors actively engage with one another throughout the whole process 
starting from proposing solutions and ending with paving the way for implementing 
the agreed on prevention measure. Accordingly, actors in security networks do not 
merely react to the actions of others in a sequential move pattern as currently 
described in security networks literature (Arora et al., 2008; Cavusoglu et al., 2007; 
Kannan & Telang, 2005; Liu et al., 2014) where actors’ relationships are interpreted 
to occur in multi-stage models. For example, in the first stage, a social planner (as 
CERT) set the protection period. In the second, vendors choose their patch release 
time and in the third organizations install the patch once it is available. Another 
example is designing research models to let the infomediary announce its pricing 
policy regarding rewards for reporting vulnerabilities and subscription fees and then 
allow discoverers and organizations to react accordingly. Although the process 
model shows that prevention efforts involve several stages (proposing solutions, 
resolving dissonance, paving the way) those are far from being static or 
bidirectional. Direct confrontations and negotiations were a foundational cornerstone 
in how security networks achieve prevention, making the process cyclical rather than 
linear. In the attempts of pursuing their own interests, actors challenged propositions 
offered to prevent credit card fraud moving the network to earlier stages. Therefore, 
there was not only one version of how security is achieved.  
 
While the current literature tends to view relationships between actors to be 
unproblematic because actors are rational and have homogeneous beliefs on how to 
prevent security threats, the process model shows that conflict, heterogeneity of 
beliefs and uncertainty are key characteristics of collective security efforts. The 
difficulty of envisioning future consequences of prevention measures was apparent. 
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Actors struggled with ambiguity that stalled the entire prevention process since the 
future security path was blurry making it challenging to prefer one alternative over 
the other. Legislators, for instance, were not able to take a position about digital 
signature because they had little information to help them make sense of the Internet 
and its consequences and accordingly any technology related to it. Several hearings 
were initiated to gain information needed making security a complex cognitive task.  
 
In addition, interdependence between actors add to the complexity of security 
networks. In the current literature, interdependence is mainly seen to be problematic 
and an obstacle to collective security efforts because it encourages free riding 
behaviour in information sharing alliances (Gordon et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014) and 
introduces information asymmetry that makes it difficult to observe security efforts 
in outsourcing contracts (Hui et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013). The prevention process 
offers a different view on interdependence. Interdependence can indeed be seen as an 
obstacle in security networks’ prevention efforts but not because it drives actors to 
renege on security, rather because it prolong the prevention process as actors hold 
different beliefs about security efforts that force them to engage in negotiations to 
resolve their dissonance. An example is the different beliefs actors had on digital 
signature that created an uncertain legal environment. Developing a shared 
understanding of the technology between actors was necessary in order for the 
prevention process to proceed. 
 
7.3 The Structure of Security Networks 
 
Examining the structure of security networks, that is their constituent elements, 
facilitates uncovering components that play key roles in how prevention is attained 
and therefore allows a better understanding of security networks’ prevention efforts. 
The current literature pays significant attention to individuals in security networks 
(e.g. a vendor, a competitor, an infomediary), whereby examining their actions it 
tries to explain collective security efforts. For example, in vulnerability disclosure 
networks preventing threats is achieved through referencing to vendors’ patch 
release time decision (Arora et al., 2010; Arora et al., 2008) or infomediaries’ profit 
maximization actions (Kannan & Telang, 2005; Li & Rao, 2007; Ransbotham et al., 
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2012). Similarly, although information sharing and analysis center’s goal is not 
maximizing its own profits but increasing the network’s reliability and decreasing 
losses from security breaches, it still achieves this by leveraging its role in setting the 
optimal membership fee structure (Liu et al., 2014). Explanation is therefore 
achieved through focusing on individual’s actions. This study shows that how 
security networks achieve prevention cannot be seen resulting from individual’s 
actions alone. Each actor indeed had his own agenda on how prevention should be 
pursued but in such an interactive process it would be difficult to attribute the efforts 
of the network to that of one actor alone. Consensus on a prevention measure was 
rarely made individually. Rather it resulted collectively through negotiating solutions 
proposed by the network’s heterogeneous actors which by themselves (proposed 
solutions) were modified during the process resulting in the emergence of new 
solutions that did not exist before. Possible alternatives therefore do not exist in 
outer space and already known by actors (Arora et al., 2008) but can rather emerge 
throughout actors’ efforts in finding the future security path. Therefore, to explain 
collective security efforts it is more useful to look at social actors in security 
networks through their relations with each other and the external environment rather 
than focusing on individuals’ actions alone. 
 
Moreover, although social actors are a key element in the structure of security 
networks, they offer a limited view on how these networks prevent security threats. 
This research identified technology and operating system (in terms of laws and 
regulations that govern actors’ interactions) as other critical components that can 
change how prevention is achieved and thus their role should not be neglected. 
 
Of importance here is to go more in depth and beyond identification of structural 
components to identify their properties that influence collective security efforts. My 
research shows that social actors occupy different roles in the network. Similarly the 
novelty and newness of the technology and the complexity of the legal system makes 
technology and operating system (respectively) causally relevant to the network’s 
prevention efforts. 
 
Heterogeneity of role refers to the different positions actors occupy in security 
networks to achieve prevention. Those positions are challengers, arbitrators, 
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stabilizers, and enablers. The case further demonstrated that actors’ role is not static 
and that the same actor can shift between these roles in response to changing context. 
While Visa’s efforts in developing security standards represent its enabler role, the 
company acted as a stabilizer when there was confusion in the market in the 1980s 
over whether smart card would replace magstripe or not. Actors thus do not only 
shift their security position such as levels of security investments and information 
sharing or preference towards a certain patch disclosure policy to fit contextual 
conditions (Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Hausken, 2007), but also their network position. 
The latter reflects the dynamic nature of security networks where actors move, enter, 
exit, or even threaten the network. It is crucial not to neglect such changes as they 
can impact security path as evident in the case of credit card fraud. This can be 
further inferred from Cavusoglu et al. (2007) study that observed a change in optimal 
disclosure policies once their single-vendor model was extended to incorporate the 
presence of multiple vendors in the network. Hausken (2007) also notes that social 
planner’s interference in information sharing alliances should be carefully examined 
in order for it to result in collectively beneficial sharing conditions. This is because a 
social planner’s actions (e.g. controlling for security investment) can sometimes 
have a perverse effect and result in an increase in free-riding behaviour. Moreover, it 
is vital to recognize the heterogeneity of actors in security networks and the impact 
that has on security decisions. Actors in the network differ in their capabilities to 
accommodate solutions that lead to better security (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Liu et 
al., 2014). Because small-size vendors need to be able to accept credit cards 
payment, security solutions adopted were not always the optimal ones. The fact that 
the network included small actors actually benefited larger ones in their negotiations 
and helped them in their mobilizing efforts. This runs contrary to what is frequently 
assumed that small actors tend to exploit larger ones (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012).  
 
Inherited complexity is the second property identified to be relevant to prevention 
efforts. It depicts how the multi-level and interrelated nature of the legal system 
interferes to constrain actors’ security efforts. The study illustrated how such 
structure created inconsistencies concerning prevention efforts between the different 
legal branches prolonging the prevention process as well as creating security gaps 
that could be exploited to conduct illegal activities. The study extends prior research 
that conceptualizes the impact of the regulatory environment through the actions of 
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regulators (e.g., Arora et al., 2010; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005) to show the impact of 
the legal system as a whole in security networks prevention efforts.  
 
Technological novelty is the final property identified that shape collective security 
efforts. The research findings show that the effect of new technologies can be seen in 
three ways. First, actors have to experiment with new technologies to gain 
knowledge about their feasibility and consequences to be able to draw future security 
path. Second, new technologies are open to multiple interpretations that create 
confusion over how security is best achieved. Actors thus engage in negotiations to 
develop shared understanding of the meaning of the technology. Third, new 
technologies are not always seen ambiguous but can offer business opportunities that 
incite competition to deliver best security solutions. 
 
7.4 Incentive Mechanisms in Security Networks 
 
Incentives are essential for the survival of collective security efforts. Prior research 
stressed the importance of monetary payoffs in converging actors in security 
networks. This research concurs with this finding but also departs significantly by 
showing that monetary incentives only partly explain human motivation and that 
they are one of the three types of incentives to motivate collective security efforts. 
 
The analysis of the case study provides evidence of the three incentive mechanisms 
conceptualized from the literature: transformative, preparatory and captive. 
Identifying such a variety of incentives acknowledges the heterogeneity of actors 
involved in security networks that makes the use of only one form of incentives 
(monetary) insufficient in succeeding convergence. Moreover, the current focus on 
rational actors averted attention from meanings and interpretations behind actors’ 
interactions, and their role in the mobilization efforts. Issues such as free-riding 
behaviour and designing outsourcing contracts received more attention, leaving 
details about the interactions between actors and how they reach a common 
understanding about their relationships unexplored, providing by this incomplete 
picture of incentive mechanisms. 
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Conflicted beliefs about future security efforts are expected in security networks as 
clearly seen from the study. This incongruence hindered actors from reaching 
consensus over a prevention measure. From here, transformative incentives 
mechanism which targets actors’ beliefs is deemed central to mobilize actors towards 
certain behaviour. The case analysis illustrated this mechanism hinges on utilizing 
different rhetorical arguments and drawing on vocabularies of motive repertoire to 
attain belief transformation. In particular, actors employed three rhetorical arguments 
in their mobilization efforts. In perversity argument, actors emphasized the 
contradicting effect of a particular behaviour. For example, in mass mailing 
prevention encounter the credit card industry tried to gain legislators’ support by 
highlighting how enacting a banning law would display inconsistency between 
legislators’ role and their actual actions. Moreover, a banning law would send a 
message in the industry that legislators oppose innovations in payment solutions. 
This resonates with ‘signalling’ incentive identified in security networks literature 
(Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012) where, for instance, actors join 
information sharing alliances to signal their security commitment to stakeholders. 
This research expands on this idea by offering a deeper understanding that explains 
that signalling works as an incentive through changing actors’ beliefs and therefore 
can be seen part of transformative incentives mechanism.  
 
Actors employed futility argument to reflect on the uselessness of a certain 
prevention measure in order to drive acceptance of another. In here, actors open up 
the discussion by using elements of the social structures to advance their interests. 
Proponents of magstripe referred to the nature of the U.S. payment environment to 
build support for magstripe against smart cards. At the same, these elements can 
constrain actors’ collective security efforts as with antitrust laws that rendered a 
collective approach towards a unified authorization system futile. 
 
The third rhetorical argument evidenced in the case is jeopardy argument which 
represents actors clinging to status quo and resistance to migrate to an alternative 
future in an attempt to protect valuable accomplishments. Actors manoeuvre their 
way to gain support not by attacking the proposed solution, which on the contrary 
can be accepted, but by shifting the discussion towards its undesirable consequences. 
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Jeopardy argument was the primary tool employed to stretch the life of magstripe as 
long as possible before the industry finally redirected towards smart cards.  
 
Diversifying mobilization efforts through applying different rhetorical arguments 
and vocabularies of motive increase the chances of success. Nonetheless, appealing 
to an audience is complicated, and mobilization gets more problematic with the 
presence of counter-mobilizing moves that challenge transformative attempts. The 
strength of the counter-mobilization arguments of proponents of a banning law 
weakened the credit card industry’s claims, and their efforts to convince legislators 
of the lack of a need for a new law failed. At the same time, countermovement’s 
mobilizing arguments can benefit those they aim to oppose rather than incapacitate 
them. When arguments are built on shallow grounds, they open opportunities for the 
opposite party to find gaps and weak points that threaten the creditability of the 
claims. For the audience, this gives a perception that the latter has better knowledge 
in the matter of interest and therefore drives them to adopt their beliefs and their side 
of the debate. The research shows how the validity of some claims such as the 
anticompetitive nature of sharing of POS terminals and the mandate to save credit 
card numbers by merchants were questioned affecting and diminishing their 
persuasive effect in changing beliefs.   
 
Vocabularies of motive are situated and vary with different contexts (Mills, 1940). 
Nonetheless, they can be associated with particular social conditions where some 
vocabularies become woven with certain behaviour. Mobilizing legislators often 
used vocabularies that revolved around their mission. Therefore, in more than one 
prevention encounter actors emphasized the conflict of role found in legislators’ 
current behaviour whether that was through highlighting the anti-competitive nature 
of the prevention measure or showing how their actions are impeding innovation and 
societal benefits. Furthermore, actors were keen to associate the desired action with 
vocabularies related to national impact and national prosperity that that are of high 
interest to legislators and at the core of their mission. In other contexts, such 
vocabularies were of little value and different ones were employed. For instance, 
when PCI standards were attacked, the Council and the card associations defended 
themselves by using inclusion vocabularies, such as shared responsibility, locus of 
    Chapter 7     Chapter 5 
154 
security, collective work, threats complexity, which aimed to include other actors in 
preventing fraud. 
 
Who makes the claim contributes to the success of mobilizing efforts. The credibility 
of actors involved is essential for a particular belief to resonate (Benford & Snow, 
2000). The fact that the use of SET was encouraged by Visa and MasterCard was 
significant in creating a sense of security for transactions over the Internet among 
consumers and alleviating their concerns. This finding goes in line with Arora et al. 
(2010) who found that vendors respond faster to vulnerabilities disclosed by CERT 
than by other actors. They reasoned this to CERT’s strong reputation of being a 
credible source of information since it investigates vulnerabilities before reporting 
them to vendors. 
 
While it is commonly assumed that actors need to be incentivized to contribute to 
security networks, my study revealed that this need not be necessarily the case. 
Actors’ interests can be aligned with those of the network. However, what is holding 
them from engaging in collective security efforts is the difficulty of pursuing their 
interests. Technology vendors, for instance, did not need incentives to develop 
solutions for securing transactions over the Internet; they already had self-interest in 
capturing the new revenue stream. What they needed was a foundational cornerstone 
for their development efforts. Therefore, enrolling actors to security networks is not 
only a misalignment problem but can also be an advancement problem.  Preparatory 
incentive mechanism is another form of incentives that is crucial for converging 
actors in security networks. As actors do not come into a prepared environment, it 
becomes pivotal to manipulate the latter to make it more favourable for the former to 
advance their interests. It by this involves deliberate attempts to change the context 
to allocate power to actors and legitimize their efforts. 
 
The analysis revealed that actors sought two kinds of certainty to pursue their 
security efforts: legal and operational. Prevention encounters demonstrated how 
actors ensured to comply with both regulatory and industry requirements but 
ambiguity surrounding any of the two impeded investments in security. National 
recognition of digital signature was necessary to justify investments in the 
technology. Legal certainty would enable building a stronger case for security 
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products that are based on digital signature since it increases the scale of adoption. 
Instead of investing in a solution that can be only adopted in one state, legal certainty 
allowed it to diffuse across 50 states. The same applies to operational certainty that 
offers guidelines for security efforts. Merchants’ hesitancy in adopting tokenization 
was due to a lack of legitimate standard recognized by the credit card industry. Prior 
research that investigated underinvestment in security reasoned that to 
interdependencies among actors (Kunreuther & Heal, 2003; Zhao et al., 2013). This 
research offers two alternative grounds for underinvestment: legal and operational 
uncertainty.  
 
The literature on security networks emphasizes the role of monetary incentives in 
motivating actors’ enrolment. This research acknowledges the importance of this 
type of incentive it nevertheless shows that monetary incentives are a subset of a 
larger umbrella of incentives the research refers to by captive incentives. In captive 
incentives, actors are incited towards a particular behaviour because it is 
indispensable if they want to achieve their interests. IS security outsourcing offers 
valuable benefits ranging from cost savings to liability shift that incite actors to 
engage in outsourcing relationships (Cezar et al., 2010; Hui et al., 2012). Security 
networks’ value hence stems from their ability to mediate between actors and their 
interests. Offering monetary incentives was also evident in the case of credit card 
fraud. Favourable interchange rates, a waiver from chargeback fees, and lessening 
the scope of PCI environment all resemble financial benefits actors are entitled to if 
they enrol to the network. This research complements the literature by demonstrating 
that actors can be captivated to collective security efforts by means other than 
financial rewards and penalties. The common future vision of a cashless society was 
behind actors’ support for magstripe despite the security challenges surrounding the 
technology. ABA mobilization efforts aimed to invoke the notion of cashless society 
and the urgent need to agree on a standard technology in order to pursue this vision. 
Continuous debates about magstripe were impeding the realization of the vision and 
until the industry reaches consensus on a standard technology, efforts to build a 
cashless society would be held off. Tying a common future vision with accepting 
magstripe as the standard undermined the effectiveness of the opponents’ arguments 
and facilitated mobilizing acceptance for magstripe. My research further provides 
evidence of the effectiveness of tying desired behaviour with national interest 
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(legitimacy of digital signature case) and business opportunities (tokenization and 
smart card case) in converging actors in security networks.  
 
The literature on information sharing alliances shows that they suffer from free-
riding behaviour among their members because each want to protect its reputation 
and so renege on sharing security breach information. Besides designing better 
membership policies that incorporate economic incentives (Gordon et al., 2003), this 
study indicated that concerns over the industry’s reputation have a substantial impact 
on inciting actors and driving stronger commitment to security. The well-known 
Target security breach, for instance, cannot be seen as a problem affecting Target 
alone; its repercussions resonated to the entire credit card industry and drove 
regulatory attention to measures taken to safeguard consumers’ personal 
information. Scaling the problem from an organization level to an industry level 
made actors more active in their security efforts. 
 
Captive incentives can also be seen in relation to Gupta and Zhdanov’s study that 
examined the formation of MSSP (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012). They argue that actors 
join MSSP network to take benefits of its protective measures and large information 
base, what they call knowledge effect. However, they show that during the early 
stage of MSSP formation the network suffers from critical mass problem lessening 
the effectiveness of knowledge effect in enrolling actors to the network, making for-
profit MSSP networks more prevalent in comparison with consortium networks. My 
study demonstrates that the value of security networks can be derived from benefits 
other than knowledge effect and members are willing to take the risk and contribute 
to the network formation because the network is indispensable to reach a broader 
common interest. 
 
A key contribution of this research stems from examining the role of technology in 
security networks. Liability for security losses is a widely proposed incentive for 
driving collective security efforts (August & Tunca, 2011; Cavusoglu et al., 2007; 
Hui et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014; Ogut et al., 2005). At the same time, the literature 
acknowledges that interdependent security and complexity in observing actors’ 
efforts in security networks makes it difficult to determine the actor responsible for 
the loss, which can render this strategy inapplicable (Kunreuther & Heal, 2003; Lee 
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et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). The case revealed that technology plays a key role in 
solving this dilemma. Technological prevention measures were coupled with liability 
shift rules to motivate their adoption. By automating POS terminals, merchants 
shifted liability of fraudulent transactions to issuing banks. Similarly, security rules 
are inscribed in PCI standards allowing the technology to shift liability from one 
actor to another. By this, fraud liability is never definite and in a continuous flux that 
changes with various technologies. Technology has become the reference point 
actors revert to whenever security breaches occur to assign liabilities with no 
reasonable doubt.  
 
Taking these incentive mechanisms together shows how they are related and nested 
within one another.  During their attempts to transform beliefs and recruit supporters 
(transformative incentive) actors utilized captive incentives to strengthen their 
arguments. In legitimizing digital signature prevention encounter, for instance, they 
tied the growth of e-commerce with national recognition of the technology to drive 
legislators to perceive the importance of the issue at hand. At the same time, 
transformative incentive was employed to activate preparatory incentive 
mechanisms. Updating legislators’ beliefs about the value of federal intervention to 
provide a consistent approach towards digital signature was necessary to build a 
stable legal environment for technology vendors to develop prevention technologies. 
This shows that security threats prevention is more about chain of incentives where 
providing incentives for one actor requires mobilizing other actors first. 
 
Incentivizing others is therefore a complex process. While prior security networks 
literature recognizes the interdependent nature of security (Ogut et al., 2005; Zhao et 
al., 2013), the research findings reveal that incentives are, in return, interdependent. 
This finding extends prevalent understanding of incentives that treat them as ready-
made structures that just need to be given to others to stimulate certain behaviour 
(Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014). In this view, 
incentives are used to mobilize actors (first arrow in Figure 7-1). According to the 
chain of incentives view, the interdependence between actors make the provisioning 
of incentives to mobilize one actor requires the intervention of another actor. The 
latter actor hence needs to be mobilized first in order to offer the needed incentive  
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Figure 7-1 Chain of incentives 
 
(second arrow in Figure 7-1), which in itself requires the use of incentives and 
therefore going back to the beginning of the cyclic process. Incentives here become a 
socially dynamic process rather than a one-time event. Figure 7-1 shows the 
interplay between incentives and mobilization. 
 
Incentive mechanisms in security networks are more complicated than what is 
currently portrayed by security networks literature. Another source of complexity 
arises when considering the networks of organizational relationships. For example, it 
is assumed that once firms transfer their security risks to another actor through 
outsourcing or insuring their services, they will have less incentive to invest in 
security (Zhao et al., 2013). This may not be necessarily true as organizations can 
have their own security obligations to other actors. Through PCI standards, financial 
institutions do indeed transfer liability of security breach incidents to non-complying 
actors, in most cases retailers. Their investments in security solutions however are 
not lessened since they have obligations under Electronic Fund Transfer Act to 
protect consumer data. Considering the organization’s networks of relationships can 
reveal networks of incentives that are central to achieving security. 
 
Incentive mechanisms are situated and emerge during the prevention process 
(Archer, 1995). When actors were trying to resolve their dissonance and mobilize 
others to their goals they had to apply different incentive strategies to meet the 
nature of the situation and how it was developing. Actors can begin with one form of 
incentive and in the course of the prevention process moves to another. To illustrate, 
in automating POS terminal prevention encounter, captive incentives served as the 
MobilizeIncentives 
To offer 
To  
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principle mechanism for stimulating actors to propose encoding technologies. 
However, when later on magstripe was challenged new vocabularies of motives 
(equality and fairness, locus of security) emerged to cope with the situation. 
Incentives hence are not fixed because motives and interests change with time, they 
are rather created during the process by which actors recruit others to perform a 
particular action.   
 
While incentives are socially constructed, they are at the same time shaped and 
affected by social structures (Archer, 1995; Fairclough, 2005). Futility and jeopardy 
rhetorical devices embody the influence of structure in their arguments. Futility 
recognizes the deep institutionalization of social rules in order to dissuade certain 
actions and turn the attention to another desired one, while jeopardy achieves the 
same but by drawing on the value of past structures. Structural relations and 
historical conditions influence how actors interpret events and how they engage in 
social encounters. 
 
Accordingly, actors can exist in a constrained context with structures impeding the 
perusal of certain goals. Laws that do not properly offer appropriate prosecution 
tools to fight fraud limit law enforcements’ involvement in security networks. 
Transforming pre-existing structures become necessary to provide a proper 
environment that supports threats prevention. Structures at the same time can be 
reinforced when they become tools actors draw on when mobilizing others towards a 
particular behaviour. For instance, actors advocating against a unified authorization 
system made use of antitrust laws to support their argument. Besides their 
constraining and enabling effects in creating incentives, structures and incentives 
might be inseparable. This is in situations where structures have built-in incentives. 
Financial rewards and penalties for adopting prevention measures were inscribed in 
technologies developed. Incentives here are not derived from structures but they 
became part of the structure itself. 
 
Incentives are not constituted of language and communication alone but are also 
shaped by components of the social system such as the legal and the technological 
structures. The interplay between discourse and structure during the mobilization 
process is displayed in Figure 7-2. Structures affect discourse in multiple ways. As a  
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Figure 7-2 The interplay between discourse and structure in incentive mechanisms 
 
broader and more general effect they represent tools for constructing arguments and 
vocabularies of motives which are then used for several purposes. Structures allowed 
actors to support their arguments, invalidate counter-arguments, shift attention, and 
initiate prevention communications. 
 
Legislators’ role was employed in many prevention encounters to stimulate specific 
behaviour, especially the role pertaining to encouraging competition and free market. 
Persuasive discourses focused on how a certain action conflicted with legislators’ 
role in order to support their argument and advance particular security behaviour. 
Values of fairness and equality in the market also prevailed to support claims. At the 
other end, actors made use of structures to invalidate assertions. Competition, as a 
salient market structure, allowed financial institutions to undermine DoJ statement 
that sharing POS terminals would be anti-competitive by showing how delivery 
systems do not reside within financial institutions competition area. During 
mobilization discourse, actors further utilized existing structures to shift attention 
away from the contested issue. Internal banking procedures for fighting credit card 
fraud were brought to attention when magstripe security was challenged. Actors 
argued that security hinges not only on magstripe but the whole payment system 
including security mechanisms applied in financial institutions. A final impact of 
structure on discourse lies in its role in initiating it. Inconsistent laws and weak legal 
infrastructure drove dissatisfaction and instigated negotiations in the network to 
solve the problem.  
 
As structure influences discourse, discourse in return feedbacks and affects structure. 
Structural reinforcement takes place whenever actors draw on aspects of the social 
Provides tools to 
Discourse  
- Supports argument  
- Invalidates argument 
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system during their encounters to support their arguments. Referring to competition 
and antitrust laws during prevention encounters, for instance, reproduced existing 
market and legal structures. In certain situations, the discourse aimed to delineate 
certain aspects of existing structures. Discursive processes to legitimize sharing POS 
terminals sought to outline the border of competition for financial institutions. At 
other times, discourse impact on structures is more radical, it challenges existing 
rules in an attempt to reconstitute them and introduce new rules of conduct. The 
enactment of new laws is seen to have such reconstitution effect. 
 
Challenging, delineation and reconstitution influences are seen to manifest during 
novel situations where existing structures hamper innovation. Through them, 
discourse can overcome structural impediments either by redefining their scope or 
introducing new ones to serve their interests. 
 
The role of discourse in incentive mechanisms cannot be neglected. In addition to 
what have been discussed, discourse can be used to revise costs and benefits 
associated with prevention measures and what would constitute a rational decision. 
The debates about smart card and magstripe (in the 1980s) show how MasterCard 
sought through discourse to rework the cost-benefit analysis of the new technology, 
and the meaning behind its economic infeasibility. In its arguments, MasterCard 
reinterpreted feasibility to be one that is determined on the long-term not on the 
short-term as Visa advocated. Taking the expansion in card expiration lifecycle, 
smart cards can cut costs on the long-run and thus the technology would be 
economically feasible. Discourse therefore can evoke new meanings for what would 
be considered a rational behaviour. 
 
A final but important point to mention before moving to the next section is that 
divergence or failing collective security efforts should not always be seen as a 
problem of insufficient provisioning of proper incentives or a failure in the 
communication process to create incentives. Compelling incentives might be offered, 
however achieving the desired action might not be realized because incentive 
mechanism’s effect is countered by the exercise of another incentive mechanism. For 
example, MasterCard offered persuasive evidence of the impact of smart cards in 
thwarting fraud and one would expect that this would appeal to financial institutions. 
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However, the presence of counter-mobilization efforts by Visa that stressed on the 
immaturity of the new technology silenced MasterCard’s incentive strategy. So it is 
the interaction between mechanisms that defines what the end result would be, and 
hence the actualization of incentive mechanisms is context-dependent. 
 
 
7.5 The Process Model of Prevention Encounters and Contemporary 
Security Threats 
 
To substantiate the findings of my research, contemporary security threats such as 
those arising from innovations in connected cars, wearable technologies, and smart 
home products1 are viewed in line with the findings to examine the applicability of 
the research model in different settings as well as examining how the new cases can 
inform the research results.  
 
7.5.1 The Case of Connected Cars 
 
Technological innovations are sweeping the automotive industry in efforts to 
improve the driving experience, reduce fuel consumption and enhance safety. An 
emergent mode of transport is connected cars. Cars have become connected through 
various electronic systems such as infotainment and safety monitory tools. 
Connected cars promise a broad range of benefits from providing information about 
traffic jams and alternative routes to automatic emergency call upon accidents. 
However, with opportunities come challenges and connected cars have become the 
next target for security attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Data for this section has been mainly, but not exclusively, collected from: (FTC workshop on 
Internet of Things, 2013; Hearing on Internet of Things, 2015; Hearing on Internet of Cars, 2015; 
Hearing on Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle and Roadway Safety, 2015) 
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Interests in automotive cyber security arose when in 2013 two security researchers, 
Charlie Miller and Christopher Valasek, demonstrated how they were able to hack a 
car, disable its braking system and take control over the steering system along with 
other things (e.g. turn the engine off, honk the horn). More recently, the same 
researchers wirelessly hacked a Jeep Cherokee through its Internet-connected 
entertainment system causing Fiat Chrysler to recall 1.4 million vehicles in July 
2015. These demonstrations exposed the inapplicability of the current prevention 
measures (e.g. locks, alarm systems) in ensuring connected cars’ security and 
triggered a need for developing new prevention measures that match the revolution 
in the transport industry. 
 
Captive incentive mechanism was driving the efforts for proposing prevention 
measures to fight possible security threats. Connected cars technology opened up 
new revenue streams for car manufacturers and allowed them to reimagine their 
business and transform customers’ driving experience. However, ensuring the safety 
and security of connected cars was of paramount importance to build trust in and 
drive adoption of the new technology. Consequently, several prevention measures 
were proposed to secure connected cars that differed in their focus (technical, 
organizational, and legislative). The automobile industry proposed forming an 
information sharing and analysis center to exchange information and effectively 
counter threats on a timely basis. Some actors perceived the security of connected 
cars as a human resource problem and suggested developing automotive 
cybersecurity programs and degrees to develop the skills and talents needed in this 
new phenomenon. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) solutions for securing vehicle-to vehicle (V2V) communications involved 
three technologies: symmetric encryption systems, group signature systems, and 
asymmetric public key infrastructure systems. In their turn, legislators sent letters to 
17 major automakers (e.g. General Motors, Ford, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volvo, 
Mercedes-Benz) and NHTSA asking for clarifications on the industry’s security 
efforts. The responses to these letters revealed the different security directions being 
taken to secure the novel technology and the need to consolidate these efforts, clarify 
roles and responsibility, and build a national strategy. Accordingly, several bills 
were proposed to offer an overarching strategy.  
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In discussing these bills, the heterogeneity of role and the inherited complexity of the 
legal system enabled resolving dissonance mechanism to emerge. The division of the 
Congress into two parties; Republican and Democratic incited conflicts among 
actors (legislators) who acted as challengers and attacked the unilateral process 
through which the discussed bill was drafted. They argued had bipartisan approach 
been followed, many of the weaknesses would have been addressed leading to a 
stronger bill and faster process to achieve security. Other challengers included 
NHTSA and FTC who aired their concerns about weaknesses in the proposed bill 
such as assigning more responsibilities to NHTSA without allocating additional 
necessary funds for the agency to take on the extra work, failing to name an 
enforcing agency that would ensure car manufacturers compliance with security 
standards, and setting no minimum requirements for best practices or acknowledging 
the need for updating them in accordance with emerging threats and technologies. 
Moreover, defining roles in this emerging technology was itself a challenging task 
and a source of conflict as different roles were envisaged for various actors. This 
involved divergent views on whether NHSTA should take a leading role in 
establishing appropriate security practices and standards or that role should be 
passed to the private sector. The FTC also revealed concerns about the proposed bill 
since it undermined its role in fighting improper security practices and argued for a 
redefinition that would acknowledge the role of the FTC Act in securing connected 
cars. 
 
The bill further allowed multiple conflicting interpretations of the novel technology. 
For some (legislators, regulators) it was a threat to the environment since it was 
associated with carbon emission credits. For others (car manufacturers), connected 
cars contributed to a cleaner environment. Opponents sought to transform beliefs 
about the effectiveness of the proposed bill and gain support for their arguments by 
employing perversity and futility argument. They emphasized the bill’s current 
security approach does very little in protecting the car and can, in fact, makes it more 
vulnerable. The bill prohibited all unauthorized access to vehicle data ignoring the 
fact that security researchers can hack the car for research purposes which 
contributes significantly in making it more secure. In addition, they argued the 
proposal of allowing more pollution in exchange for implementing advanced 
technologies is unnecessary; car manufacturers have already publicly committed to 
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making such technologies (as emergency breaking) a standard feature in new cars, 
and therefore there was no need to propose this trade-off.  Negotiating these bills is 
still underway1. 
 
Paving the way mechanism can be seen in auto-specific hackathon such as 
CyberAuto Challenge that represent an attempt to materialize the proposition for the 
need of automotive cybersecurity engineers. The event which is held annually brings 
together automotive engineers, government engineers, students and white hat 
hackers, and constitutes a learning environment where actors can gain and apply 
their knowledge and experiment on real cars to identify possible security threats and 
propose solutions that help in designing more secure cars. The event further provides 
an opportunity to expose current engineers to the cyber community and develop 
interest around auto-cyber security issues (preparatory incentive). 
 
Figure 7-3 applies the process model on connected cars case. 
  
7.5.2 The Case of Wearable Technologies 
 
As with the case of connected cars, the research community played a key role in 
raising the attention to the lack of effective prevention measures for securing 
wearable technologies. In 2008, academic researchers demonstrated how they were 
able to attack a defibrillator and change its operations. In 2010 and 2011 researchers 
illustrated how attackers can intercept insulin pump signal and change the blood-
sugar level read on the device alarming the person to adjust their insulin dosage 
which can be fatal over time. Furthermore, a report by the Government 
Accountability Office showed the lack of attention towards wearables’ cyber 
security. 
 
 
 
 
1There was not sufficient data to show evidence of resolving dissonance mechanism for the other 
proposed solutions. I should note that data availability constrained evidence of the prevention and 
incentive mechanisms in this case as well as the next two cases. 
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Figure 7-3 The application of the process model in the case of connected cars
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These strong pieces of evidence of the possibility of penetrating wearable health 
devices and posing threats to human life triggered actions to develop better 
prevention measures for wearable devices. Driven by the captive incentives of the 
new technology such as improving health and empowering patients, and new 
business opportunities that would facilitate better personalized services such as 
insurance plans and premium discounts offers, actors engaged in proposing different 
solutions that can enhance the security of wearable technologies. Technical solutions 
such as encrypting the data stored in the devices and while in transit, use of 
passwords, biometric and smartcard to limit unauthorized access, were proposed. 
Other actors focused on legislative solutions emphasizing that mobile health 
applications are not governed by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) and wearables are not subject to security breach notification laws. 
Companies therefore have no legal obligation to make public disclosure of hacking 
incidents. Others proposed a more engaging role of regulators as the FTC and 
suggested the agency should organize a multi-stakeholder group with the mission of 
building a code of conduct to protect wearables’ security.  
 
The heterogeneity of actors involved in wearable technologies enabled resolving 
dissonance mechanism to emerge. Because actors vary in their interests, some of 
them challenged the proposed solutions. There was a clear tension between the need 
to ensure the usability of these devices and the need to secure them. Some actors did 
not favour technical measures that obliged the use of passwords to protect these 
devices and the data they contain. They argued that physicians did not favour them 
either because they saw them as an obstacle towards using the devices and therefore 
improving patients’ health. Furthermore, others challenged the belief that publicly 
announcing breaches on wearable devices would make consumers more aware of the 
risk involved in this technology as they believed that consumers have become “alert 
fatigue” and accustomed to continuous hacking incidents (futility argument). The 
negotiation process also involved attempts to mobilize legislators in securing 
wearables by stressing that regulatory barriers and outdated laws were impeding not 
supporting the advancement of healthcare innovations (perversity argument). 
 
Securing wearable technologies is in its early stages, actors are still finding their way 
on the best means to ensure security, and most of actors’ encounters lie in proposing 
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solutions and resolving dissonance prevention mechanisms. Nonetheless, the FTC’s 
release of security practices and recommendations to be taken by manufacturers can 
be seen as an attempt to introduce some legal certainty that can protect the new 
innovation from legal liability because it ensures companies that they are following 
reliable and trusted guidelines suggested by a regulatory agency. 
 
Figure 7-4 applies the process model on wearable technologies case. 
 
7.5.3 The Case of Smart Home 
 
Attention to the security risks associated with smart home technology was drawn 
when in January 2012 hackers exploited a vulnerability in TRENDnet IP camera and 
spied into users’ homes exposing the private lives of hundreds on the internet. 
Following this practical evidence, efforts to secure the technology took place.  
 
Actors started proposing different solutions as security was inevitable to build trust 
and confidence, and realize the business opportunities and societal benefits the novel 
technology offers. Smart home products increase efficiency, reduce costs, improve 
convenience and allow data monetization (captive incentives). Actors however 
differed in how they interpreted the technology and this was reflected in the type of 
prevention measures they proposed. Some opted for technical solutions such as 
applying better security standards (such as ZigBee and Z-wave) in wireless home 
network. While others focused on the importance of organizational approaches as 
well technical ones. They saw the problem rising from the fact that most of the 
companies that offer smart home products were not expert in security. Accordingly, 
their suggestion was a change in organizational structure and hiring policies to 
recruit security experts in order to build more secure products. Another proposition 
was consumer-focused and suggested that educating consumers and creating 
awareness of the security risks associated with the technology can help in preventing 
attacks. 
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Figure 7-4 The application of the process model in the case of wearable technologies
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Resolving dissonance mechanism emerged from the diverse views on how smart 
home technology can be secured. With multiple interpretations of the novel 
technology and the security problems it introduced (technological novelty), actors 
challenged some of the proposed solutions (heterogeneity of role). Some believed 
that the proposition to focus on consumers to attain security through education and 
awareness programs would achieve very little (futility argument). They supported 
their claim by drawing on computer security field where immense efforts had been 
undertaken to educate users, and still security problems remain. For those actors, the 
real problem lied in the products and the fact that manufacturers themselves do not 
understand the technology and its security implications. They argued that building 
strong security requires considerable computing power and storage capacity which 
significantly consume energy lowering the product’s battery life. Vendors, who aim 
for value and convenience, therefore do not take security seriously and tend to rely 
on the security of the home network to prevent threats. In their view, securing smart 
home technology should start from the vendors who ought to be more responsible 
and develop expertise in security. Vendors agreed that there is a trade-off between 
convenience and security. Nonetheless, they refused to be seen as passive and 
considering security as an afterthought. They contended security by design approach 
is followed and many devices work only within acceptable parameter ranges making 
the products more secure. 
 
Figure 7-5 applies the process model on smart home case. 
 
Taking these cases collectively demonstrates and confirms the importance of 
evidence in gaining attention to security and in triggering prevention encounters. 
Furthermore, the process model reveals that prevention encounters in security 
networks are dispersed and ramified to cover diverse security aspects: developing 
required talents, developing technical prevention measures, changing organizational 
processes, developing industry and government regulations, and enacting and 
updating laws. While having their own objective, these encounters are nested within 
one another and interrelated; talents and skills are needed to develop technical 
solutions, organizations should change their processes to attract new talents and 
respond to new regulations, regulations are developed to offer best security practices, 
and laws are enacted to facilitate innovation in prevention measures and ascertain 
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accountability. Actors engage in different encounters and thus become part of 
various security networks where they move freely between them, making security 
networks loosely coupled (see Figure 7-6). 
 
Security networks vary in their structure and objective, and they therefore act at a 
different pace. To give an illustrative example, security networks involved in 
developing skills and talents in cyber-auto security, such as CyberAuto Challenge is 
expected to take less time than legislative security networks that aim to support the 
security of connected cars through enacting laws. In the latter, the case showed that 
the security aspect of the technology was crowded out by many other issues such as 
environmental safety, the privacy of collected data, and recall notices that supported 
conflict between actors and prolonged the prevention process. Consequently, for 
collective security efforts to be more efficient it has to be focused. Taking dedicated 
steps towards achieving security yield faster results than trying to incorporate 
security along with other matters. This was seen in strengthening the legal system 
prevention encounter in preventing credit card fraud where actors advocated 
segregating computer fraud problems from credit card fraud and addressing those 
specifically related to the latter. This focus increased the pace of security networks 
and allowed the new law to be enacted in a shorter time span.  
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Figure 7-5 The application of the process model in the case of smart home 
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Figure 7-6 Nested and loosely coupled security networks 
 
7.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the research findings in relation to the current literature 
on security networks. Tracing the causal chain of events occurring while preventing 
credit card fraud revealed the dynamic and interactive nature of the work processes 
of security networks. The in-depth analysis of security networks allowed drawing 
new insights on security threats prevention process and identified elements of 
importance in these networks that inform and extend knowledge derived from 
analytical models emphasized by the previous literature. Entities such as the legal 
system and prevention technologies along with their distinctive properties play a 
crucial role in enabling the emergence of prevention mechanisms. This chapter 
further showed how economic incentives alone are not sufficient for converging 
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actors in security networks and how they form part of a larger form of incentives 
referred to herein by captive incentives. 
 
Finally, contemporary security threats related to the internet of things were discussed 
through the research lens and proved the applicability of the research model to 
cybercrime threats. In the next chapter, theoretical and practical implications are 
described as well as limitations and avenues for future research.  
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8 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The process model of prevention encounters with its underlying prevention and 
incentive mechanisms provides a detailed explanation of how security networks 
achieve prevention. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings of this research. Avenues for future research are 
explored along with the limitations. Finally, I end with the conclusion. 
 
8.2 Implications for Theory 
 
Previous literature on security networks focuses on causal effects in understanding 
how certain factors such as security investments, competition, vulnerability 
disclosure mechanism, and reward/penalty structure in outsourcing contracts affect 
security behaviour. This research contributes to the existing knowledge of collective 
security efforts by moving beyond examining effects to studying mechanisms 
underlying security networks. That is moving from studying the relationships 
between variables to those between actors. This focus on qualitatively tracing the 
causal chain of events in preventing threats is of great importance since it provides a 
detailed analysis of prevention processes and adds the significant element of context 
when explaining collective security efforts. By this, this research offers useful and 
deep insights that can enrich the previous literature with its quantitative and 
analytical models research approach. Explicating prevention mechanisms in security 
networks can strengthen quantitative research in multiple ways. They can help in 
explaining anomalies in observations quantitative models cannot justify (Helper, 
2000). In addition, they can identify important factors that are often difficult to 
capture in standard economic thinking (Starr, 2014). For example, this research 
showed the important role of values such as fairness and equality in driving 
convergence on a particular prevention measure. Moreover, the qualitative approach 
can offer guidelines for future research by shedding light on important elements to 
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account for when building quantitative models. For instance, the literature on 
information sharing alliances examines the relationship between information sharing 
and security investments and shows that organizations tend to shift their defence line 
to more information sharing when the cost of security investments increases (Gordon 
et al., 2003; Hausken, 2007). Deep analysis of security networks’ prevention efforts 
revealed that it is the effectiveness of the prevention measure that influences the 
adoption of alternative solutions rather than merely its high costs. That is actors are 
willing to incur high investments in security if these are likely to offer better security 
and move to adopt another when the prevention measure is ineffective. This is 
evident in merchants and legislators questioning the effectiveness of PCI standards 
in thwarting credit card fraud despite the substantial investments that have already 
been made to comply with the standards and their calls for adopting another more 
effective prevention measure. This suggests that the effectiveness of security 
measures is an important element to consider by quantitative researchers when 
designing their models. Furthermore, preventing threats is path dependent and 
security investment decisions, along with other security decisions, are not divorced 
from the past. The research showed how moving to smart cards, although promised a 
reduction in fraud levels, was hindered by the industry’s past investments in 
magstripe. Security decisions are not influenced by current strategies alone but also 
past experiences and their impact on how the present is interpreted and how 
decisions are made should be acknowledged.  
 
This research extends existing understanding of security networks by offering a 
process model that explains how security networks achieve prevention. By 
incorporating incentive mechanisms that are necessary to hold the network together, 
the model reveals the conditions under which diverse interests are likely to converge 
contributing to the durability of the network. The model shows that preventing 
threats is full of encounters between security network’s actors. Collective security 
effort is thus not a smooth process as currently portrayed; it is best described as one 
that entails a combination of both conflict and cooperation. Conflict because of the 
rival opinions and competing interests of the networks players, while cooperation 
because actors realize that individual pursuit to achieve security is not enough and 
they need to work collectively with others to attain security. The model makes clear 
the multilevel dynamics of threats prevention where multiple security networks exist 
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and interact with one another to achieve security. Those networks operate at different 
levels (e.g. individual, organizational, legal) but their constituent actors can travel 
across these levels distributing knowledge and facilitating collective security. The 
process model thus helps us view security networks as nested and loosely coupled 
formations. This should contribute to better adaptation with the constant emergence 
of new security threats.  
 
Prevention measures are not carved in stones, and future security paths are not 
known a priori. In searching for ways to resolve dissonance, actors engage in 
negotiations that may result in the emergence of new prevention measures. This 
emphasizes the fact that there is no one best method for preventing a certain security 
threat. However, unlike prior literature that mainly reasons this to actors’ rational 
behaviour (Cavusoglu et al., 2007) this study shows that there is no standard optimal 
method because of the continuous conflict in the network that makes it difficult for 
actors to collectively agree on the prevention measure. The research gives a fine-
grained analysis of the causes of such dissonance that surpass rationality and self-
interest while acknowledging their importance. The structure of security network, 
that is its constituent elements, is a main source of conflict that should be taken into 
consideration. The research findings highlight the role of technological novelty and 
complexity of the legal system in initiating disagreements and multiple 
interpretations about prevention measures and which one to adopt. 
 
Another important contribution of this research is introducing the concept of 
prevention encounters to examine security networks. Researchers that tend to study 
collective actions usually start by having an existent network or organization to 
investigate. In security networks, those can be information sharing alliances or 
vulnerability disclosure networks. Although valuable, with such conceptualization of 
security networks opportunities for capturing the formation of the network and why 
it was created can be missed. Examining the phenomenon with pre-determined 
dimensions of interests assumes researchers already know what is important and 
worthy of investigation and can result in not only failing to recognize key events that 
greatly influence future path of security networks but also eliminating the important 
role of emergence and surprise in explaining social phenomenon (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). Prevention encounters concept shifts the focus from the network per se 
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towards actors’ actions that would collectively form the network. It will allow us to 
unpack the black box of security networks and gain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon including conditions for their emergence and durability. Furthermore, 
changes that are likely to result in a departure from standard means of achieving 
security provide better chances for capturing collective security efforts since their 
impact would ripple through a wide range of actors who will then constitute the 
network in order to take action. Prevention encounters therefore, with its focus on 
critical change opportunities, represent an excellent manifestation of collective 
security efforts and can serve as a useful foundation for future work on security 
networks.  
 
The paucity of empirical studies is a key shortcoming identified in the previous 
security networks literature (Arora et al., 2008; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon et 
al., 2003; Kannan & Telang, 2005; Ransbotham et al., 2012). This research 
empirical study on credit card fraud answers calls for a need for empirical evidence. 
Drawing findings from examining real-life events increase the value of the research 
since the results would be seen more representative (Piore, 2006). Moreover, the 
insights drawn from this empirical research can boost quantitative research 
explanatory power since “Unless there is such correspondence between model and 
reality, the analysis will only offer an as-if story of little or no explanatory value” 
(Hedstrom, 2008, p.330-331). 
 
Collective security efforts is an incentive-related process, whereby offering the 
proper incentives is crucial for maintaining security networks. A significant 
contribution of this study lies in breaking away from a homogenous view on security 
networks and the underlying incentives to recognizing the heterogeneity of actors 
involved where motivating one using a certain incentive might not have the same 
impact on another. The research identifies three forms of incentive mechanisms that 
have a pivotal influence on motivating collective security efforts and cater for actors’ 
various needs. 
 
Transformative incentive mechanism recognizes the role of beliefs in motivating 
behaviour. By changing beliefs to be aligned with the desired actions, actors can 
recruit others to meet a particular goal. Transforming beliefs is attained through 
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employing different rhetorical strategies. The research illustrates the role of 
perversity, futility and jeopardy arguments in challenging current beliefs and 
establishing new ones. Moreover, the use of vocabularies of motive can help in 
encouraging collective security. 
 
Market forces in terms of price, demand, and competition are identified in security 
networks literature as critical incentives in driving security behaviour (Arora et al., 
2008; Cezar et al., 2010; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). These are certainly of value 
however this research revealed that their effect should not be taken for granted. The 
case showed that in order for market mechanisms (such as competition) to exert their 
power, they need to be enabled. That is preparing the environment for their 
activation. This research shed new knowledge on the effect of market mechanisms as 
incentives through identifying preparatory incentives as a pre-stage that is required 
for the motivating influence of market mechanisms to take place. The research 
identified two preparatory incentives: legal certainty and operational certainty. Gal-
Or and Ghose (2005) argue for the need to address the role of government 
intervention in providing incentives to encourage collective security efforts.  Besides 
common incentives that come in the form of subsidies and tax benefits, this study 
shows that policymakers can intervene to provide legal stability that protects security 
investments and fosters innovation in developing better security products. The other 
means identified to prepare the environment is providing operational certainty. In 
here, mobilizing actors in security networks hinges on empowering them with tools 
that delineate future security path. By this, preparatory incentive mechanism departs 
from the current understanding that actors always need incentives to contribute to 
security networks. This study shows that the interests of the actors and the network 
can be aligned. The types of incentives needed at this condition are ones that boost 
actors’ interests and remove roadblocks in the way. Therefore, elements of the 
environment should not be neglected when designing incentive structures. 
 
Finally, captive incentives incorporate the current literature emphasis on financial 
penalties and rewards but extends that to demonstrate that the power of captive 
incentives lies in its ability to act as an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986) for 
actors to reach their interests, and monetary incentives are only one mean to achieve 
this. Provoking shared future vision and common national interest and tying those 
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with the desired security behaviour proved effective in mobilizing actors in security 
networks. This finding provides a possible explanation of why actors would join 
security networks though the benefits the network offers do not justify such a 
decision. 
 
This research extends current understanding of incentives as end products by 
showing how a complex process incentivizing can be. Actors need to be 
continuously motivated to perform the desired action. Moreover, interdependence 
between actors makes incentives in return interdependent. The research introduced 
chain of incentives concept to reflect this interdependence where providing 
incentives for one actor requires mobilizing other actors first. Incentives here 
become a socially dynamic process rather than a one-time event. What comes of 
importance as well is acknowledging inter-organizational relationships that can make 
incentives stem from numerous sources in which actors become involved in 
networks of incentives. Having this notion in mind help us realize that shifting 
security liabilities to other actors does not mean that incentives to have proper 
security measures are diminished. This is because actors are motivated to retain a 
positive security attitude through their obligations to other stakeholders in their 
network.  
 
Besides contributing to the security networks literature, the three incentive 
mechanisms identified, particularly transformative incentive, offers valuable 
contributions to the literature on behavioural IS security. This literature advocates 
that users are the key element in protecting organizations against security threats, 
and therefore there is a need to identify factors that will increase their compliance 
with information security policies and procedures. In achieving this, research into 
behavioural security draws on various theories such as deterrence theory, protection 
motivated theory, theory of planned behaviour, and rational choice theory to derive 
insights into the effective development of security training and education programs. 
For example, by mapping volitional security behaviour (e.g. legitimate email 
handling, account protection) with dimensions of criticality, promotion difficulty, 
and degree of common sense, Posey et al. (2013) offer a taxonomy of protection-
motivated behaviour that provides details on types of behaviour that should be 
prioritized during security training programs. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) stress 
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the significant role of cognitive processing in motivating desired security behaviour. 
They argue that security education programs should be designed to account for 
users’ prior knowledge in order to activate their cognitive processing capabilities. 
Moral reasoning (Myyry et al., 2009) and beliefs about the costs and benefits of 
compliance and non-compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) were also seen to influence 
user’s compliance behaviour and so such consequences should be reinforced in 
security awareness programs. The use of fear appeals (threat messages) further 
influence users’ compliance given the severity of the threat, the susceptibility of 
being a victim, and personal efficacy in mitigating the threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010). 
 
In summary, the current literature on behavioural IS security emphasizes the role of 
security education and training programs in increasing compliance with 
organizations’ security policies, and offers recommendations to be taken into 
consideration when designing these programs. This research provides a contribution 
in this respect and offers an alternative theory, rhetoric, for motivating security 
behaviour and driving compliance. The role of beliefs in driving compliance is 
acknowledged in the literature (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). This research suggests the use 
of different rhetorical arguments to persuade users by questioning their current 
beliefs about compliance with security policies and then transforming them from 
negative or neutral ones to positive ones. Perversity, futility and jeopardy bring to 
light the interactive nature of security and help us understand how achieving 
compliance is a two-way communication process. While the need for persuasive 
communication and providing justifications to motivate security behaviour have 
been implied in the literature (Siponen, 2000), this is often portrayed as a one-side 
relationship, often a one-way communication from the organization’s part, 
neglecting how employees would react to compliance efforts. The use of rhetorical 
devices is not limited to educators in security training programs, they are open for 
everyone to use including employees who can employ them to counter presented 
arguments. The value of rhetoric stems from its ability to give voice to users through 
competing discourse. It therefore provides a better picture on the reciprocal 
interactions between employees and educators in security management programs. 
This open nature draws attention to the importance of employing more than one 
rhetorical device to strengthen the argument presented which should increase the 
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probability of transforming users’ beliefs. It also caters for the individual differences 
between users where one might be affected by a particular persuasive strategy rather 
than another. 
 
Besides the three rhetorical devices, this research suggests the use of vocabularies of 
motive as another rhetorical tactic that can be applied to motivate compliance. 
Careful use of language when communicating security policies and selecting 
vocabularies that are more likely to have an impact on employees’ psychology can 
enhance compliance rates. The case shows that vocabularies of motive are situational 
because motives themselves are situational. Actors in prevention encounters behaved 
in a particular way because of the peculiarities of the context they found themselves 
in. Motives therefore cannot be separated from their contextual conditions and the 
latter should be accounted for when seeking mechanisms to increase users’ 
compliance. 
 
While the extent literature has researched different means to motivate users to 
comply with information security policies, which indicates that users are not self-
motivated to comply, this research revealed that this might not necessarily be true. 
Preparatory incentives are evident to have a significant role in achieving security. In 
here, the environment must offer support for users’ volitional compliance efforts. 
Employees that acknowledge the importance of not sharing account details, for 
instance, are unlikely to conform to this security procedure in an environment that 
places task completion a top priority. Pre-existing structures influence users’ actions 
and in situations where they act as constraints they have to be modified to enable the 
realization of desired actions. 
 
8.3 Implications for Practice 
 
This research offers a number of practical implications. The prevention encounters 
process model helps practitioners understand how threat prevention in security 
networks take place. Knowledge of prevention mechanisms is valuable because it 
allows intervention to improve the process and gives insights on what needs to be 
done to make it more efficient and productive. The model shows how the prevention 
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process is full of contestations where actors’ interests change during interactions. 
Accordingly, when participating in security networks, organizations must be flexible 
and move away from having a rigid security agenda. They should be open to and 
expect alternative views on future security practices. As prevention is a political 
process, actors ought to recognize that it would be unlikely to reach agreement on a 
solution that would satisfy all actors. Compromise and tuning interests are necessary 
to keep collective prevention efforts alive and sustain the network. 
 
The model further shows that prevention processes undergo interruptions that 
prolong security efforts and increase organizations’ susceptibility to security threats. 
Organizations can avoid this by identifying the causes of interruptions and address 
them before they occur in order to allow a smooth pursuit of collective security 
efforts. This research identified two sources for interruptions: legal and operational 
uncertainty about prevention measures. An important issue for organizations is to 
ensure the legal legitimacy of their prevention measures. Prevention measures that 
are susceptible to antitrust laws (or any other law) can disrupt prevention efforts if 
such legal threat is practiced. Organizations can seek legal authorities’ support of 
their security product to protect it against future complexity. Providing legal 
certainty has an implication for policymakers as well. As my study illustrated, legal 
fragmentations towards prevention technologies can hinder investments in these 
technologies as fragmentation increases risk and compliance costs. Policymakers can 
encourage technological innovation through clear and integrated laws and enacting 
ones that protect actors’ security investments. Moreover, since both technology and 
security threats keep evolving, laws should be technologically neutral to promote 
innovation and retain their adaptability to changing contexts. 
 
The research further demonstrated that the absence of operational certainty in terms 
of foundational tools for future security efforts hindered the prevention process. The 
responsible actors (whether policymakers or organizations) should recognize the 
significance of these tools and work to empower actors with laws and security 
standards that facilitate their involvement in security networks. 
 
Practical implications for designing security training, awareness and education 
programs can also be drawn. Perversity, futility and jeopardy arguments offer a 
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strong foundation regarding the content of these programs. These programs should 
communicate appropriate messages to users by stressing, for example, how their 
reckless security behaviour while seen simple, such as sharing passwords, does not 
only constitute a threat to the organization’s image and profitability but will also 
extend to jeopardize employees’ job security and stability. At the same time, 
management should be aware of how their security efforts are perceived by 
employees. If despite great investments in security products and security 
management programs the organization is still facing considerable security breaches, 
it would be unlikely that employees would see any value of these security efforts, 
and therefore their compliance is expected to decline. 
 
In a similar vein, practitioners can benefit from the concept of vocabularies of 
motive and use ones that are likely to influence behaviour. This implies that they 
must have knowledge of the organizational culture and their audience in order to be 
able to intelligently select suitable vocabularies. This strategy can involve naming 
users’ act, for example as shameful or unethical to dissuade undesired behaviour. By 
this, certain vocabularies become woven with certain behaviours that should 
ultimately drive better security. 
 
In addition, while the focus on employees’ behaviour and modes of motivation is 
certainly crucial to attain security, management should not always assume that 
employees need to be motivated. Research shows that employees can be a valuable 
resource for maintaining security (Hedstrom et al., 2011; Spears & Barki, 2010). 
This research revealed ensuring that the organizational environment supports 
security efforts is another area that deserves management attention. Managers should 
design the organizational structure in a way that foster security and be compatible 
with the organization’s security requirements mandated in its security policy. For 
instance, reporting relationships with regards to security issues must be clearly 
stated, regular updates for security programs should take place, and security checks 
should be incorporated into functional tasks. Moreover, since preparatory incentive 
requires changes in the environment to facilitate desired security behaviour, 
organizations ought to maintain a flexible structure that would allow such changes. 
Another practical implication lies in captivating compliance with users’ interests. 
This supports the literature that recognizes the role of rewards and punishments in 
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motivating conformity with security policies. For example, managers can tie yearly 
appraisal with adherence to security policy. Practitioners however should utilize 
captive incentives more and look beyond financial gains or penalties. Focusing on 
higher goals and visions and joining them with proper security behaviour might 
result in better outcomes that extend achieving security. Informing project leaders, 
for instance, that access to needed resources is conditioned on following security 
procedures by team members, not only enables the organization to encourage better 
security behaviour but also helps it achieve its goals. Naturally, continuous 
monitoring to ensure security guidelines are being followed is necessary to maintain 
the incentive’s power (in this example). 
 
8.4 Limitations 
 
As with any other, this research has its own limitations. First, the use of a single case 
study of credit card fraud places limitations on the generalizability of the findings to 
other types of security threats. Nonetheless, generalizability according to critical 
realism is not defined by the ability to apply the findings to other empirical domains 
but it is more about the ability to go beyond description and delve more in depth to 
identify mechanisms and contingent conditions that activate these mechanisms 
(Tsoukas, 1989). The examination of eight prevention encounters in credit card fraud 
prevention helped in providing this in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and 
identifying enduring mechanisms that better explain the prevention process and the 
contingent conditions that facilitate transposing the research model to other settings. 
The aim hence is not generalizing from sample to population but from case findings 
to theory in order to offer rich insights on how security threats are prevented (Lee & 
Baskerville, 2003). As generalizability to other settings is best achieved by actually 
examining the theory under new settings (Lee & Baskerville, 2003), I have applied 
the process model on three different contexts and showed how it was able to shed 
light on cybercrime prevention processes as well. 
 
Another limitation pertains to the fact that this research is a document-based one 
where no interviews were conducted to collect the data. Although collecting data 
using different methods is important to facilitate triangulation, Denzin (1989) 
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explains that this is only one strategy for triangulation. Data triangulation is another 
strategy where triangulation is achieved through collecting data from different 
sources (using the same method); this includes collecting data at different points in 
time as well. Accordingly, although methodological triangulation was not 
accomplished, collecting data on prevention encounters at different times and the use 
of multiple types of sources (books, trade journals, government documents, 
newsletters) helped me obtain data triangulation.   
 
Moreover, given the historical nature of the research, documents represent the main 
and logical sources of data (Marwick, 2001; Mason et al., 1997a). Documents 
(public sources) are more objective as the researcher has no influence on the data 
collected. Also, many of the documents I used, especially congressional hearings, 
can be defined as noninentional social documents (Rowlinson et al., 2014) that are 
not exposed to subjective distortion as they represent direct reporting of discussions 
without any external interference (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009). Although I was not 
directly involved in collecting the data, I had an influence in interpreting it, where 
new meanings and understanding could have been assigned to the events taking 
place in maintaining the security of credit card transactions, which may go beyond 
the scope of the evidence. I tried to mitigate this interpretation bias by remaining 
close to the evidence. 
 
A crucial element in my study was gaining knowledge of the exact time of events 
and their sequence. Public sources signify excellent resources for establishing 
timeline of key events as it is common for interviewees not to remember exact dates 
(Mason et al., 1997a). Accordingly, public sources can be seen more reliable for 
gaining retrospective knowledge since interview data is more susceptible to recall 
errors such as selective reporting of events whether intentionally or unintentionally 
(Glick et al., 1990). Capturing early prevention encounters would thus be difficult 
using interview data which would result in significantly limiting the prevention 
encounters examined. The historical analysis of documents facilitated the 
identification of eight prevention encounters which helped me in building a stronger 
theory. 
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Third, security networks are complex and can include large numbers of actors. In 
order to have focus and draw boundaries, this research focused on Visa’s efforts to 
prevent credit card fraud. Through tracing prevention encounters over time, some 
actors appeared to be more salient than others. Those were the card associations, 
technology vendors, merchants, financial institutions, regulators and legislators. This 
is not to limit prevention efforts to these actors, and future researchers can identify 
and examine the role of other actors in preventing credit card fraud. 
 
Fourth, the concept of prevention encounters is used to explain how security 
networks achieve prevention. Accordingly, the research findings are constrained by 
the research focus on security efforts that disrupt a prior security practice. That is, I 
only focus on encounters or disequilibrium moments. Episodes of continuous 
security efforts by different actors in security networks are thus not covered in this 
research. 
 
Finally, in two prevention encounters (credit card mass mailing and strengthening 
the legal system) the prevention measure manifested itself in terms of law. 
Investigating the process preceding the enactment of the law was seen suffice to 
meet the research objectives and therefore events taking place after the law has 
passed have not been traced. 
 
8.5 Future Research 
 
The primary focus of this research was to explain how security networks achieve 
prevention and identify the incentive mechanisms for converging actors in these 
networks. In answering these questions areas for future research have arisen.   
 
The research findings revealed that interactive communication is a critical element in 
the functioning of security networks. Future research can benefit from this finding, 
for example, the literature on vulnerability disclosure networks can focus on the 
reporting process and communication patterns between vendors and coordinators and 
examine how that would influence the disclosure process and vendor’s decision on 
when to release a patch.  
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Properties of the social and technological structures have a significant influence on 
security networks’ prevention efforts. This research identified the complexity of the 
legal system, the novelty of the prevention measure, and the heterogeneity of roles of 
the social actors as pivotal in enabling prevention mechanisms to prevent credit card 
fraud. Identifying other properties under different contexts will deepen our 
understanding of collective security efforts. Moreover, future research can study 
whether the fact that the vulnerable technology is new has an impact on patch release 
time, and accordingly whether the coordinator (e.g., CERT) needs to change its 
vulnerability disclosure policy for new technologies.  
 
Although this research revealed divergence between actors in security networks and 
reasoned that to different interpretations of the prevention measure and different 
beliefs on how security is to be achieved, the main focus was on the convergence 
rather than the divergence process. A promising venue for future research would be 
to explore and provide in-depth analysis of the divergence process, which can 
include the identification of different sources of divergence and how divergence 
affects the prevention process and the security networks’ outcome. This means 
studying cases where collective security efforts fail and security networks dissolve. 
This is because convergence herein occurs when the network’s actors collectively 
reach consensus on the mean to achieve security. Although my study revealed one 
prevention encounter where collective security efforts did not succeed (automating 
card transactions), this is not enough to offer a robust analysis of the divergence 
process especially since the later may require a different methodology than the one 
adopted in this research. 
 
The complexity of security networks and security threats requires varying the 
incentives used to account for the particularities of the actors involved and the 
context of the phenomenon.  Future research would benefit from the three forms of 
incentives identified to develop a configurational perspective on incentives for 
converging actors in security networks. This approach acknowledges equifinality in 
security networks where not all of the three forms of incentives need to be employed 
to achieve successful convergence. Future research can investigate this issue and 
develop combinations of incentives along with their contextual conditions that result 
in converging actors. 
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8.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In our increasingly connected world, achieving security has become distributed 
across heterogeneity of actors that reside outside organizational boundaries. It is 
important therefore to envisage IS security as one that is not only about 
organizational processes, extra-organizational settings deserve scholarly attention to 
advance the field of IS security. Taking extra-organizational settings as the point of 
departure, this research aimed to increase our understanding of security networks by 
extending the current literature that places more emphasis on cause-effect 
relationships to examine the causal mechanisms behind the prevention efforts of 
security networks. Towards this aim, prevention encounters concept was introduced 
to capture the complexity of security networks and the constant upheavals they 
experience that makes reaching equilibrium a continuous process. 
 
Incentives are crucial for the functioning of security networks. However, it is of 
paramount importance to acknowledge the heterogeneity of actors involved and thus 
the need to use a variety of incentives to cater for actors’ various interests. This 
research identified three forms of incentives that aligned actors’ interests and 
allowed the network to achieve its purpose.  
 
The findings of this research provide valuable contributions to the literature on 
security networks as well as the literature on behavioural IS security. The qualitative 
and historical research design along with adopting a different philosophical stance 
than the common interpretivism and positivism offer rich and new insights that have 
the promise to move the field of IS security forward. 
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